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1.1 General Introduction and Scope of the Thesis
The reduction of greenhouse gas pollution in electricity markets has been a
political issue for several decades. Governments, businesses, and researchers
are seeking for clean renewable alternatives for the traditional coal and gas
plants. Consequently, in the last ten years there has been an uprising invest-
ment in renewable resources like wind and solar power. These investments
contribute to meeting long term international commitments such as the Kyoto
Protocol on the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. We are not there
yet, however. Since profit maximizing firms are inclined to invest in relatively
cheap conventional technologies, regulators may have to put financial incen-
tives as to make investments in clean but more expensive alternatives attrac-
tive. This dissertation considers several of these incentives. We aim to present
a message for regulators and policy makers indicating the potential benefits
and side-effects of policies. In addition, we provide a benchmark for how to
achieve a desired market outcome in terms of resource allocation, pollution
reduction, and other measures, by setting the right parameters in the avail-
able environmental policies. We state theoretical results based on analysis of a
mathematical framework of the electricity market and numerical results that
we obtain through the use and expansion of numerical tools.
In the remainder of this section we briefly explain how electricity markets
work and give an overview of the different environmental policies. In Section
1
2 1.1. General Introduction and Scope of the Thesis
1.2 we elaborate on the methods and solution techniques used throughout
the thesis. Section 1.3, which contains an overview of the main findings and
contributions in each chapter, concludes the introduction.
1.1.1 Electricity Markets
In a typical (decentralized) electricity market, a couple of profit maximizing
firms compete at several nodes in a network. These firms have two key de-
cisions to make. First, firms have to decide for each node, in which of the
available resources for power generation to invest and in how much capac-
ity (in megawatt (MW)) of these resources to invest. There are many avail-
able resources, basically split into two categories. There are non-renewable
resources or technologies such as coal, and certain types of gas. These tech-
nologies are also referred to as polluting, since with the production of power
a certain amount of CO2 is emitted. The second category consists of renew-
able resources or technologies such as wind power (onshore and offshore),
solar power, biomass, and landfill gas. Such technologies are referred to as
clean due to the low or negligible pollution that comes with their electric-
ity production (besides other potential environmental damage caused dur-
ing the life cycle of a power generator, see Weisser (2007)). Firms investing
in these non-renewable and renewable technologies typically maximize their
long term profits consisting of the total or expected profits from producing
and selling power minus their investment cost. Investment is a long term de-
cision.
A second decision firms make in each node is with which technologies to
produce electricity and how much electricity to produce with each available
technology. These decisions are made every short period, which could be a
day, hour, or minute, and are short term decisions. A firm’s objective in the
short term is to maximize its profits from producing electricity. Production
decisions may depend on demand for electricity, installed capacities, available
capacities, the price of electricity, and several other factors.
The produced electricity is transmitted through the electricity network to
consumers located at demand nodes. Such transmission is what distinguishes
electricity markets and electricity networks from markets with other goods or
services and transportation networks. Firstly, since power is a non-storable
good, electricity generation at any time will have to go to a demand node
and whenever there is demand, sufficient production capacity will have to
be available. Secondly, power transmission from one node to another node
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may affect transmission capacities in the entire network in accordance with
Kirchhoff’s voltage law (see Chao et al. (2000)). Hence, when transmitting
power between two nodes, the entire network and its capacities will have to
be taken into account. This is done by a transmission system operator (TSO).
A TSO decides on the power transmission or so-called flows between all the
nodes in order to maximize their own short term profits from buying power
at supply nodes and selling it to consumers at demand nodes.
Electricity demand is characterized by its low elasticity in the short term,
since on a daily, hourly, or minutely basis consumers barely respond to chang-
ing electricity prices. Short term demand is however dependent on several
other factors such as daylight and weather conditions. Therefore, electricity
demand is typically fluctuating and subject to uncertainty.
Electricity prices in each node are commonly determined by the market,
that is, prices will be such that the market is cleared. Depending on the num-
ber of firms and how the market is regulated, firms and the TSO either take
these prices as given, or one or several decision makers are aware that by be-
having strategically they can influence electricity prices. The former is the case
when firms behave in a perfectly competitive environment, whereas the latter
is the case in a monopolistic or oligopolistic setting. While there are often only
a handful of electricity producing firms per region or country, which could
potentially lead to firms exerting market power, perfect competition in elec-
tricity markets is generally strived for by regulators. They aim to mitigate any
market power that firms may exert (Gilbert et al. (2004) and Helman (2006)).
In addition to firms, a transmission operator, and consumers, an environ-
mental regulator is often involved in the market. An environmental regulator
aims to reduce the burden of electricity production and consumption on the
environment. Several policies are available to achieve this, as we discuss in
the next section.
1.1.2 Environmental Policies
Firms are profit maximizing entities and are therefore inclined to invest in the
cheapest available resources. Typically, the cheapest resources are also the
most polluting ones (Sims et al. (2003) and Lise et al. (2006)). Governments
or environmental regulators can interfere in the electricity market in order to
provide financial incentives to make investments in cleaner resources more
attractive. These incentives can be given for a number of political and eco-
nomical reasons. Two main political arguments in favor of clean resources are
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the following. Firstly, there can be a target on emission reduction agreed upon
by a group of countries or regulators, such as the climate policy of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) that concerns a binding greenhouse gas emission reduction
target of 20% by 2020 (EU (2009a)). Secondly, there can be a target agreed upon
by a group of countries or regulators on the amount or percentage of energy
consumption that must come from renewable resources, such as in the EU
Renewables Directive (EU (2009b)). While this thesis specifically focuses on
these political targets, underlying these targets there are a number of econom-
ical reasons for giving financial incentives to cleaner (renewable) technologies.
More investment in renewable technologies can result in enhanced energy se-
curity, technological advance, trade advantages, and skilled employment (Fis-
cher and Preonas (2010) and EU (2009b)), as well as correct for potential posi-
tive externalities from learning spill-overs and learning by doing (Fischer and
Newell (2008), Reichenbach and Requate (2012), and Kalkuhl et al. (2012)).
A distinction is made between policies that charge firms for their CO2 emis-
sions (and possibly other forms of pollution or damage to the environment)
and policies that reward firms for investment in or production with renewable
technologies in order to compensate for high investment costs in these cleaner
alternatives. Another distinction can be made between quantity based and
price based policies. A quantity based policy imposes a certain target or quota
on the market. Firms can be rewarded for contributing to the target, punished
for violating the target, or be obliged to buy a certain amount of permits in
order to show compliance to the target. The value or price of a reward, fine,
or permit is generally determined by the market. A price based policy, on the
other hand, fixes a certain price that is rewarded to firms or charged to firms
depending on the policy.
Since in Chapter 2 we deal with two policies that charge firms for their pol-
lution, namely a cap-and-trade policy and a fixed taxation policy, we first dis-
cuss these briefly. Under a cap-and-trade policy, which is a quantity based
policy, a regulator imposes a maximum CO2 emission allowance level (re-
ferred to as the cap) on the market. For each unit of CO2 emitted, a firm needs
to buy a permit at a price that is determined in a secondary trading market.
This price generally depends on the maximum allowed level and the demand
for permits. When insufficient permits are obtained at the end of a certain
period, typically a year, firms face a fine. The most notable cap-and-trade pol-
icy applied in practice is the European Union emissions trading system (EU
ETS), which involves 31 European countries. Several states in the US also
have cap-and-trade policies, for example the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
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tiative (RGGI), which is in effect in nine northeastern states, and the Western
Climate Initiative (WCI), which is in effect in seven western states as well as
four Canadian provinces.
In the fixed taxation policy, which is a price based policy, an environmental
regulator is either charging firms with a fixed tax per unit of CO2 emitted or
charging consumers with a fixed tax per unit of CO2 consumed. The so-called
carbon tax is fixed for a certain period, typically a year or several years. Car-
bon taxation is effective in, amongst others, a few US states, several European
countries such as Denmark, Norway, Slovenia, and Switzerland, and a few
Asian countries such as India and Japan. A regulator can impose both an emis-
sion cap and a taxation, but firms are in some cases exempted from taxation
if they participate in the emissions trading (for example in Switzerland). A
policy combining fixed taxation and cap-and-trade, the so-called safety valve,
has been suggested in the literature (Pizer (2001), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004),
and Burtraw et al. (2010)). In a safety valve policy, as long as sufficient al-
lowances are available the market acts like a cap-and-trade system; however,
when the cap is reached, additional allowances can be bought at a fixed price.
Such a policy can resolve the issues of a very high allowance price in case of
a tight cap. Safety valves are out of the scope of this paper, but extending our
mathematical framework with this policy is suggested for future research in
relation to Chapter 2 of this thesis.
Several advantages and disadvantages of both policies are discussed in the
literature. In favor of taxation, Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann (2009) state that it is
easier to implement and hence can give an immediate price signal. Further-
more, taxation is argued to be more efficient than cap-and-trade in Aldy et al.
(2008). Parry and Pizer (2007) mentions other possible advantages of carbon
tax, such as carbon price certainty, more flexibility in changing the cost of car-
bon over time, and direct income for the regulator. In favor of cap-and-trade
however, Fischer and Springborn (2011) find that the market is less sensitive
to productivity shocks under cap-and-trade. Additionally, in general there
seems to be more political resistance to taxation than to cap-and-trade, and
cap-and-trade allows regulators to put a tighter cap every year such that emis-
sions are progressively curbed (Parry and Pizer (2007)). We stay away from a
direct comparison of the two policies and instead present a thorough theoreti-
cal and numerical analysis of both policies, which will be further discussed in
Section 1.3.
As opposed to making polluting technologies more expensive, a regulator
may also make clean renewable technologies more financially attractive by
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handing out (indirect) subsidies. We explain two of these policies, namely a
renewable energy obligation, which is dealt with in Chapter 3 and feed-in tar-
iffs, which is the policy addressed in Chapter 4. Under an obligation policy,
a regulator imposes a renewable energy obligation on the electricity market.
The obligation is a quantity based policy instrument prescribing a minimum
quantity of power that should be produced with renewable energy resources.
It is often expressed in terms of a fraction of the total production. In order
to show compliance to the obligation, firms need to present a sufficient num-
ber of so-called green energy certificates at the end of each period, typically
several months or a year. In principle each unit production with a renewable
resource is rewarded with one certificate, but in the UK electricity market dif-
ferent technologies are eligible for a different number of certificates, so-called
technology banding. In the latter policy, the obligation shifts from one on re-
newable production to one on certificates. Technology banding is done mainly
to support less established renewable technologies. Green certificates can be
traded on a secondary market and will thus have a value depending on the
demand for certificates. The value of a certificate represents a reward for pro-
duction with a renewable resource and adds to the short term profits of firms.
When not committing to the target, firms are charged a fine. Renewable obli-
gations are effective in a few European countries such as Belgium, Italy, and
the UK, and in 29 US states where the so called Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS) is in effect.
Under a feed-in tariff (FIT) policy, a regulator rewards a unit production
with renewable resources with a price that is different from (and often higher
than) the price of electricity. This direct form of subsidy can be different for
different technologies and is paid either out of national taxes or by electricity
consumers. The most common feed-in tariff policies are the fixed FIT policy
and the premium price policy. A fixed FIT is a fixed payment per unit produc-
tion with a renewable resource, paid to firms instead of the electricity price.
The tariff is typically fixed for several years. In the premium price policy, per
unit production with a renewable resource a fixed price is paid on top of the
electricity price. While the tariffs are fixed for a certain period, typically sev-
eral years, the day to day payment in such a scheme can be fluctuating. Fixed
FIT policies are applied in most European countries and some US states. The
premium price policy is used in for example Czech Republic, Slovenia, and
Estonia. In the Netherlands, the so-called Dutch Spot Market Gap policy is
applied. This policy is a combination between a fixed FIT, paid when the elec-
tricity price is below a certain level, and a variable premium price, paid when
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the difference between the fixed tariff and electricity price exceeds a certain
boundary. In Spain a cap-and-floor system, which also combines features of
both the fixed FIT and the premium price policy, is in effect.
A number of studies compare green certificate systems and feed-in tariffs.
Green certificate system are considered more cost-effective in theory (Menan-
teau et al. (2003), Palmer and Burtraw (2005), Böhringer et al. (2007), and
Fell and Linn (2013)). However, there are practical examples that show that
obligation policies can be more costly to society than feed-in systems (Butler
and Neuhoff (2008)) and less successful in terms of encouraging investments
in renewable technologies (Mitchell et al. (2006)). Furthermore, obligation
policies may single out the cheapest renewable technologies (Meyer (2003),
Wood and Dow (2011), Verbruggen and Lauber (2012), and del Rio and Gual
(2007)). Johnstone et al. (2010) empirically establish that while obligation poli-
cies manage to induce technological innovation, feed-in tariffs may be neces-
sary for inducing innovation in more expensive technologies. Chapter 3 of
this thesis suggests that the UK banding policy and an alternative banding
policy that we introduce can also accomplish this. It is worth noting that bud-
get constraints may force governments to switch to less costly, but possibly
less efficient, policy instruments (del Rio and Gual (2004)).
Finally, in the economics and policy literature several claims are made about
policy interactions. When a regulator’s policy goal is to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions as opposed to meeting a renewable quota, subsidizing renewables
is not cost-effective, neither instead of charging firms for emissions (Palmer
and Burtraw (2005)), nor in combination with cap-and-trade (Böhringer and
Rosendahl (2010)). In the latter case, supporting renewable technologies may
even induce investments in polluting non-renewable technologies. It is also
argued that imposing cap-and-trade and renewable quota can lead to substan-
tial excess cost (Böhringer et al. (2009)) and that feed-in tariffs in combination
with cap-and-trade can lead to higher CO2 emissions in a duopoly market
(Chaton and Guillerminet (2013)). In this thesis, we focus on each policy sep-
arately and do not consider policy interactions.
1.2 Methodology
Throughout the thesis, we work with a mathematical framework to repre-
sent the electricity market. Using this mathematical framework, we analyze
and if possible characterize the (equilibrium) outcome of the market for differ-
ent policies and different parameter choices within these policies. Due to the
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complicated nature of the electricity market and the size of the mathematical
problem, it is not always possible to analytically describe the possible market
outcomes. In such cases, we have numerical tools at hand with which we can
still track or approximate the market outcome. In this section, we briefly elab-
orate on our modeling choices and assumptions, and we explain the methods
used throughout the thesis.
Since we deal with both long term and short term decision making, these
two types of decisions are dealt with separately, in two stages. Long term
investment decisions are done at a first stage, while short term production and
power dispatching to consumers are done at a second stage. When multiple
firms are competing at both stages, we are dealing with a two-stage game.
This game can be modeled in a mathematical way.
Several two-stage models for electricity investments are available in the lit-
erature, which can basically be separated into two streams, one dealing with
imperfect competition models (Murphy and Smeers (2005), Ralph and Smeers
(2006), Yao et al. (2008), Ruiz et al. (2012), and Hu and Ralph (2007)) and the
other dealing with perfect competition models (Neuhoff et al. (2005), Ehren-
mann and Smeers (2008), Zhao et al. (2010), and Gürkan et al. (2013)). When
a small number of firms compete, an imperfect oligopolistic framework is be-
lieved to be a better representation of reality. On the other hand, when market
power is successfully mitigated by regulators, a perfect competition frame-
work is better suited. In addition, from a modeling and analyzing perspective,
perfect competition first and foremost presents a benchmark for imperfect
competition models and leads to more analytically tractable results; that is,
assuming imperfect competition in a two-stage framework could result in an
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), which is known to
often be analytically intractable due to its non-convexity (Gabriel et al. (2012)).
We thus choose to focus on a perfectly competitive electricity market and will
in each chapter of this thesis use and expand the two-stage model as presented
by Gürkan et al. (2013). Their analysis specifically focusses on capacity invest-
ments and resource adequacy in both a deterministic and a stochastic setting,
which poses a good starting point for incorporating and subsequently analyz-
ing different types of environmental regulation.
In the model for the two-stage game, a number of firms simultaneously
invests in production capacity in the available technologies at the first stage.
Their objective is to maximize long term profits, consisting of (expected) prof-
its from electricity production minus their investment cost. Electricity produc-
tion takes place at the second stage, where firms produce a certain amount of
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power as to maximize their short term profits. In addition, the transmission
system operator dispatches power between supply and demand nodes as to
maximize its short term profits from buying power at supply nodes and sell-
ing it at demand nodes. The second stage is cleared by means of two market
clearing conditions, one condition balancing electricity supply and demand
while setting the electricity price, and one condition putting a price cap on the
electricity price in case there is demand curtailment. Firms and the TSO are
assumed to be price takers at both stages, since we are in a perfect competition
setting. In the models in Chapters 2 and 3, all the second stage problems can
be solved as a single optimization problem, a so-called optimal power flow
(OPF) problem. This was originally explored by Boucher and Smeers (2001).
In summary, we deal with a two-stage problem with firms investing at the
first stage and, if existent, an OPF problem at the second stage. All con-
straints, objective functions, and cost functions at both stages are linear, ex-
cept in Chapter 4, where we also consider (non-linear) convex cost functions.
The first and second stage problems are linked to each other in the following
way. In each firm’s objective function at the first stage, the optimal second
stage production quantities for given investment quantities are taken into ac-
count. At the second stage, optimal production quantities are limited by first
stage investment quantities via a capacity constraint. The dual variable to this
capacity constraint, referred to as the scarcity rent, represents the additional
second stage profit that comes with an additional available unit of capacity.
Using this information, firms decide whether or not to invest. More specifi-
cally, a firm invests in a technology in a certain node if the (expected) scarcity
of that technology in that node covers the corresponding unit investment cost.
Second stage sensitivities are thus key in determining the optimal first stage
decisions. When none of the firms nor the TSO have an incentive to deviate
from a certain solution at neither stage, the market is at equilibrium.
In the deterministic version of the model, first and second stage decisions
are basically made at the same time. While a stochastic representation may be
more realistic, in the deterministic setting results remain analytically tractable
in stylized versions of the model. Since investment and production decisions
are made simultaneously, for all firms in all nodes and for each technology,
production quantities are generally equal to available investment quantities.
In addition, the optimal scarcity rent in each node for each technology equals
the corresponding investment cost. These two observations, that are also
made in Gürkan et al. (2013), allow us to write the two-stage game as a sin-
gle linear optimization problem when all cost functions are linear. As such,
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we can apply standard linear optimization techniques to analyze the prob-
lem and characterize the equilibrium to the two stage game. Analysis of the
deterministic problem is mainly done in Chapter 2 and briefly in Chapter 3.
Many short term (second stage) parameters are typically fluctuating and
unknown at the time firms invest in production capacity. This uncertainty is
taken into account in the stochastic version of the model. In particular, con-
sumer demand and available capacity of renewable resources like wind and
solar power are considered unknown to firms at the first stage and are re-
vealed at the second stage. At the first stage, firms only know the distributions
and expectations of the random variables involved, but not the realizations.
Contrary to the deterministic model, we can no longer write the two-stage
game as a single optimization problem. When the second stage problems can
be written as a single optimization problem (the OPF), like in Chapters 2 and
3, then the two-stage game is in general equivalent to a standard two-stage
stochastic program. However, instead of dealing with two-stage stochastic
programs, we derive the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions of both stages
of the problem and write the problem as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP). We do this for two main reasons. First of all, an MCP is a more suit-
able framework for adding regulator’s conditions related to environmental
policies on production and prices. In some cases the problem can no longer
be written as a two-stage stochastic program, while the problem can still be
written as an MCP. In particular, in the alternative banding policy introduced
in Section 3.4.2, there is an additional condition that involves both primal and
dual variables, and in the fixed feed-in system in Chapter 4 there is, to the
best of our knowledge, no single optimization problem that solves the second
stage. Secondly, as we explain in more detail below, we have optimization
tools at our disposal that are capable of handling large sized MCPs. For these
reasons, and in order to be consistent in our numerical studies, we formulate
all models as MCPs.
Several previous studies analyze electricity and energy markets using com-
plementarity problems, such as Hobbs (2001), Metzler et al. (2003), Bushnell
(2003), Gabriel et al. (2005), Kazempour et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2011), Ehren-
mann and Smeers (2011), and Shanbhag et al. (2011). In other areas of oper-
ations research like supply-chain management (Adida and DeMiguel (2011))
and transportation (Agdeppa et al. (2007)) complementarity problems are also
used. For electricity markets there also exists literature on an even broader
class of mathematical problems, for example the quasi-variational inequality
(QVI) formulation in Hobbs and Pang (2007). The QVI results from piece-
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wise linear demand functions and joint constraints, and is considered more
challenging to analyze, both theoretically and numerically, compared to MCP
formulations.
Throughout the thesis, the mixed complementarity problems are dealt with
in two ways. First, in some situations, model outcomes can be expressed in
terms of expectations and hence an equilibrium solution can be approximated
analytically. Such approximations are used for determining parameters in a
regulator’s policy in a way that certain policy goals are met. In particular, we
use this type of analysis in Chapter 4 to determine the feed-in tariffs in a way
that at least a certain fraction of electricity production is done with renewable
resources, as well as to obtain feed-in tariffs that, in expectation, lead to a
desired mixture of renewable technologies.
Second, the MCP can be analyzed numerically, using a sampling technique.
Given probability distributions for the random parameters in the model, we
generate random samples using a pseudorandom number generator. Through-
out the thesis we work with uniform distributions for all random variables
and thus sample from uniform distributions. We obtain realization vectors,
simply referred to as realizations. For each realization there is a second stage
problem that needs to be solved. At the first stage, expectations are replaced
by sample averages. Then we obtain a large sized MCP that we program in
GAMS and solve using the PATH solver, see Ferris and Munson (2000). This
solver, which can be seen as a generalization of Newton’s method for solving
MCPs, finds an equilibrium solution to the set of KKT optimality conditions of
the sampled first and second stage problems. Since solving these large MCPs
can be very time consuming for large instances of the problem, we apply sam-
pling to relatively small networks. We use samples of size 3000, which we
established to be sufficiently large by subsequently solving the model for 3,
100, 1000, 3000, 5000, 8000, and 10000 samples. In all models, there is a sig-
nificant difference between the solutions for 100 and 1000 samples. However,
increasing the sample size to 3000 does not reveal significant changes, nor
does increasing the sample size any further. We solve the MCP for a range
of parameter values. Per instance we solve, computation times are around 15
minutes (fixed taxation) and around three hours (cap-and-trade) in Chapter 2,
around two hours in 3, and around 20 minutes in 4, on a 300MHz Pentium-II
with 1 GB RAM.
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1.3 Contributions and Outline of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis consists of three chapters. In each chapter we focus on a
different environmental policy. These policies are analyzed in a mathematical
model of the electricity market. While the model used in each chapter is simi-
lar, it is introduced in its entirety in each chapter and consecutively extended
to include the necessary modifications for the policy we consider.
In Chapter 2, which is based on Gürkan, Langestraat, and Özdemir (2013),
we analyze and compare the effects of cap-and-trade and fixed taxation on
investments, production, pollution, and consumer prices. There currently ex-
ists a broad literature on the effects of taxation and in particular on the impact
of cap-and-trade policies, more specifically of the EU ETS. Chen et al. (2008)
and Lise et al. (2010) use the COMPETES (Comprehensive Market Power in
Electricity Transmission and Energy Simulator) model to investigate short-
term effects of the EU ETS, in particular with respect to cost pass through
to consumers and what factors affect this cost past through. Our modeling
framework is more stylized and we theoretically confirm their result that un-
der perfect competition there is a cost pass through of cap-and-trade of 100%.
There are also studies specifically focussing on the impacts of the EU ETS on
the Spanish electricity market (Linares et al. (2010)) and the Italian electricity
market (Bonenti et al. (2013)). We instead study a more general framework
that is representative for any electricity market. Lise and Kruseman (2008)
present a recursive dynamic model of the electricity market used for simu-
lations and focus on long-run implications of cap-and-trade. They conclude
that perfect competition can beneficial for the environment, since under per-
fect consumption lower emissions are observed. The models contained in the
literature discussed so far are more extensive than our model and are mostly
used for simulation studies. The model in Ehrenmann and Smeers (2008) is
more similar to our model, but their focus is specifically on the effects of dif-
ferent price caps under the assumption of random fuel prices, as opposed to
random demand that is assumed in our work.
The first part of our analysis in Chapter 2 will be strictly theoretical and
based on a very stylized mathematical representation of the electricity mar-
ket, with no network effects and deterministic demand. Due to the growing
amount of research in this field over the last decade, some of our findings
(partly) overlap with known results in the literature. Nonetheless, we provide
theoretical confirmations of previous numerical findings and establish a few
new results relevant to policy makers. Our key results are the following:
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• In case of cap-and-trade, either one or a mixture of two technologies is
used at a market equilibrium. Such a mixture consists of a relatively
clean and a relatively dirty technology. In the absence of a ceiling on
total emissions, marginal operating costs of different technologies form
a fixed merit order; that is, the marginal costs are ordered in an ascend-
ing fashion. Based on the observed demand, this merit order is used
to determine the total number of technologies used so that all demand is
satisfied. We show that, as long as there is enough capacity in the system,
when a fixed maximum allowance level is introduced, different demand
levels impose different prices for a unit of emission allowance, and con-
sequently there is no fixed merit order on the technologies. Therefore,
for different levels of observed demand one can find a different optimal
mixture. This confirms numerical results on merit order changes in for
example Zhao et al. (2010).
• For the cap-and-trade model we develop an algorithm for finding the
induced optimal technology mixture in a systematic way. Using this, we
show that the price of electricity and the price of allowances increase as
the maximum allowance level decreases.
• In contrast to cap-and-trade, when a fixed tax is charged for the emis-
sions, the merit order is fixed for all demand levels. The first technology
in the merit order, if unique, is the only generating unit. Therefore, a
cap-and-trade system often results in a wider portfolio of technologies
than fixed taxation.
• For a special case of taxation, that is, when the fixed tax is equal to the op-
timal price of emission allowances for some given maximum allowance
level, we find a range of equilibria. Some of these equilibria satisfy the
emission allowance level, while others do not.
• Given the cost characteristics and the amount of CO2 emission per unit
production for each technology, one can analytically identify which tech-
nologies will never be in the optimal technology mixture under either
policy. Such technologies are unattractive for investors, and are deter-
mined by our analysis.
In the second part of Chapter 2 we consider the stochastic version of the model
and carry out a numerical study. A small network with three producing firms
and three technologies is considered. We investigate the effects of stochastic
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demand and effectivity of cap-and-trade and taxation when there is limited
transmission capacity in the network. Our key findings are the following:
• Uncertainty leads to broader optimal mixtures of technologies. At de-
mand peaks, peak load technologies that are characterized by low in-
vestment cost and high production costs enter the optimal production
mixture.
• If there is a shortage of transmission capacity in the system, only intro-
ducing financial incentives and instruments (taxation or a cap-and-trade
system) neither is sufficient to curb CO2 levels nor necessarily induces
investment in cleaner technologies. As such, investments in transmis-
sion capacity may be necessary in order to achieve the desired pollution
reduction.
• Similar to the deterministic case, we consider the effects of setting the
fixed taxation level equal to an optimal price of emission allowances
found for some maximum allowance level. Then either we find the same
solution, or there are multiple optimal solutions. In the latter case, there
is a trade-off between minimizing pollution and maximizing the regu-
lator’s profits or surplus. Again, some of the solutions violate the emis-
sion allowance level, meaning that a taxation chosen in this way cannot
achieve the same as a cap-and-trade system without explicitly enforcing
a cap on firms.
In Chapter 3, which is based on Gürkan and Langestraat (2013), we deal
with renewable energy obligations and green certificates. We model the re-
newable obligation into the two-stage mathematical framework and introduce
the UK technology banding. To the best of our knowledge, there are no mod-
els dealing with technology banding available in the literature. One theoreti-
cal concern of the UK banding policy is that it may result in an outcome where
the original obligation target on renewable production is not satisfied, hence
potentially resulting in more pollution. We therefore present an alternative
banding policy, in which the obligation target is still on electricity production.
We provide revenue adequate pricing schemes for the three obligation policies
above in order to guarantee that the regulator can cover the payments to firms
owning certificates with the mark-ups paid by consumers. We carry out a nu-
merical study using the stochastic version of the model with uncertainty in
both consumer demand and available capacities of renewable resources. We
investigate the potential effects and side-effects of a renewable obligation, the
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UK banding policy, and the alternative banding policy, and find the following
key results:
• An obligation can reduce pollution in two ways. Firstly by the replace-
ment of polluting non-renewable technologies by cleaner renewable
technologies. Secondly, due to the random availability of renewable re-
sources, the obligation may lead to replacement of polluting non-renew-
able technologies by (slightly) cleaner non-renewable technologies.
• Although technology bandings are introduced to give financial incen-
tives to less established technologies, when the obligation target is too
low, bandings are not necessarily effective in giving these incentives.
• As expected, the UK banding policy cannot guarantee that the original
obligation target is met. In particular, when there is a lot of investment in
a technology with a high banding coefficient (namely offshore wind), the
new target on certificates is met while the original target on production
is not.
• The alternative banding policy provides a way to make sure that the
original target is met while supporting less established technologies, but
it comes with a significantly higher consumer price.
• As a concerning side-effect of technology banding, we find that a cost
reduction in a technology with a high banding leads to more CO2 emis-
sions under the UK banding policy and to significantly higher consumer
prices under the alternative banding policy. When investment costs in
technologies reduce over time, banding coefficients should be adjusted
accordingly.
In Chapter 4, which is based on Langestraat (2013), we take a closer look at
feed-in tariff systems. In particular, we deal with a fixed FIT policy and inves-
tigate whether or not quantity based policy goals can be achieved by means of
this price based policy instrument. We consider the electricity market invest-
ment model with uncertainty in both demand and availability of renewable
resources and provide a number of analytical results for different assumptions
on the investment cost functions of renewable technologies. More specifically,
we distinguish between renewable technologies having linear investment cost
and renewable technologies having non-linear convex investment cost and es-
tablish significantly different results for the two cases. We assume the regu-
lator to have the freedom to choose feed-in parameters, specifying for each
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technology the relative feed-in tariff they receive. This way, a regulator differ-
entiates between technologies as to achieve broader technology mixtures or to
give more financial support to less established technologies. While non-linear
convex cost are sometimes assumed in the literature on electricity markets (Re-
ichenbach and Requate (2012) and Traber and Kemfert (2011)), to the best of
our knowledge there is no in-depth theoretical analysis of the consequences
of feed-in policies under the different cost assumptions, in particular in the
presence of uncertainty. Our main analytical findings are the following:
• A renewable energy obligation is satisfied at the market equilibrium, re-
gardless of assumptions on investment costs. A lower bound for the
optimal price of certificates is provided.
• Under the assumption of linear investment cost in renewable technolo-
gies, a fixed feed-in tariff cannot guarantee that a certain obligation tar-
get is met. Using a benchmark model that imposes an explicit obligation
on the market, we find a feed-in tariff such that the obligation target can
potentially be achieved. However, when the obtained feed-in tariff is
handed out to firms while the explicit obligation is omitted, multiple so-
lutions occur. Only one of these solutions meets the obligation and there
is no guarantee that this solution is going to be the one achieved by the
market.
• Under the assumption of non-linear convex investment cost in renew-
able technologies, a fixed feed-in tariff achieves the same as an obliga-
tion when the right feed-in tariff is chosen. We find the correct fixed
feed-in tariff using the benchmark model with an explicit obligation on
the market.
• In case of linear investment cost functions, a regulator can choose any
subset of technologies that she prefers to support, and set the feed-in
tariffs in a way that all other technologies are not in the optimal technol-
ogy mixture. Since there exist multiple optima, it is not guaranteed that
technologies in the chosen subset are actually in the optimal technology
mixture.
• For the case of non-linear convex investment cost functions, we find for
which choices of feed-in parameters each technology is singled out in
the optimal mixture. Additionally, we derive in which way to change
the feed-in parameters such that a second technology is added to the
optimal mixture.
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• When investment cost functions are quadratic and when there are three
renewable technologies in the market, we analytically establish for any
choice of feed-in parameters the corresponding optimal mixture. Hence,
besides parameters for which one technology is singled out, we find the
parameters for which any two or all three technologies are in the optimal
mixture.
We finally carry out a numerical study with three renewable technologies and
consider the effects of different feed-in parameter choices in case of linear and
quadratic cost functions, as well as two other non-linear convex cost functions.
These are our key contributions:
• For the case of non-linear non-quadratic convex cost functions, when an-
alytically we are only able to find the parameter choices for which one
technology is singled out, we found a way to numerically trace the opti-
mal technology mixture corresponding to any choice of parameters. One
can thus use our numerical tools for finding feed-in parameters resulting
in any desired optimal mixture of technologies.
• Our numerical observations lead to a theoretical generalization for all
cost functions with either a superadditive or a subadditive non-constant
part of its marginal cost function. In particular this means that when a
regulator faces a market with firms having investment cost functions of
one of these types, our analysis as well as our graphics provide a useful
guideline for determining feed-in tariffs in a way that guarantees that a
certain target on renewable electricity production is met and resulting in




INTRODUCING CO2 ALLOWANCES, HIGHER PRICES
FOR ALL CONSUMERS; HIGHER REVENUES FOR
WHOM?
2.1 Introduction
These days, policy makers and businesses are setting goals in order to reduce
the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). Especially power generators in electric-
ity markets emit high levels of CO2. Since investments in polluting technolo-
gies such as coal are most profitable, profit-maximizing firms do not have the
right incentives to invest in cleaner alternatives.
Encouraging firms to invest in cleaner technologies can be done by im-
plementing financial incentives. We consider two actions governments may
take to accomplish such incentives. One is imposing a maximum allowance
level on the total emissions by power generators. Firms buy and trade per-
mits on a secondary market, which results in a price for emission allowances
that should be paid when allowances are scarce. This is what is called a cap-
and-trade system. Another way to give firms financial incentives to invest in
cleaner alternatives is to charge a fixed tax per unit emission. Our goal is to an-
alyze the effects of introducing these incentives on investment and production
quantities, and on consumer prices. Our analysis will be done in two parts,
the first part focussing on a deterministic demand setting in order to get more
stylized and analytical results, and the second part dealing with stochastic
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demand as to derive results that are closer to reality.
We are going to consider the electricity market in a perfect competition set-
ting. For perfectly competitive electricity markets, emission allowances have
been analyzed before in for example Zhao et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2008), and
Lise et al. (2010). However, these papers put more emphasis on the initial allo-
cation of allowances and the effects thereof. In addition, the models are more
general and are therefore used for deriving mostly numerical results, while
we consider a more stylized framework in order to derive analytical results.
Finally, Ehrenmann and Smeers (2008) deal with a perfect competition model
including CO2 emission allowances and endogenous allowance prices. They
study the effects of different price caps in case of demand curtailment and of
uncertainty in fuel prices and environmental policies. While we adopt their
way of modeling emission allowances, we put more emphasis on the effects
of the policies themselves and rather than taking fuel prices and policies as
uncertain, we are going to deal with uncertain demand.
The electricity market can be seen as a two-stage game between firms,
where investments take place at the first stage, and production and dispatch-
ing to consumers take place at the second stage. As mentioned in Chapter
1, a suitable modeling framework is presented by Gürkan et al. (2013). We
first deal with a deterministic version of this model and extend it to include
cap-and-trade and taxation. We show that under either policy the two-stage
game can be reduced to a single optimization problem, similar to what has
been shown for the original problem. For a stylized version of the single op-
timization problem we then analyze equilibria under both cap-and-trade and
taxation. We make two simplifying assumptions. First, we consider a single
node and assume that each firm is producing with a single and unique tech-
nology. Having a single node means that we can ignore network limitations
that may affect the tractability of results. Second, we assume an order on the
technologies and their CO2 emissions; that is, we can order the technologies
from lowest to highest marginal cost and assume that the cheapest technol-
ogy is the most polluting, the second cheapest is the second most polluting,
and so on. This assumption is both realistic and, as we show, can be made
without loss of generality. These assumptions allow us to systematically an-
alyze the direct effects of cap-and-trade and taxation on investments. These
effects on investments can best be explained via the notion of merit order. At
the beginning of a period firms invest in certain technologies; this is the first
stage. Then, at the second stage, firms use the installed capacities to generate
power; a transmission system operator (TSO) will buy the power and dispatch
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it to the demand nodes. Power is dispatched to the demand nodes according
to a merit order. A merit order is a sequence of technologies based on their
marginal costs in an ascending fashion. When power is dispatched, power
from the first technology in the merit order will be used until all its capacity
is used up. Then, the next technology in the merit order will be used, and
so on. That way a number of technologies will be used to satisfy demand.
In each node, the market price is then set by the technology that is active on
the market and producing with the highest marginal cost. Regulation via ei-
ther a cap-and-trade system or a fixed tax affects marginal costs since it comes
with an additional cost per unit production. Obviously, these marginal cost
changes may affect the merit order and hence the dispatching order. Produc-
tion quantities and hence investment decisions may change accordingly.
In case of cap-and-trade, firms will have to pay the unit allowance price
per unit emission. This allowance price is determined by the market, and as
such is dependent on both the level of demand and the maximum emission
allowance level. Therefore, marginal costs and hence the merit order may
change with a change in demand or allowance level. This analytical result co-
incides with numerical evidence found in Zhao et al. (2010), who carry out
a numerical study and find that the merit order changes for certain (high)
allowance prices. Since in our analysis we find the allowance price to be in-
creasing when the allowance level goes down or when demand goes up, we
have a non-fixed merit order. We show that in our simplified setting either one
or two technologies are first in a merit order, for given demand and allowance
level. Three different cases can be distinguished: First, the dirtiest and cheap-
est technology can satisfy the demand without violating the (relatively low)
allowance level. This technology will be the first in the merit order and hence
the only technology used at the market equilibrium. Total emissions will be
below the allowance level resulting in the allowance price to be zero (free al-
lowances). Second, even the cleanest firm cannot satisfy the demand while
meeting the (very strict) allowance level. The most expensive technology will
be first in the merit order and hence the only technology used. Electricity de-
mand will not be satisfied and the electricity price will be set at a price cap.
Third, when none of these two cases occur, a combination of a relatively cheap
and dirty and a relatively expensive and clean technology will be first in the
merit order. The allowance price is then set in such a way that marginal costs
of these two technologies are equal. We develop an algorithm to find the opti-
mal technology mixture and the resulting allowance price in a systematic way.
Using the algorithm, we show that electricity prices and the price for emission
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allowances increase when the emission allowance level decreases.
In case of a fixed tax, the merit order is fixed in the sense that it does not
depend on the demand or the allowance level. Either one or two technologies
are first in the merit order, which can easily be found by comparing effective
marginal costs. A special case is when the taxation is set equal to the optimal
unit allowance price that was found in case of cap-and-trade for a given al-
lowance level. We find that multiple market equilibria exist, of which some
do not satisfy the allowance level. Finally, we characterize technologies that
will never be first in the merit order; that is, technologies for which there is no
level of taxation such that it becomes the cheapest. We show that this, in turn,
implies that those technologies will never be in the optimal mixture in case of
cap-and-trade either.
After analyzing the effects on firms, we take a look at the extent to which
costs for CO2 emissions are passed through to consumers. Several results for
perfect competition with inelastic demand have been shown in the literature;
see for example Bonacina and Gullí (2007) and Chen et al. (2008), where it is
argued that there is a 100% cost pass-through to consumers. Contrary to our
study, they take the price of emission allowances as exogenous to the model
and in addition focus on the short-run without considering investment strate-
gies. Even though an endogenously determined allowance price results in a
different merit order for different demand levels, we show that both endoge-
nous prices and the two-stage nature of the model have no effect on the cost
pass-through rate as long as demand is not curtailed; that is, the cost pass-
through is still 100%. If demand is curtailed we show that the pass-through
even exceeds 100%.
The second part of our analysis deals with the two-stage investment model
with stochastic exogenous demand. Demand is unknown to firms at the first
stage and will be revealed at the second stage. We can now interpret the first
stage as the long-run; that is, investment decisions are made once every pe-
riod, for example a year, while not knowing future demands. The second stage
can be seen as the short-run, where each day there is a demand realization.
Each day a second stage problem is solved, while investment decisions are
made based on the expected outcome of these daily realizations. To the model
as presented by Gürkan et al. (2013) we again add the cap-and-trade and fixed
taxation. As allowances are typically set for a certain period rather than on a
daily basis, the maximum emission allowance is going to be imposed at the
first stage. As stochastic programs are obscured by the large dimension of the
problem, instead of an analytical study we carry out a numerical study using
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sampling. We propose the sampled versions of the problem in the form of a
large mixed complementarity problem (MCP). Using the PATH MCP-solver
we can derive and analyze numerical results. In particular, we focus on the
adequacy of cap-and-trade and fixed taxation in the presence of limited net-
work capacity.
For our numerical study we consider a small network with three supply-
ing firms producing with either coal, which is relatively cheap and polluting,
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), which is the cleanest available conven-
tional technology we consider, and open cycle gas turbine (OCGT), which has
the lowest investment cost. A key result is that under demand uncertainty we
see broader technology mixtures than in the deterministic case. OCGT is in
the mixture as the peak load technology, whereas coal and CCGT are used as
base load technologies. When a cap-and-trade system is implemented, we see
that the tighter the allowance level, the more coal is replaced by the cleaner
CCGT. In case of a fixed tax we observe that for low levels mainly coal is
used, up to a certain threshold tax for which we see a shift to CCGT. The im-
plications of limited transmission capacity in combination with government
regulation are the following. In case of a maximum emission allowance level,
limited transmission capacity may induce cleaner mixtures in case emission
allowances are scarce. However, it does not necessarily induce investments
in cleaner technologies, since limited transmission capacity may block such
investments. Hence, investments in network capacity may be necessary to
achieve the goal of motivating investment in cleaner technologies. In case of a
fixed tax per unit emission we find that for higher tax levels a dirty technology
is replaced by a cleaner technology. The network capacity may put a limit on
this replacement. Therefore, it may be necessary to invest in network capacity
in order to curb CO2 levels.
Finally, we establish a relation between the optimal outcome in case of cap-
and-trade and the optimal outcome in case of taxation. We show that for a
special case of taxation, by taking the taxation level equal to the optimal price
of emission allowances derived in the cap-and-trade model, we either find
the same solution, or we find multiple solutions of which the cap-and-trade
solution is one. In case there are multiple solutions, we see a trade-off between
minimizing pollution and maximizing the regulator’s surplus. Some of the
solutions violate the maximum emission allowance level, indicating that when
the optimal emission allowance price is set as a fixed tax, in the absence of a
cap-and-trade system there is no way to enforce firms to choose the solution
with minimal pollution.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We begin with the introduc-
tion of the two-stage investment model with deterministic exogenous demand
in Section 2.2. We sequentially reduce it to a single optimization problem. Sec-
tion 2.3 introduces a stylized version of the model. We then derive our main
findings concerning the effects of government regulations in the deterministic
setting. In addition, an algorithm that finds the optimal mixture of technolo-
gies in case of a maximum emission allowance level is developed. In Section
2.4 we introduce the model with stochastic demand. A numerical study is
presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Investment Model - Deterministic Exoge-
nous Demand
We deal with a perfectly competitive electricity market with deterministic ex-
ogenous demand; under perfect competition firms cannot exert market power
and act as price takers. We discuss the basics of the electricity market and
give an overview of the electricity market investment model as presented in
Gürkan et al. (2013). Then, as an extension, we include either an emission
constraint or a fixed carbon tax imposed by the environmental regulator.
The electricity market consists of a grid of supply and demand nodes con-
nected by transmission lines. Typical to such an electricity network, compared
to other networks treated in the literature, is first of all the non-storability of
electricity. Secondly, power transmission between two nodes affects the capac-
ities on all transmission lines in the network in accordance with Kirchhoff’s
voltage law; see for example Chao et al. (2000). At supply nodes, electric-
ity producing firms are located, whereas consumers with a fixed exogenous
demand are located at demand nodes. Decisions in the market are taken in
two stages. At the first stage firms maximize their profits while choosing for
each of their supply nodes the production capacities in the available technolo-
gies. All firms are assumed to take these investment decisions simultaneously
without knowing the decisions of other firms and their effect on the electricity
price. First stage profits depend on the equilibrium outcome of the second
stage, where prices and production quantities are determined. At the second
stage, firms determine their optimal production quantity given their invest-
ment capacities from the first stage as to maximize their second stage profits.
In addition, a transmission system operator (TSO) owning the electricity grid
is taking care of the transmission of power, while maximizing its own profits.
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Finally, the market is cleared by means of market clearing conditions imposing
that in each node supply of electricity should cover demand, and imposing a
price cap in case of demand curtailment.
In addition, there is an environmental regulator that tries to curb and pre-
vent high levels of CO2 emissions in the electricity market. We focus on two
main financial instruments available to such a regulator. One option is to im-
pose a maximum allowance level for the total emissions. For each unit of CO2
firms emit they should posses an allowance. Allowances can be traded on a
secondary market. The "correct" price of an allowance depends on the num-
ber of allowances available and the demand for allowances. As soon as the
total emissions hit the maximum allowed level, the price of the allowance be-
comes positive; otherwise it is zero. An alternative way for reducing the total
emissions is to impose a fixed carbon tax per unit emission. With both in-
struments, the environmental regulator aims to reduce the production by the
more polluting technologies and motivate firms to produce more with cleaner
technologies, eventually inducing higher investment levels in cleaner tech-
nologies.
We call the resulting two-stage game containing all firms, the TSO, the mar-
ket clearing conditions, and the environmental regulator, a perfect competi-
tion equilibrium problem. “Equilibrium” emphasizes that the firms optimize
their own objective functions, and that their individual optimization problems
are tied together by the market clearing conditions. When we are at a so-called
perfectly competitive equilibrium, for none of the firms it is profitable to de-
viate.
A suitable mathematical framework for modeling the perfectly competitive
electricity market is presented in Gürkan et al. (2013). However, that model
does not include an environmental regulator or CO2 regulation. In the next
section, we introduce the two-stage game as presented in Gürkan et al. (2013)
and incorporate the environmental regulator’s problem. As shown in Gürkan
et al. (2013), the original two-stage game can be reduced to a single optimiza-
tion problem. The same reduction can be done when adding a cap-and-trade
system or imposing taxation, as we will show in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Introducing the Two-Stage Game
The sets, parameters, and variables to be used in the perfect competition equi-
librium problem are given below.
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Sets:
N : the set of demand nodes
G : the set of firms
Ig : the set of supply nodes of firm g ∈ G
I : the set of all supply nodes (I := ∪g Ig)
Kg : the set of technologies of firm g ∈ G
K : the set of all technologies (K := ∪gKg)
L : the set of electricity transmission lines connecting nodes in the net-
work.
Parameters:
cgik : unit production cost of firm g at supply node i ∈ Ig for techno-
logy k ∈ Kg
κ
g
ik : unit investment cost of firm g ∈ G at supply node i ∈ Ig for
technology k ∈ Kg
dn : demand at demand node n ∈ N
PTDFl,j : power transmitted through line l ∈ L due to one unit of po-
wer injection into node j ∈ N ∪ I
hl : capacity limit of line l ∈ L
VOLL : value of unserved energy or lost load
E : total CO2 emission allowed by the environmental regulator
ek : units of CO2 emitted per unit production with technology
k ∈ Kg.
Variables:
xgik : generation capacity investment of firm g ∈ G for technology k ∈ Kg
at supply node i ∈ Ig
ygik : quantity of power generated by firm g ∈ G at supply node i ∈ Ig by
using technology k ∈ Kg
f j : net power flow dispatched by the TSO to node j ∈ N ∪ I
δj : unserved demand at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pj : electricity price at node j ∈ N ∪ I
µ : unit allowance price.
For g ∈ G we write xg = (xgik)i∈Ig,k∈Kg and yg = (y
g
ik)i∈Ig,k∈Kg , the vectors
containing investment and production quantities, respectively, of firm g in all
its technologies in all its supply nodes.
We next introduce the first and second stage problems. Each firm owns a
set of technologies in some of its supply nodes. At the first stage, each firm
g ∈ G simultaneously decides on its optimal investment quantities xg in all
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its available technologies in all its supply nodes. Per unit investment in tech-
nology k ∈ Kg in supply node i ∈ Ig, firm g ∈ G pays investment cost κgik.
Firms determine their optimal investment quantities by maximizing their op-
timal second stage profits that are dependent on their investment quantities,
minus their first stage investment costs. The second stage profit per unit pro-
duction of firm g ∈ G with technology k ∈ Kg in supply node i ∈ Ig consists
of the market price of electricity, pi, minus the unit production cost c
g
ik, and
minus the price paid for emission allowances, ekµ. The optimization problem


















g) is the optimal production quantity of firm g at supply node i ∈ Ig
with technology k ∈ Kg at the second stage if xg is the investment quantity. pi,
i ∈ I, and µ are taken as parameters, since firms are behaving as price takers
and are not aware that by changing their investments they may influence the
price of electricity and the allowance price. Both will be determined at the sec-
ond stage as a result of market clearing conditions and the emission allowance
constraint, as we explain below.
At the second stage, firms treat the investment quantities as parameters.





(pi − cgik − ekµ)y
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ik




ik) ∀i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg,
(2.2)
where βgik is the shadow price associated with the capacity constraint, repre-
senting the scarcity rent of technology k ∈ Kg at supply node i ∈ Ig. The pro-
duced power is then dispatched by the transmission system operator (TSO)
from the supply nodes to demand nodes. The TSO maximizes its profit from
transmitting power while taking into account the network capacity. The elec-
tricity network consists of a set of transmission lines L in which each line l ∈ L
runs from one node to another node. The amounts transmitted, that is, the net
flows into or out of each node j ∈ N ∪ I, are denoted by f j. f j > 0 represents
a flow into node j, whereas f j < 0 represents a flow out of node j. For each
unit of power flow into node j, some amount of power, given by the coefficient
PTDFl,j, is transmitted along transmission line l ∈ L. A power injection in one
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node typically affects the flows on all transmission lines (either positively or
negatively). hl is the capacity on transmission line l ∈ L, and total net power
flow (which can be either negative or positive) on each line l ∈ L must be
between −hl and hl. If there is limited capacity on some lines (hl is finite for
some l ∈ L), we call the network a capacitated network. The TSO’s problem








f j = 0 (ρ)
hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L
hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L.
(2.3)
The first constraint, with corresponding dual variable ρ, is the flow balance
constraint; that is, the total amount the TSO buys from firms should equal
the total amount the TSO dispatches to demand nodes. The second and third
constraints take into account the limited positive and negative transmission
capacity in the network and have dual variables λ+l , l ∈ L, and λ−l , l ∈ L,
respectively.
The environmental regulator determines the level of maximum emission
allowance, E, which should be satisfied by the entire market and which is an-
nounced to the firms in advance. The price of emission allowances, µ, is then
determined by the market. As long as the maximum allowance level is not
reached, the price of an emission allowance will be zero; as soon as emissions
hit the ceiling, µ will become positive as to create an incentive for firms to
switch to cleaner technologies. This leads to the following complementarity
condition:








ik ⊥ µ ≥ 0. (2.4)
Finally, there are two types of market clearing conditions. The market price of
electricity is determined by the first type, which balances supply and demand
in each node. Since not all firms are necessarily producing in all nodes, we
define Gj = {g ∈ G|j ∈ Ig}, j ∈ N ∪ I, as the set of firms that are active in
node j. In each demand node n ∈ N, where production is zero, the net flow
fn into the node should be at least equal to the demand dn, unless there is
unsatisfied demand. In each supply node i ∈ I, where demand is defined as
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di = 0, the net flow fi will in general be negative, meaning it is a flow out of
node i. This flow can be at most equal to the total production in node i. Hence,
for each node j ∈ N ∪ I we have a constraint on the flows, balancing supply
and demand. Nodal prices are determined perpendicular to each of these
constraints. A second type of condition puts a cap on the price in each node
and is known as VOLL pricing in the literature; see, for example, Stoft (2002),
or alternatively Ehrenmann and Smeers (2008). Whenever demand cannot
be satisfied at node j ∈ N ∪ I, unsatisfied demand δj will be positive. Then,
the price of electricity at node j is set at VOLL, the value of lost load. VOLL
is a relatively large number; that is, in numerical experiments it is typical to
assume VOLL = 10.000, whereas the regular nodal prices usually lie between





ygjk + δj + f j − dj ⊥ pj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ VOLL− pj ⊥ δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(2.5)
An alternative way of reducing the amount of CO2 emitted by energy com-
panies, is to tax firms per unit emission without imposing a bound on the
total amount of CO2 emitted. In such a system the environmental regulator
fixes a level of taxation, say µ̄. In the model the (optimal) price of emission
allowances, µ, should be replaced by the fixed parameter µ̄ and the emission
constraint (2.4) should be omitted. In the next section we analyze the two
models in further detail.
2.2.2 Reduction to a Single Optimization Problem
In Gürkan et al. (2013), it is shown that the problem of finding a perfect compe-
tition equilibrium, excluding the emission constraint (2.4), between the firms
and the TSO can be written as a single optimization problem. This result can
be extended to the models which include either an emission constraint or tax-
ation imposed by the environmental regulator. We do not discuss the deriva-
tions in detail here (see Gürkan et al. (2013)); however, we briefly elaborate on
the results that are relevant to us.
First we show that there exists a single optimization problem that simul-
taneously solves the firms’ second stage problems (2.2) and the TSO’s second
stage problem (2.3), under the emission constraint (2.4) and the market clear-
ing conditions (2.5). As a result, we are left with a single optimization problem
at the second stage. Then we show that the first and the second stage prob-
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lems together can be written as a single optimization problem. Having been
reduced to a single optimization problem, a perfect competition equilibrium
can be easily found by using standard optimization techniques.
In order to show that there exists a single optimization problem that solves
all second stage problems simultaneously, we first write the KKT optimality
conditions for all the second stage problems introduced in Section 2.2.1 for
given x = (xg)g∈G:
0 ≤ β∗gik − p∗i + c
g
ik + ekµ
∗ ⊥ y∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg




ik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg









j − dj ⊥ p∗j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j ⊥ λ∗+l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j ⊥ λ∗−l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L








ik ⊥ µ∗ ≥ 0
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l − λ∗−l )+
p∗j − ρ∗ = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j = 0.
(2.6)
A point which satisfies these KKT conditions (2.6) also solves (2.2) and (2.3)
under the constraints (2.4) and (2.5).
The KKT conditions (2.6) correspond to a single optimization problem, re-
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ygjk + δj + f j ≥ dj (pj) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f j = 0 (ρ)
hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L
hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L
xgik − y
g
ik ≥ 0 (β
g









ik ≥ 0 (µ)
ygik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(2.7)
The basic idea of this derivation was originally introduced in Boucher and
Smeers (2001) for a game between firms, consumers, and TSO, and can be used
in more general settings such as the one we consider here. Solving the OPF
problem clearly results in the optimal solution for the firms’ problems at the
second stage, the TSO’s problem, and the environmental regulator’s problem.
The resulting optimal solution is a perfectly competitive equilibrium of the
market at the second stage, since none of the players will have an incentive to
deviate.
Next, we briefly outline how the problem in stage one, consisting of opti-
mization problem (2.1) for each firm, together with the OPF problem (2.7) at
stage two, can be written as a single optimization problem. When demand
is assumed to be deterministic, Lemma 1.1 of Gürkan et al. (2013) states that
the optimal investment amount x∗gik is equal to the optimal production amount
y∗gik for all g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg, and Lemma 1.2 of Gürkan et al. (2013) states
that for x∗gik to be positive at the equilibrium, β
∗g
ik should be equal to κ
g
ik. These
results are employed in Lemma 1.3 of Gürkan et al. (2013) to show that a point
satisfying a particular set of KKT conditions is an equilibrium solution of the
two-stage game consisting of (2.1) and (2.7). When we use the corresponding
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result in our setting, the resulting set of KKT conditions is the following:
0 ≤ κgik − p∗i + c
g
ik + ekµ
∗ ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg









j − dj ⊥ p∗j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j ⊥ λ∗+l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j ⊥ λ∗−l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L








ik ⊥ µ∗ ≥ 0
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l − λ∗−l ) + p∗j − ρ∗ = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j = 0.





















xgjk + δj + f j ≥ dj (pj) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f j = 0 (ρ)
hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L
hl + ∑
j∈N∪I









ik ≥ 0 (µ)
xgik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(2.8)
Note that (2.8) simultaneously solves the optimization problems (2.1), (2.2),
and (2.3), while taking the emission constraint (2.4) and the market clear-
ing conditions (2.5) into account. As a consequence, the optimal solution
(x∗, δ∗, f ∗) of (2.8) results in optimality for all firms at both stages.
We now turn our attention to the fixed tax model. As mentioned earlier,
one needs to replace the (optimal) price of emission allowances µ by the fixed
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parameter µ̄, and omit the emission constraint. It then turns out that the two-
stage game can again be written as a single optimization problem for this




















xgjk + δj + f j ≥ dj (pj) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f j = 0 (ρ)
hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L
hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L
xgik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(2.9)
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The qualitative equilibrium analysis of the underlying two-stage game is ob-
scured by the intractability of the problem in its current form because of the
network effects due to the underlying network topology, the transmission line
capacities, and the associated PTDFs. In order to understand the direct effects
of the emission constraint or taxation on the decisions of the firms, we work
with the following simplifying assumptions. There is a single node with a
given demand d and n firms. Each firm possesses a single and unique tech-
nology in K. Hence, we compromise indices g, i, and k by simply k and denote
by K = {1, ..., n} the set of all firms or technologies. In effect, having a single
node means that we are focusing on a network with unlimited transmission
capacities and that we can omit the flows and the PTDF-constraints. In addi-
tion, we write ak := ck + κk, the total cost per unit production in technology
k ∈ K and make the following assumption on the parameters:
a1 < a2 < · · · < an and e1 > e2 > · · · > en.
That is, the technologies are ordered such that technology 1 is the cheapest
and the dirtiest, and technology n is the most expensive and the cleanest tech-
nology. This assumption is reasonable, since dirty technologies typically have
relatively low long-run marginal cost, but have a relatively high level of CO2
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emission per unit production; later we will argue that this assumption can in
fact be made without loss of generality, see Remark 1.
Let s be the slack variable in the emission constraint. The stylized version of

















ekxk −s = −E (µ)
xk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K
δ, s ≥ 0.
(2.10)
Note that minus signs appear on both sides of the emission constraint. Ob-
viously, it is possible to multiply this constraint by −1, but this results in a
non-positive dual variable. Since that will be more tricky to interpret, we will
work with the current formulation (2.10). This way, the dual variable actually
gives the "correct" price of the unit emission allowance.











xk +δ ≥ d (p)
xk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K
δ ≥ 0.
(2.11)
Next, we elaborate on the perfect competition equilibrium in both models
(2.10) and (2.11). In Section 2.3.1, we derive that in case of a maximum al-
lowance level one or two firms will be producing at the equilibrium. This will
have an important consequence. When there is enough capacity in the system,
different demand levels will impose different prices for a unit of emission al-
lowance and there will not be a fixed merit order of the technologies. An
algorithm for finding the optimal mixture in the equilibrium in a systematic
way is proposed in Section 2.3.2. A proof showing that the algorithm finds the
optimal solution, is included in the Appendix (Section 2.7). In case of a fixed
tax, there will be a fixed merit order and only one firm will be producing at the
equilibrium; this and its implications are dealt with in Section 2.3.3. Section
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2.3.4 provides a characterization of the technologies that can never be the first
in the merit order; hence those technologies will permanently be dominated
by other technologies. Finally, Section 2.3.5 analyzes the effects of cap-and-
trade and taxation on consumer prices via the concept of consumers’ surplus.
2.3.1 Characterizing the Equilibrium with a Cap on Total
Emissions
As there are only two constraints in the stylized model (2.10), there will be
only two basic variables. Therefore, at most two technologies will be pro-
ducing at the equilibrium. Obviously, without an emission constraint (that is,
when E = ∞) only the cheapest technology will be used. On the other hand,
when the emission constraint is very tight (that is, when E is extremely low),
only the cleanest technology can be used. In all other cases, two technolo-
gies, a relatively cheap one and a relatively clean one, will be contained in the
optimal mixture.
In order to find which technologies will be part of the optimal mix, we di-
vide the set of firms into two sets; the first set, J, contains the relatively cheap
and dirty firms, whereas the second set, H, contains the remaining, relatively
expensive and clean, firms. To be more precise, a firm is in J when it cannot
satisfy the demand on its own without violating the emission constraint; a
firm is in H otherwise. We must then find the cheapest combination of a firm
in J and a firm in H, which can together satisfy the emission allowance con-
straint. Note that, when J = N, even the cleanest firm cannot satisfy demand
without violating the emission constraint. On the other hand, when H = N,
all demand can be produced by the cheapest firm without violating the emis-
sion constraint. The following proposition summarizes these results formally
and lays down a property that the basic variables of the linear program (2.10)
should satisfy at optimality when J and H are both nonempty.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that there are n firms for which it holds that
a1 < a2 < · · · < an and e1 > e2 > · · · > en.
Given E and d, define
J = {1, ..., i} and H = {i + 1, ..., n},
where i ∈ K ∪ {0} is such that ei+1d ≤ E < eid (with e0 = ∞ and en+1 = 0).
Then, at the perfect competition equilibrium, that is, at the optimal solution to (2.10),
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exactly one of the following cases holds:
(i) All firms are able to satisfy the demand without violating the emission constraint.
This is the case when J = ∅. At the equilibrium, x∗1 = d, x
∗
k = 0 for k = 2, ..., n,
δ∗ = 0, and s∗ = E− e1d.
(ii) No firm is able to satisfy the demand without violating the emission constraint.
This is the case when H = ∅. At the equilibrium, x∗n = E/en, x∗k = 0 for
k = 1, ..., n− 1, δ∗ = d− Een , and s
∗ = 0.
(iii) A combination of a relatively clean and a relatively dirty firm will satisfy de-
mand without violating the emission constraint. This is the case when both J and H
are non-empty. Firms j ∈ J and h ∈ H produce at the equilibrium if j and h satisfy
ak(ej − eh) + aj(eh − ek) + ah(ek − ej) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}. (2.12)








k = 0 for
k 6= j, h, δ∗ = 0, s∗ = 0.
Proof: Let p be the price of electricity and µ the price of unit emission. That is, p
and µ are the dual variables associated with the first and second constraint of
(2.10). Then we can write the KKT optimality conditions of the linear program
(2.10) as
0 ≤ ak − p∗ + ekµ∗ ⊥ x∗k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}











ekx∗k ⊥ µ∗ ≥ 0.
(2.13)


















[p∗ µ∗] = cBB−1 = [a1 0].
The optimal solution is x∗1 = d, x
∗
k = 0 for k = 2, ..., n, δ
∗ = 0, and s∗ = E− e1d.
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This is case (i).






















The optimal solution is x∗n = E/en, x∗k = 0 for k = 1, ..., n− 1, δ∗ = d− Een > 0,
and s∗ = 0. This is case (ii).
If J 6= ∅ and H 6= ∅, then for some j ∈ J, h ∈ H, xj and xh are the basic

































k = 0 for k 6= j, h, δ∗ = 0,
s∗ = 0. This is case (iii). The solution found is a perfect competition equilib-
rium when (2.12) holds, since this implies that the first condition of (2.13) is
satisfied, that is,






ek = ak − p∗ + ekµ∗ ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
One can easily check that the other conditions in (2.13) are also satisfied, by
noting that j ∈ J, h ∈ H, and ehd ≤ E < ejd holds. 2
Since determining the sets J and H is straightforward, it is easy to see which
case in Proposition 2.1 holds. However, finding a j ∈ J and h ∈ H in case (iii)
that satisfy (2.12) is not straightforward. In Section 2.3.2 we give an algorithm
for finding the optimal j ∈ J and h ∈ H. First, we provide an interpretation of
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the optimal price of emission allowances and the optimal electricity price.
The proof of Proposition 2.1 shows that it is possible to derive both µ∗ and
p∗ explicitly at optimality. One can interpret µ∗ as follows. In case (i), µ∗ is
zero, since one should not pay for an extra unit of CO2 emission when the
emission constraint is not active. In case (ii), since demand is not satisfied,
VOLL pricing is in effect, and consequently µ∗ is relatively high. When E
decreases, one produces less with technology n and the unsatisfied demand
δ∗ increases. Let ∆y denote the change in unsatisfied demand and ∆E denote







Then, one would pay ∆y · VOLL more and save ∆y · an. If we take ∆E = −1,
then µ∗ gives the marginal cost for satisfying a lower emission allowance level,
as long as the optimal basis does not change. In other words, µ∗ is equal to the
price one pays to substitute the production of firm n by unsatisfied demand
for a unit decrease in E:




In case (iii), µ∗ represents the price to pay to substitute the dirty technology
by the clean technology when E decreases. Let ∆y denote the extra amount of
the clean technology that is produced. This volume ∆y of the substitution of
the dirty technology by the clean technology should satisfy
−ej∆y + eh∆y = ∆E,
in order to satisfy the emission constraint. ej∆y is the amount of CO2 emission





Due to the lower allowance level, one saves aj∆y and additionally pays ah∆y.
Again, if we take ∆E = −1, then µ∗ represents the price to pay for substituting
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dirty technology by clean technology as a result of a unit decrease in E:




A similar argument holds for p∗ when we perturb demand d. In case (i),
firm 1 can satisfy demand without violating the emission constraint. As long
as the optimal basis does not change, a unit increase of demand costs p∗ =
a1. In case (ii), demand is not satisfied; hence, VOLL pricing is in effect and
an extra unit of demand causes the unsatisfied demand to increase by one
unit. The extra cost involved equals p∗ = VOLL. In case (iii), p∗ represents
the extra cost incurred (shared by firms j and h) in order to satisfy an extra
unit of demand. In order to do so, they should take care that, with the new
production amounts, the total emission does not increase; that is,
ej(∆d− ∆y) + eh∆y = 0,
where ∆y denotes the extra production by firm h, whereas ∆d denotes the






Furthermore, when demand increases with ∆d, and given that the basis does
not change, the total production cost changes by ah∆y and aj(∆d− ∆y). If we
take ∆d = 1 then




2.3.2 Algorithms for Finding the Equilibrium
Given a maximum emission allowance level E and demand d, we determined
sets of technologies J = {1, ..., i} and H = {i + 1, ..., n} where i ∈ K ∪ {0} is
such that ei+1d ≤ E < eid. We next discuss two algorithms for finding j ∈ J
and h ∈ H such that (2.12) is satisfied. Initially we generate candidate sets J̄
and H̄ for J and H, respectively. By starting with the smallest non-empty J̄
or H̄ and expanding or reducing the sets systematically we will reach to the
optimal j and h in a finite number of iterations. In each iteration, we find a
j∗ ∈ J̄ and an h∗ ∈ H̄ such that (2.12) is satisfied. Afterwards, we evaluate
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whether j∗ and h∗ belong to the sets J and H, respectively. If yes, the optimal
solution is found. If not, the algorithm systematically expands one candidate
set and reduces the other.
The forward version of the algorithm first checks whether J or H is empty.
If so, we are in case (i) or (ii) of Proposition 2.1, respectively. If not, we let
j∗ = 1 and start with the smallest non-empty candidate set for J, J̄ = {1}.
Since J is nonempty, firm 1 cannot satisfy all demand without violating the
emission constraint. A cleaner and more expensive firm has to contribute. As
a result, the total production cost will increase. The algorithm will then find
h∗ ∈ H̄ = {2, ..., n} such that this increase in production cost is minimized. By
doing this, we guarantee that (2.12) is satisfied, as shown in the proof that can
be found in the appendix. If h∗ ∈ H, the optimal solution is found. If not, we
have to do another iteration. We first expand J̄ by adding {j∗ + 1, ..., h∗} and
reduce H̄ accordingly. Then, we set j∗ = h∗ and find again the firm in the new
candidate set H̄ that minimizes the extra cost. The algorithm terminates when
h∗ ∈ H; that is, we found a j∗ ∈ J and h∗ ∈ H such that (2.12) is satisfied.
The optimal solution to (2.10) then immediately follows from Proposition 2.1.
One may wonder why we pick j∗ = h∗ in each new iteration. In the proof of
the algorithm we show that if the new j∗ is not h∗, then for at least one firm k
inequality (2.12) is violated.
The backward version of the algorithm has the same structure. It first
checks if J or H is empty. If not, we let h∗ = n and start with the smallest
non-empty candidate set for H, H̄ = {n}. Since H is nonempty, firm n is
able to satisfy all demand without violating the emission constraint. How-
ever, we can reduce the objective function value by letting a more polluting
and cheaper firm contribute. The algorithm will find the firm j∗ ∈ J̄ that
maximizes the reduction of the total cost. Again by ensuring this, (2.12) is
automatically satisfied for all k. If j∗ ∈ H, we can gain even more by letting
another firm in J̄\{j∗, ..., h∗− 1} contribute instead of h∗. We hence do another
iteration and update J̄ by removing {j∗, ..., h∗ − 1} and update H̄ accordingly.
Then we set h∗ = j∗ and find the firm that maximizes the reduction of the total
cost. The algorithm terminates when j∗ ∈ J.
Algorithm 2.1. The Forward Version
Step 0:
Given E and d, let J = {1, ..., i} and H = {i + 1, ..., n}, where i ∈ K ∪ {0} is
such that ei+1d ≤ E < eid.
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Step 1:
If J = ∅, STOP= 1, Output= (1, 1).
Else if H = ∅, STOP= 1, Output= (n, n).
Else STOP= 0, j∗ = 1, h∗ = 1.
Step 2:
While STOP= 0 do
Let J̄ = {1, ..., h∗}, H̄ = N\ J̄, j∗ = h∗, h∗ = arg min
h∈H̄




If h∗ ∈ H, j = j∗, h = h∗, STOP= 1, Output= (j, h);
end.
Algorithm 2.2. The Backward Version
Step 0:
Given E and d, let J = {1, ..., i} and H = {i + 1, ..., n}, where i ∈ K ∪ {0} is
such that ei+1d ≤ E < eid.
Step 1:
If J = ∅, STOP= 1, Output= (1, 1).
Else if H = ∅, STOP= 1, Output= (n, n).
Else STOP= 0, j∗ = n, h∗ = n.
Step 2:
While STOP= 0 do
Let H̄ = {j∗, ..., n}, J̄ = N\H̄, h∗ = j∗, j∗ = arg max
j∈ J̄
{ ah∗ − aj
ej − eh∗
};
If j∗ ∈ J, j = j∗, h = h∗, STOP= 1, Output= (j, h);
end.
Given E, d, and the characteristics of the firms, we can apply either one of the
algorithms to find the optimal (j, h). A proof showing that the Forward al-
gorithm finds the optimal solution is included in the Appendix (Section 2.7);
clearly one can write a proof for the Backward algorithm in a similar way.
Also note that when Output= (1, 1), firm 1 is the only producer (case (i) of
Proposition 2.1) and when Output= (n, n), firm n is the only producer (case
(ii) of Proposition 2.1).
Remark 1. From the arguments in the appendix, it becomes clear that the
assumption that a1 < a2 < · · · < an and e1 > e2 > · · · > en can in fact be
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made without loss of generality. If a technology would not obey this assump-
tion, it would either dominate another technology or it would be dominated
by another technology itself. A technology that is dominated by another tech-
nology will never be chosen by the algorithm since it is both more polluting
and more expensive than the other one.
The following proposition establishes the monotonicity relationship between
the price of electricity, the price of emission allowances, and the maximum
emission allowance level.
Proposition 2.2. The price of electricity p∗ and the price of emission allowances µ∗
are weakly increasing as E decreases.
Proof: Given E, let (jE, hE) be the producing firms at the perfect equilibrium.
We let E decrease to Ẽ < E and consider the effect. Define
J̃ = {1, ..., ĩ} and H̃ = {ĩ + 1, ..., n},
where ĩ ∈ K ∪ {0} is such that eĩ+1d ≤ Ẽ < eĩd. Note that H̃ ⊆ H; that is, since
the emission constraint became tighter, we may need to choose a cleaner firm.
Two things may happen.
(1) hE ∈ H̃ : Then (jE, hE) is still the optimal mixture. p∗ and µ∗ remain the
same.
(2) hE /∈ H̃ : Apply the Forward Algorithm with j∗ = hE, J̄ = {1, ..., hE},
and H̄ = N\ J̄ and find
h∗ = arg min
h∈H̄
{ ah − ahE
ehE − eh
}.
In case this h∗ ∈ H̃, the new optimal solution is found and we can compare
the prices of allowances. First notice that, since jE and hE were producing at
the equilibrium for the allowance level E, (2.12) holds for all k. In particular,
for k = h∗ we have
ajE(ehE − eh∗) + ahE(eh∗ − ejE) + ah∗(ejE − ehE) ≥ 0. (2.14)
Using this, we compare the prices of allowances and the prices of electricity:
µ∗Ẽ − µ∗E =
ah∗ − ahE
ehE − eh∗
− ahE − ajE
ejE − ehE
=
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ajE(ehE − eh∗) + ahE(eh∗ − ejE) + ah∗(ejE − ehE)
(ehE − eh∗)(ejE − ehE)
≥ 0.
Since the denominator and the numerator are positive by the fact that eh∗ <
ehE < ejE and inequality (2.14), respectively, the last inequality holds. Simi-
larly,
p∗Ẽ − p∗E =
ehE ah∗ − eh∗ahE
ehE − eh∗




ajE(ehE − eh∗) + ahE(eh∗ − ejE) + ah∗(ejE − ehE)
(ehE − eh∗)(ejE − ehE)
≥ 0.
In case h∗ /∈ H̃, continue the algorithm. Then, µ∗ and p∗ even further increase.
2
2.3.3 Characterizing the Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax per Unit
Emission
We have seen that there is no fixed merit order of technologies in (2.10). In
order to satisfy the emission allowance, different technologies may be chosen
in the optimal mixture for different levels of demand. In particular, for each
demand realization we get a combination of a cheap but dirty technology and
an expensive but clean technology; this combination depends on the level of
demand. As a consequence, the entire industry is motivated to have several
technologies available.
We now turn our attention to the situation where the environmental regula-
tor taxes firms per unit emission. In the fixed tax model (2.11), there is a fixed
merit order on the firms. Only the firm(s) with the lowest total marginal cost,
being production cost plus investment cost plus tax on CO2 emission, will be
producing at the equilibrium. Hence, this system singles out one or, in case of
equal marginal cost, several technologies and is independent of demand levels
as long as there is sufficient capacity. In addition, we show the implications of
taking the optimal price of emission allowances from the cap-and-trade model
as the fixed tax. In this special case, the fixed tax model cannot guarantee that
emissions stay below the maximum allowance level and hence may lead to a
more polluting technology mixture.
To illustrate this result, suppose that, for given µ̄, we may reorder the firms
such that
a1 + µ̄e1 ≤ a2 + µ̄e2 ≤ · · · ≤ an + µ̄en. (2.15)
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This is, aside from possible equalities, the fixed merit order of the firms in
the presence of taxation. In order to illustrate our results in a clear way, we
additionally assume that one or both of the first two inequalities in (2.15) are
strict. At the optimal solution to (2.11), either firm 1 or both firm 1 and firm
2 are producing. Firm 1 is the only firm producing at the equilibrium when
a1 + µ̄e1 < a2 + µ̄e2; both firms might be producing when equality holds, since
then both are equally cheap. Hence, independent of the level of demand, we
know which firm(s) will be producing at the equilibrium.
In order to see that we cannot necessarily guarantee that the total amount
of CO2 emitted will remain below some maximum allowance level, we will
consider a special case of taxation, namely µ̄ = µ∗. In order to distinguish
between the cap-and-trade and the taxation solution we will give the corre-
sponding variables a superscript E and T, respectively. First, recall that in the
cap-and-trade model, for given E, firms j and h, with j the relatively dirty but
cheap firm and h the relatively clean but expensive firm, are found as pro-
ducing firms at the equilibrium in (2.10). By Proposition 2.1, we have optimal


















Now, we choose µ̄ = µ∗. Obviously, the optimal solution (xE∗, pE∗) is also an
optimal solution to (2.11), since the set of KKT conditions to (2.11) is a subset of
(2.13). Hence, firm j and firm h must be the first two firms in the merit order
(2.15) and their effective marginal costs are equal, namely aj + µ̄ej = ah +
µ̄eh. Therefore, any convex combination xT∗with (xT∗j , x
T∗
h ) between (d, 0) and
(0, d) is also a solution to the fixed tax problem (2.11); see Figure 2.1 where we
draw the set of optimal solutions for firms j and h. In fact, there is a trade-off
between producing with the cheaper technology and satisfying the emission
constraint. The total emission will depend on this trade-off, and may exceed
the maximum allowance level E. To see this, note that for the solution xT∗
with (xT∗j , x
T∗
h ) = (d, 0), ejd is the total amount of CO2 emitted; however, by
the choice of j and h, we have ejd > E. Hence, this solution would not have
been allowed in (2.10). In particular, all points on the dotted line in Figure
2.1 would exceed the maximum allowance level, although they give optimal
solutions of (2.11).
On the other hand, all solutions xT∗ with (xT∗j , x
T∗





(0, d) do satisfy the emission constraint. This then raises the questions: Is
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Figure 2.1: Set of optimal production quantities (xT∗j , x
T∗




















one of the solutions that satisfy the emission allowance better than any other
solution? Is there a way to distinguish between several solutions by means of
some reasonable measures? We may for example focus on the total emissions,
which is obviously lowest in case (xT∗j , x
T∗
h ) = (0, d), but we may also consider
social welfare. As the environmental regulator (or government) takes action
to reduce the amount of CO2 emitted, it generates some income. This income
consists of the fixed tax collected per unit emission. We will call the total
amount the regulator earns from a certain action the regulator’s surplus. The








We next discuss why this way of computing the regulator’s surplus helps us
in distinguishing between the multiple optima. Since multiple optima means
that there is a range of values for xT∗j and x
T∗
h , there is a range of values for the
regulator’s surplus (2.16). Recall that we would like to exclude points that are
on the dotted line of Figure 2.1; that is, all points where the maximum emis-
sion allowance level would be violated. Analyzing the remaining points, one
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can see the trade off between maximizing the regulator’s surplus and mini-
mizing the total emissions. Then (xT∗j , x
T∗




h ) is the point for which
the regulator’s surplus is maximized, whereas (xT∗j , x
T∗
h ) = (0, d) is the point
for which the total emissions are minimized; obviously, the implications of
these for "social welfare" are unclear. In addition, in reality there is no way
to enforce one of these potentially preferred solutions without imposing ad-
ditional conditions on the technology mixture (for example in the form of an
emission allowance).
2.3.4 Characterizing Unused Technologies
As mentioned earlier, when ignoring possible equal marginal cost, any specific
level of taxation, µ̄, induces a fixed merit order on the technologies. When a
technology has the lowest total marginal cost, that is, when it is the first in
the fixed merit order, it is used to satisfy (part of) the demand. This raises the
following question: For any given technology, does there exist a level of fixed
tax such that this technology is the first in the merit order? If the answer is
"not affirmative", then there is no reason for that technology to exist with its
current specifications; hence either something should be done to improve the
specifications or it should be discarded.
To answer this question, we try to characterize the technologies that can
not be the first in the merit order for any level of taxation. We give sufficient
conditions implicating when no fixed tax level exists such that a technology
is first in the merit order. We show, by means of a counter-example, that the
conditions are not necessary. In addition, a technology which satisfies the
sufficient conditions is not used in the optimal mixture in case of a maximum
emission allowance level either.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that there are n firms with n different technologies, for
which it holds that
a1 < a2 < · · · < an and e1 > e2 > · · · > en.
For k ∈ K, define
γk =
0 for k = 1,ak−a1




ek−en for k = 1, ..., n− 1
∞ for k = n.
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For any k ∈ K, if we have
γk > γi for at least one i > k, (2.17)
or
τk < τi for at least one i < k, (2.18)
then no µ̄ exists such that technology k is first in the merit order.
Proof: Let MCk denote the effective marginal costs of technology k ∈ K, that
is, MCk = ak + µ̄ek. Then γk is the level of taxation at which MC1 = MCk.
Furthermore, by the assumption that e1 > ek for k 6= 1, we have
MCk < MC1 if µ̄ > γk,
MCk > MC1 if µ̄ < γk.
(2.19)
Similarly, τk is the level of fixed tax at which MCn = MCk. By the assumption
that en < ek for k 6= n, we get
MCk < MCn if µ̄ < τk,
MCk > MCn if µ̄ > τk.
(2.20)
Consider any technology k ∈ K for which (2.17) holds; that is, for some i > k
we have γk > γi. We show that for all levels of taxation a different technology,
with lower marginal cost than technology k, can be found; that is, technology
k will always be dominated. In particular, we claim:
for 0 ≤ µ̄ < γi, MC1 < MCi and MC1 < MCk;
for γi ≤ µ̄ < γk, MCi ≤ MC1 < MCk;
for γk ≤ µ̄, MCi < MCk ≤ MC1.
The first two statements follow immediately from (2.19). To see the third state-
ment, note that we have MCi < MCk with taxation levels between γi and γk.
Since i > k, and hence ek > ei, an increase of µ̄ such that µ̄ ≥ γk does not
influence the direction of the inequality MCi < MCk.
Next, assume we have a technology k ∈ K for which (2.18) holds; that is,
for some i < k we have τk < τi. We again show that for all levels of taxation
another technology with lower marginal cost can be found. This time, we will
have:
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for τi ≤ µ̄, MCn ≤ MCi and MCn < MCk;
for τk ≤ µ̄ < τi, MCi < MCn ≤ MCk;
for 0 ≤ µ̄ < τk, MCi < MCk < MCn.
Again, the first two statements follow immediately from (2.20). The third
statement is a consequence of the assumption ei > ek. 2
Next, by means of a numerical example, we show that (2.17) and (2.18) are not
necessary conditions. That is, we have a situation in which none of the tech-
nologies satisfy (2.17) or (2.18); nevertheless, there is a technology for which
no µ̄ can ensure that this technology will be the first in the merit order.
Example 2.1. Table 2.1 contains the characteristics of five technologies and the
corresponding γ- and τ-values. None of the technologies satisfies (2.17) and
(2.18).
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the technologies.
k ak ek γk τk
1 10 0.9 0 175
2 18.8 0.8 88 204
3 20.5 0.79 95.45 205.17
4 25 0.75 100 220
5 80 0.5 175 ∞
Next, we compute the marginal costs of the firms for all levels of fixed tax.
Table 2.2 shows that for no level of taxation technology 3 is first in the merit
order. Hence, no level of fixed tax exists for which technology 3 has lowest
marginal cost.
Table 2.2: Lower and upper limits of fixed tax and the corresponding
technology that appears first in the merit order.
Lower limit Upper limit First in merit order
0 88 Technology 1
88 124 Technology 2
124 220 Technology 4
220 ∞ Technology 5
Hence, the conditions mentioned in Proposition 2.3 are not necessary. We
remark that it is possible to show that for less than five technologies the condi-
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tions are necessary, but with five or more technologies counter examples can
be found.
Finally, we find that a technology which satisfies the sufficient conditions
can not be chosen in the optimal mixture in case of a maximum emission al-
lowance level.
Corollary 2.1. For any maximum emission allowance level in (2.10), a technology
which satisfies condition (2.17) or (2.18) is not chosen in the optimal mixture.
Proof: Suppose that (2.17) or (2.18) hold for some given technology k ∈ K.
Then, for no level of taxation technology k is first in the merit order. Hence,
in the equilibrium solution to problem (2.11), the corresponding production
quantity will be zero, independent of the level of taxation. Furthermore, if
µ̄ = µ∗ is chosen, then each equilibrium solution (2.10) is a solution of (2.11).
Since technology k will not be in the solution set of (2.11) for any µ̄, it will not
be in the solution set of (2.10) for any E. 2.
2.3.5 Analyzing Effects for Consumers: CO2 Cost
Pass-Through
Reducing the total amount of CO2 emitted will obviously have a price. Since
cheap and dirty technologies are replaced by costly clean technologies, total
production cost and hence consumer prices increase. In this section we elab-
orate on to what extent additional production costs are passed through to the
consumers. In particular, we consider changes in consumers’ surplus as a re-
sult of regulator’s actions in the form of a CO2 emission cap or in the form of
taxation.
Varian (1996) introduces consumers’ surplus as follows. Each consumer is
willing to pay a certain price for a good. In case of fixed, inelastic demand, the
consumer is supposed to be willing to pay any price for the good. In an elec-
tricity market without demand side bidding, it is customary to assume that
consumers are willing to pay any price up to VOLL to obtain the electricity.
Every price below VOLL thus generates a surplus for the consumer. Hence,
the consumers’ surplus (CS) is taken as the difference between the price con-
sumers are willing to pay and the actual price paid for each unit of demand.
Given the demand d and the price of electricity p∗, the consumers’ surplus can
be calculated as
CS = (VOLL− p∗)d. (2.21)
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The total production cost (PC) can be computed by multiplying the effective
marginal costs, consisting of investment, production, and emission cost, with






We first consider the effect of going from one maximum emission allowance
level to a lower maximum emission allowance level in (2.10). We distinguish
between two possibilities. In the first one, both allowance levels are such that
we are in case (i) or case (iii) of Proposition 2.1. In the second one, one al-
lowance level is such that we are in case (i) or (iii) of Proposition 2.1 and the
other allowance level is such that we are in case (ii) of Proposition 2.1, that is,
the allowance level is so low that even the cleanest firm cannot satisfy demand
without violating the emission constraint. We do not consider the possibility
in which both allowance levels are such that we are in case (ii) of Proposition
2.1, since in this case a change of the allowance level has no effect on con-
sumers. We show that the consumers’ surplus is decreasing with the emission
allowance level. We also show that in the first case the decrease in consumers’
surplus equals the increase in production cost, whereas in the second case the
decrease in consumers’ surplus is larger than the additional production cost
incurred.
We start with three different maximum allowance levels E1, E2, and E3 such
that E1 > E2 > E3. Assume that E1 and E2 are such that we are in case (i) or
case (iii) of Proposition 2.1; that is, we are in the first alternative. We know that
either one or two technologies are first in the merit order and hence the market
prices p1∗ and p2∗, corresponding to E1 and E2, respectively, will be set by the
effective marginal costs of these technologies. By Proposition 2.2, we know
that p1∗ < p2∗. Furthermore, the total output is d. Using (2.21) and (2.22),
one can easily see that the decrease in consumers’ surplus and the increase in
production cost are:
∆CS = CSE2 − CSE1 = (VOLL− p2∗)d− (VOLL− p1∗)d = (p1∗ − p2∗)d
and
∆PC = PCE2 − PCE1 = (p2∗ − p1∗)d.
Since p1∗ < p2∗, the consumers’ surplus is decreasing as E decreases; the de-
crease in consumers’ surplus is equal to the increase in total production cost,
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implying that the CO2 cost pass-through to consumers is 100%.
Next, consider the second alternative: With the maximum allowance level
E2 we are in case (i) or (iii) of Proposition 2.1, and with the maximum al-
lowance level E3 we are in case (ii) of Proposition 2.1. That is, when the al-
lowance level equals E2, the consumer price and the marginal cost equal p2∗,
and the total output equals d; when the allowance level is E3, demand can no
longer be satisfied. Then, the cleanest firm, by assumption firm n, is the only
producer and is allowed to produce a quantity equal to E3en ; VOLL-pricing is
in effect and the price of allowances will be VOLL−anen . Hence, the effective
marginal cost of firm n equals an + en VOLL−anen = VOLL. Using (2.21) and
(2.22), the decrease in consumers’ surplus and the increase in production cost
are:
∆CS = CSE3 − CSE2 = (VOLL−VOLL)E3
en
− (VOLL− p2∗)d =
(p2∗ −VOLL)d
and
∆PC = PCE3 − PCE2 = VOLL E3
en
− p2∗d.
Since E3en < d by assumption, there is a negative gap between the increase in
production cost and the decrease in consumers’ surplus. All additional pro-
duction costs are passed through to the consumers, but there is an extra loss
for the consumers due to the lower total output. Obviously, this is a situation
where E3 is set to such a low value necessitating to curb the total production.
Next, we turn our attention to the fixed tax model (2.11). We consider two
different levels of fixed tax, µ̄1 and µ̄2 with µ̄1 < µ̄2. Suppose only one firm
is producing the entire quantity demanded, d; hence, the corresponding con-
sumer prices, p1∗ and p2∗, respectively, will be set by the producing firm’s
effective marginal cost. Again, the corresponding decrease in consumers’ sur-
plus and increase in production cost can be found using (2.21) and (2.22), that
is,
∆CS = CSµ̄
2 − CSµ̄1 = (VOLL− p2∗)d− (VOLL− p1∗)d = (p1∗ − p2∗)d
and
∆PC = PCµ̄
2 − PCµ̄1 = (p2∗ − p1∗)d.
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It is easy to check that p1∗ < p2∗. Hence, again the consumers’ surplus is
decreasing as µ̄ increases. Furthermore, the decrease in consumers’ surplus
is exactly equal to the increase in total production cost; hence the CO2 cost
pass-through to consumers is again 100%.
Similar to the results of Chen et al. (2008) and Bonacina and Gullí (2007),
we see that under the assumption of deterministic demand and exogenous
CO2 costs (e.g. fixed tax), the CO2 cost pass-through to consumers is 100%
not only in the short run but also in a market with optimal generation capac-
ities in the long run. In addition, we see that when CO2 allowance prices are
endogenously determined by the market, the CO2 cost pass-through to con-
sumers is again 100% except when the CO2 allowance cap is too low. When
the cap is too low, demand is curtailed with additional cost and the CO2 cost
pass-through to consumers exceeds 100%.
2.4 The Investment Model - Stochastic Exogenous
Demand
In previous sections, we considered the impact of a CO2 emission allowance
on the technology mixture and the CO2 cost pass through to consumers in a
deterministic setting. In reality, there are uncertainties in an electricity market
related to future demand, fuel prices, and emission allowances set by the regu-
lator. Hence, extending the deterministic framework by including uncertainty
provides more insight into the consequences of CO2 regulation in reality. In
this section we deal with uncertainty in demand. Realized demand is assumed
to be unknown to the firms at the first stage, and will be revealed to the firms
at the second stage. In particular, the first stage decisions can be seen as long
term decisions, that is, capacity investments are made for a certain period, for
example a year, and are based on the possible future outcomes of the second
stage. The second stage decisions can then be seen as short term, for example
hourly or daily, decisions. Uncertainty about the second stage outcomes may
affect the choice of technology and its investment level at the first stage, that
is, in order to deal with both peak and off-peak demand realizations, firms
may want to invest in broader mixtures of technologies.
Whereas the deterministic setting allowed us to derive analytical results,
the most convenient way to derive results in the stochastic setting is via a
numerical study. When the random demand distribution is given, sampling
is a handy tool for deriving numerical results. After introducing the general
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version of the model including stochastic demand, we will state the sampled
problem. In the next section, we use the sampled problem to analyze a small
network in a numerical study.
In Section 2.4.1 we briefly introduce the altered investment model including
cap-and-trade and introduce how to solve this model as a large MCP using
sampling. The altered fixed tax model is introduced in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 Introducing the Two-Stage Game Including an Emission
Allowance Level
We assume that demand is determined by a random process. The demand at
node n ∈ N is denoted by dn(ω), which has a continuous joint distribution
Ψ. Here ω ∈ Ω is a random vector in Ω, the space of possible outcomes. The
probability distribution and its possible outcomes are known to the firms at
the first stage. The realized demand will be revealed to the firms at the second
stage. For each ω ∈ Ω there may be a different optimal second stage outcome
depending on the demand realization.
At the first stage, firms consider the expected optimal second stage profit
based on the information they have on the probability distribution of demand.



















where optimal production quantities ygik(x
g, ω), g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg, and
price of electricity pi(ω), i ∈ I, for a given realization ω ∈ Ω, are taken from
the second stage with xg the investment quantity. µ is the price of emission
allowances, that will now be determined at the first stage; that is, since a maxi-
mum emission allowance level is typically set for a certain period, for example
a year, the emission allowance constraint is going to be a first stage constraint.
We impose that the expected (average) emission over all realizations of the
second stage should be less than or equal to the maximum allowance level E,
while the price of emission allowances will have to be perpendicular to that
constraint, that is,











 ⊥ µ ≥ 0. (2.24)
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Next, we write the OPF problem that solves all second stage problems for
given x and in any ω ∈ Ω. As a result of imposing (2.24), firms pay µ for
each unit of CO2 they emit. Hence, contrary to the OPF problem (2.7) in the
deterministic case, we get a term ekµ in the OPF’s objective function. For given




















f j(ω) ≥ dj(ω) (pj(ω)) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f j(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≤ hl (λ+l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
− ∑
j∈N∪I





ik(ω)) ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
ygik(ω) ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
δj(ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(2.25)
An equilibrium to the two-stage game can be found by solving for each firm
g ∈ G the first stage problem (2.23) such that (2.24) is satisfied, while solving
for each possible realization the second stage problem (2.25). As the set of
possible realizations is often very large or even uncountable, we are going
to use a sample of the given demand distribution as we explain in the next
section.
Solving the Two-Stage Game as an MCP
In order to solve the two-stage game with random demand, we generate a
random sample ω1, ω2, ..., ωM from Ω and let dn(ωm) be the demand at node
n ∈ N of realization ωm for m ∈ {1, ..., M}. As we have a random sample, the
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where pi(ωm), i ∈ I, and ygik(xg, ωm), g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg, are the price of elec-
tricity and the optimal production quantities of firm g at xg in realization ωm,
taken from the second stage. The corresponding KKT optimality condition of
the sampled problem (2.26) is










ik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg, (2.27)
as shown by Gürkan et al. (2013). Here, β∗gik (ωm) is the optimal scarcity rent
of firm g ∈ G in supply node i ∈ Ig for technology k ∈ Kg in realization
ωm, m ∈ {1, . . . , M}, taken from the second stage problem with x = x∗. The
condition (2.27) implies that the (sample) averaged scarcity rent should cover
the unit investment costs. If that is not the case, no investments will be done.
The sampled market clearing condition with respect to the emission allowance
is















 ⊥ µ∗ ≥ 0. (2.28)
The interpretation of this condition is as follows. Each ωm, m = 1, ..., M, can
be seen as a realization occurring at day m; M is the length of a period, let’s
say a year. The term between the brackets is the daily emission, whereas the
sum over all realizations is the yearly emission. The regulator then imposes a
maximum allowance level, E, per day, that should be satisfied on average.
At the second stage, in any realization we solve the OPF problem; that is, for
given x = (xg)g∈G, and in any realization ωm, m ∈ {1, . . . , M}, we find a solu-
tion y∗(ωm), δ∗(ωm), p∗(ωm), β∗(ωm), λ∗+(ωm), λ∗−(ωm), ρ∗(ωm), f ∗(ωm) to
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the following set of KKT-conditions:
0 ≤ β∗gik (ωm)− p∗i (ωm) + c
g
ik+
ekµ∗ ⊥ y∗gik (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg





y∗gjk (ωm) + δ
∗
j (ωm)+
f ∗j (ωm)− dj(ωm) ⊥ p∗j (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ xgik − y
∗g
ik (ωm) ⊥ β
∗g
ik (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ωm) ⊥ λ∗+l (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I




PTDFl,j(λ∗+l (ωm)− λ∗−l (ωm))+
p∗j (ωm)− ρ∗(ωm) = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j (ωm) = 0.
Combining the conditions for the first stage (2.27) for all g ∈ G, the emis-
sion constraint (2.28), and the second stage conditions (2.29) for all ωm, m =
1, ..., M, we get an MCP which finds an approximation of the equilibrium solu-
tion to the entire two-stage stochastic game. When the original (deterministic)
problem is large (namely when we have a large network), solving this large
(sampled) MCP may become too time consuming. In our numerical experi-
ments we therefore consider a small network.
2.4.2 Introducing the Two-Stage Game Including a Fixed Tax
The fixed tax model with stochastic demand is similar to the model defined
by Gürkan et al. (2013). There is no emission constraint and the price per unit
emission does not depend on the demand realization. Hence, in the above
sampled version of the model we replace the variable µ∗ by the parameter µ̄
and omit the emission constraint (2.24). The resulting sampled MCP is to find
a solution x∗, y∗(ωm), δ∗(ωm), p∗(ωm), β∗(ωm), λ∗+(ωm), λ∗−(ωm), ρ∗(ωm),
f ∗(ωm), m = 1, ..., M, satisfying










ik ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg,
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and for each realization ωm, m = 1, ..., M,
0 ≤ β∗gik (ωm)− p∗i (ωm) + c
g
ik+
ekµ̄ ⊥ y∗gik (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg





y∗gjk (ωm) + δ
∗
j (ωm)+
f ∗j (ωm)− dj(ωm) ⊥ p∗j (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ x∗gik − y
∗g
ik (ωm) ⊥ β
∗g
ik (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ Ig, k ∈ Kg
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ωm) ⊥ λ∗+l (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ωm) ⊥ λ∗−l (ωm) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l (ωm)− λ∗−l (ωm))+
p∗j (ωm)− ρ∗(ωm) = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j (ωm) = 0.
2.5 Numerical Study
In this section we consider a six-node example for analyzing the effect of an
emission constraint and a fixed tax on the investments under demand uncer-
tainty. In the deterministic setting in Section 2.3 we derived some results con-
cerning the merit order and the number of technologies used at equilibrium.
We show how stochastic demand results in broader technology mixtures. In
addition, we investigate the adequacy of cap-and-trade and taxation when
the network capacity is limited. We observe that, in order to curb CO2 lev-
els, investments in network capacity may be necessary. Finally, we establish
a relationship between the optimal outcome of the cap-and-trade model and
the taxation model. It turns out that the result partly coincides with the result
derived for the deterministic setting in Section 2.3.3.
2.5.1 Experimental Data
There are three supplying firms, each located in a different node and having
a unique technology at their disposal; we therefore use a single index k to dis-
tinguish between the firms. The three technologies available are coal (Coal),
open cycle gas turbine (OCGT), and closed cycle gas turbine (CCGT), used by
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firm 1 in node 1, firm 2 in node 2, and firm 3 in node 3, respectively. In ad-
dition, there are three demand nodes, nodes 4, 5, and 6. The network, which
was originally introduced by Chao and Peck (1998), is depicted in Figure 2.2.
We assume infinite capacity on all transmission lines, except for lines (1, 6)
and (2, 5), for which we assume there is a finite capacity later on. For a line
(i, j) we assume that i < j and transmission through l goes from i to j. Table
2.3 contains the PTDFs representing the flows through lines (1, 6) and (2, 5)
resulting from a power injection into nodes 1 through 5; node 6 is taken as the
hub node and thus has coefficients 0.
Figure 2.2: The electricity network.
d4(w)
d5(w) d6(w)
Table 2.3: Power transmission distribution factors of lines (1, 6) and
(2, 5).
line/node 1 2 3 4 5
(1, 5) 0.625 0.5 0.5625 0.0625 0.125
(2, 6) 0.375 0.5 0.4375 -0.0625 -0.125
Table 2.4 contains the characteristics of the technologies, consisting of per
unit production costs (ck), investment costs (κk), both in euros per MWh, and
tons of CO2 emission (ek).
These characteristics are taken from Ehrenmann and Smeers (2008). Notice
that, in contrary to the deterministic demand case, to compute the effective
CHAPTER 2: Introducing CO2 Allowances, Higher Prices for All Consumers;
Higher Revenues for Whom? 59
Table 2.4: Characteristics of the technologies.
Coal OCGT CCGT
ck 30 80 45
κk 18.3 6.8 9.1
ek 1 0.6 0.35
marginal costs we cannot simply add the investment and production costs,
since the investment quantity is not necessarily equal to the production
amount in case of demand uncertainty.
Demand dn(ω) in demand nodes n = 4, 5, 6 is assumed to be independently
distributed. They are sampled from uniform distributions with lower bound
an and upper bound bn, as given in Table 2.5.





We take a sample of 3000 realizations and solve the resulting MCP using the
PATH solver; see Ferris and Munson (2000). Using a 300MHz Pentium-II with
1 GB RAM, computation times are around three hours for each allowance level
we consider for cap-and-trade, and 15 minutes for each level of fixed taxation.
The difference in computational times is caused by the emission allowance
condition (2.28) that involves production of all three firms in 3000 realizations.
2.5.2 The Effect of Maximum Allowance Level on Uncapaci-
tated and Capacitated Networks
We consider optimal investment quantities for maximum allowance levels
E = 1, 2, ..., 35 in three different settings, namely an uncapacitated network,
transmission line (1, 6) having limited capacity, and transmission line (2, 5)
having limited capacity.
For the network without capacity constraints on the transmission lines, the
optimal investment amounts in coal, OCGT, and CCGT are depicted in Fig-
ure 2.3. We observe that up to E = 11 only CCGT is used to satisfy the de-
mand. Afterwards, up to E = 31, CCGT is gradually replaced by coal and
OCGT since a more polluting mix of technologies is allowed. We observe that,
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in comparison to the deterministic demand case, broader mixtures are used;
OCGT would never be used in the deterministic setting due to the high pro-
duction cost. However, since its investment cost is low, a positive investment
in OCGT turns out to be profitable in order to satisfy peak demand realiza-
tions. For E ≥ 31 the emission constraint is not active and hence investments
will be unaffected.
Figure 2.3: The optimal investment quantities for different maximum
emission allowance levels in case of infinite network ca-
pacity.





























Next, we consider a network with a capacity of 5 on line (1, 6). As a result,
the PTDF-constraints will be of importance and prices and hence investment
decisions will be influenced; the optimal investment amounts are depicted
in Figure 2.4. Up to the level E = 22, Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.3 look very
similar. However, starting at the point E = 22 higher levels of production
via coal would result in exceeding the transmission capacity of the line (1, 6);
consequently, no more CCGT is replaced by coal beyond that level. In fact
the network is cleaner due to its limited transmission capacity. One would
say that the network does the cleaning here, but since the allowance level is
not binding this is not very interesting when it comes to CO2 emission reduc-
tion. In addition, depending on the network structure, one may even observe
more polluting mixtures in the absence of an allowance level due to limited
transmission capacities.
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Figure 2.4: The optimal investment quantities for different maximum
emission allowance levels in case there is a transmission
capacity of 5 on line (1, 6).





























A similar behavior is observed when we choose a transmission capacity of
4 on line (2, 5) and no limit on line (1, 6). The optimal investment amounts are
depicted in Figure 2.5. We observe two major differences between Figure 2.5
and Figure 2.3. At E = 11 up to E = 14, a strictly positive investment is made
in OCGT. The transmission capacity of line (2, 5) causes this behavior. The
mixture of technologies chosen ensures that both the emission constraint and
the transmission capacity constraint are not violated. Apparently, in this case
the extra constraint associated with the transmission line capacity blocks in-
vestments in CCGT and instead motivates investments in OCGT. Clearly, this
is a typical example illustrating that the shortage of transmission line capacity
is preventing the cap-and-trade system to reach one of its main goals, namely
to induce investments in cleaner technologies. While the regulator is creating
financial incentives for firms to invest in cleaner technologies, investments in
more polluting technologies are continued due to the limited network capac-
ity. Hence, to really induce investments in cleaner technologies, investments
in network capacity may also become necessary.
The other main difference between Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.3 occurs at E =
26. Starting at this point, higher levels of production via coal would result in
exceeding the transmission capacity of line (2, 5); therefore the replacement of
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CCGT by coal cannot continue in the same way as observed in Figure 2.3. This
actually causes a reduction in the total emissions starting at E = 26; in fact,
a similar behavior was observed in Figure 2.4 at E = 22. These are examples
showing that the limited network transmission capacity by itself may lower
the total emissions. However, as noted before, it may also induce more invest-
ments in more polluting technologies, depending on the network structure.
Figure 2.5: The optimal investment quantities for different maximum
emission allowance levels in case there is a transmission
capacity of 4 on line (2, 5).





























2.5.3 The Effect of Taxation Level on Uncapacitated and Ca-
pacitated Networks
In this section we discuss the effect of a fixed tax on the investment quan-
tities. In order to analyze the impact of transmission capacity on the optimal
mixture of technologies and the total emissions, we again distinguish between
three different settings, namely an uncapacitated network, transmission line
(1, 6) having limited capacity, and transmission line (2, 5) having limited ca-
pacity. We take µ̄ = 0, ..., 20 for the first two settings and µ̄ = 0, ..., 75 for the
third setting. Note that µ̄ = 0 corresponds to an electricity market without an
emission limit (E = ∞).
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The optimal investment quantities in the network without capacities on the
transmission lines are depicted in Figure 2.6. At µ̄ = 0, the optimal invest-
ment quantities in coal, CCGT, and OCGT coincide with the optimal invest-
ment quantities in Figure 2.3 when E ≥ 34, because the emission constraint
is not binding. As µ̄ increases from µ̄ = 0 to µ̄ = 8, we observe that the in-
vestment in coal is slowly decreasing and replaced by investments in CCGT.
That is caused by the increasing cost per unit production as a result of the
increasing taxation. Since coal based generation emits more CO2 per unit gen-
eration, its marginal cost increases more rapidly with µ̄ than the marginal cost
of CCGT based generation. Therefore, as the fixed tax level increases, invest-
ments in CCGT become more attractive. Note that investments in CCGT are
done although the sum of the marginal production cost, the tax paid for the
emissions, and the investment cost, in other words what we have been calling
the "effective" marginal cost, of CCGT may not be lowest. Recall that in the
deterministic case only investments in the cheapest technology were done. In
the stochastic demand case it may still be optimal to invest in a technology
with higher "effective" marginal cost when the unit investment cost is rela-
tively low. Such investments are optimal when the corresponding capacity is
mostly used for peak demand realizations.
We observe that for high levels of fixed tax, from µ̄ = 9 to µ̄ = 20, all
coal is replaced by CCGT. As we mentioned before, when the tax per unit
emission increases, the "effective" marginal cost of coal increases more rapidly
than the marginal cost of CCGT. Beyond µ̄ = 9 coal becomes more expensive
than CCGT, making investment in CCGT more attractive than investment in
coal-based generation. Finally, we see that the investments in OCGT are at a
constant level throughout to serve the peak demand.
We next consider a network with a capacity of 5 on line (1, 6); the resulting
optimal investments are depicted in Figure 2.7. There is one major difference
between Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.6. Up to µ̄ = 8, the investment in coal is at a
much lower level, whereas the investment in CCGT is higher; this is obviously
caused by the network capacity. The limited network capacity thus leads to a
cleaner mixture. Beyond µ̄ = 9, the curves look similar.
We finally put a capacity of 4 on line (2, 5); the results are shown in Figure
2.8. We extend the fixed tax levels to µ̄ = 75. This would not be interesting in
the previous two cases, since results beyond µ̄ = 20 would be the same. How-
ever, when h(2,5) = 4, we observe different behavior. Comparing Figure 2.8
with Figure 2.6, we notice that up to µ̄ = 8 production with coal is somewhat
lower in Figure 2.8; this is again due to the limited network capacity. At µ̄ = 9,
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Figure 2.6: The optimal investment quantities for different values of
fixed tax in case the network capacity is infinite.





























Figure 2.7: The optimal investment quantities for different values of
fixed tax in case there is a transmission capacity of 5 on
line (1, 6).
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Figure 2.8: The optimal investment quantities for different values of
fixed tax in case there is a transmission capacity of 4 on
line (2, 5).





























CCGT starts dominating coal in both figures. However, in this case since the
transmission capacity of the network is not sufficient to replace all coal based
generation by CCGT based generation, investments in coal remain at a pos-
itive level beyond µ̄ = 9. In other words, for high levels of carbon tax the
reduction in the total emissions would be higher if line (2, 5) had more capac-
ity. This example illustrates that a financial incentive like the carbon tax may
not be sufficient to curb the CO2 levels when there is insufficient transmission
capacity.
In addition, we observe that beyond µ̄ = 20 investments in OCGT are
slowly increasing and replacing investments in coal. Although coal has lower
marginal production cost, the increasing taxation causes the effective marginal
cost to increase up to a point where the effective marginal cost of coal and
OCGT are equal; that is, at µ̄ = 69. Starting from that point, it is less costly to
invest in OCGT than in coal. We did not see such behavior before. This can be
explained by the fact that in the other two examples coal was replaced by the
cheaper and less polluting CCGT. Since with the current transmission capac-
ity this is not feasible, OCGT is used. Still, since OCGT is more polluting than
CCGT, the transmission capacity induces higher total emissions and hence in-
vestments in transmission capacity may be necessary to curb CO2 levels.
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2.5.4 Establishing a Relationship between Maximum
Allowance Level and Taxation
In Section 2.3.3 we considered a special case of taxation, namely the fixed tax µ̄
equal to the optimal price of emission allowance µ∗ for some given maximum
allowance level E. We found that for this taxation level multiple optima exist
and that the optimal cap-and-trade solution is one of them. Between the mul-
tiple optima, a trade-off exists between minimizing pollution and maximizing
regulator’s surplus. A similar result can be observed when the demand is
stochastic.
We assume stochastic demand and let µ∗ be the optimal price of emission
allowance for some given E. Next, we take µ̄ = µ∗ and find a solution to the
taxation model. We observe two possible outcomes. Either we find a single
optimum which then coincides with the optimum found in the cap-and-trade
model, or, similar to what we found when demand is deterministic, we find
multiple optima, of which the cap-and-trade solution is one. The latter occurs
when µ∗ induces two technologies with equal effective marginal cost. Our
numerical results show that this is often the case. We next show an example
of both possible outcomes.
In Figure 2.9 we depict the optimal allowance price for a range of E in a
network with infinite capacities. We fix an E, take the corresponding optimal
price of emission allowances as the fixed tax, and then compare the optimal
investment quantities of both models. We first take E = 30. In Figure 2.9
we observe that the corresponding price of emission allowances is µ∗ = 6.66.
Taking µ̄ = 6.66 results in a single optimum, see Figure 2.6. This optimum
coincides with the optimal investment quantities in the cap-and-trade model
when E = 30, as can be seen in Figure 2.3.
Next we consider E = 15. In Figure 2.9 we observe that the corresponding
price of emission allowances is µ∗ = 8.92. Taking µ̄ = 8.92 will make the
effective marginal cost of coal and CCGT equal. As a result a central decision
maker would be indifferent between the two technologies. When solving the
taxation model with this particular taxation level, we find a range of optimal
solutions. This can be seen in Figure 2.6, where at a certain point a jump
occurs. This jump occurs exactly at µ̄ = 8.92; all points in between represent
optimal investment quantities. We thus have multiple optima, of which some
may violate the allowance level of 15 and some may be cleaner. Similar to
the deterministic case, as discussed in Section 2.3.3, there exists a trade-off
between minimizing pollution and maximizing regulator’s surplus. One of
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Figure 2.9: The optimal price of emission allowance for different max-
imum emission allowance levels in case of infinite network
capacity.
















the multiple solutions results in a total emission of exactly 15. That solution
coincides with the cap-and-trade solution.
Concluding, taking the optimal price of emission allowances as the fixed
tax either results in the same unique optimal solution, or results in multiple
optima of which the cap-and-trade solution is one.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we address the effect of two possible actions at the disposal of
a regulator to curb CO2 emission levels and to give power generating firms
incentives to invest in cleaner technologies. In a stylized version of the invest-
ment model with no network effects and deterministic inelastic demand, we
show that it is optimal to use a mixture of a relatively clean and a relatively
dirty technology to satisfy the demand under the cap-and-trade system. For
a fixed ceiling on the total emissions and for different demand levels, there
can be a different optimal mixture of technologies. We also propose an algo-
rithm that finds such an optimal mixture. Furthermore, we analytically show
that the price of electricity and the price of allowances increase as the ceiling
on the total emissions decreases; and the extra production costs incurred are
fully passed through to the consumers.
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In comparison, when a fixed carbon tax per unit emission is charged, we
observe a fixed merit order on the firms. We give a characterization of tech-
nologies for which no fixed tax level exists, such that they are first in the merit
order. Consequently, these technologies will never be used in the optimal tech-
nology mixture. We show that these technologies will not be in the optimal
mixture in case of a cap-and-trade system either.
We also analyze the investment model with network effects and stochastic
inelastic demand through a numerical study and discuss the implications of
limited network capacity. We find that due to demand uncertainty a broader
mix of technologies is used in the optimal mixture, both with cap-and-trade
and carbon tax. We observe that in case of cap-and-trade, limited network
capacity may cause that investments in dirty technologies are necessary to
satisfy the demand without violating the transmission constraints. Hence,
cleaner mixtures of technologies are not necessarily induced when there is
limited network capacity. In case a carbon tax per unit emission is charged,
we observe that limited transmission capacity puts a limit on the replacement
of dirty technology by clean technology. In other words, the reduction of the
total emissions due to taxation would be higher if there was more available
transmission capacity. Hence, in order to curb CO2 levels, investments in net-
work capacity may be necessary. Finally, we establish a connection between
the equilibria in both models and find that, when taking the optimal price of
emission allowances as the fixed tax, multiple optima may exist. When this is
the case, some optima violate the emission allowance constraint, and one of
the optima coincides with the cap-and-trade solution.
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2.7 Appendix: Proof of the Forward Algorithm
In this appendix we will show the following for the Forward Algorithm:
1. Given a j∗, choosing h∗ ∈ H̄ which minimizes the given quotient in Step
2 guarantees that (2.12) is satisfied.
2. Given a jE, if we find a corresponding hE /∈ H in Step 2, then we need to
update j∗ = hE. Else, for at least one firm, (2.12) is violated.
Proof of 1. Suppose J 6= ∅ and define J̄ = {1} and H̄ = {2, ..., n}. In Step 2 of
the algorithm we choose
h∗ = arg min
h∈H̄
{ ah − a1
e1 − eh
}.
For the sake of clarity, assume throughout the proof that the minimum found
in this step is unique. If not, one can still find an optimal solution as we argue
in the Observation below. By the choice of h∗ we obtain for every k ∈ H̄,
0 ≤ ak − a1
e1 − ek
− ah∗ − a1
e1 − eh∗
=
ak(e1 − eh∗) + a1(eh∗ − ek) + ah∗(ek − e1)
(e1 − ek)(e1 − eh∗)
.
Since the denominator is positive, (2.12) follows. Note that equality holds for
k = h∗.
Suppose we have h∗ /∈ H. Hence we define new candidate sets J̄ = {1, ..., h∗}
and H̄ = {h∗ + 1, ..., n}. We take j∗ = h∗ and find the new h∗, denoted by h∗∗,
as
h∗∗ = arg min
h∈H̄
{ ah − ah∗
eh∗ − eh
}.
Next, we prove that by this choice (2.12) is satisfied for all k. Notice that, since
we altered j∗ and h∗, (2.12) will have the following form:
ak(eh∗ − eh∗∗) + ah∗(eh∗∗ − ek) + ah∗∗(ek − eh∗) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}. (2.30)
We will show that (2.30) holds in two parts; first for k ∈ H̄, then for k /∈ H̄.
For every k ∈ H̄
0 ≤ ak − ah∗
eh∗ − ek
− ah∗∗ − ah∗
eh∗ − eh∗∗
=
ak(eh∗ − eh∗∗) + ah∗(eh∗∗ − ek) + ah∗∗(ek − eh∗)
(eh∗ − ek)(eh∗ − eh∗∗)
,
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and (2.30) follows for k ∈ H̄, since the denominator is positive.
For every k /∈ H̄, first observe that (2.12) holds for every k when j = 1 and
h = h∗, as found in the first iteration. That is,
ak(e1 − eh∗) + a1(eh∗ − ek) + ah∗(ek − e1) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}. (2.31)
In particular, for k = h∗∗, we have
ah∗∗(e1 − eh∗) + a1(eh∗ − eh∗∗) + ah∗(eh∗∗ − e1) ≥ 0. (2.32)
Note that (2.31) implies
ak ≥
a1(ek − eh∗) + ah∗(e1 − ek)
(e1 − eh∗)
∀k /∈ H̄. (2.33)
We will finally use this together with (2.32) to show that (2.30) holds for k /∈ H̄:
ak(eh∗ − eh∗∗) + ah∗(eh∗∗ − ek) + ah∗∗(ek − eh∗) ≥
a1(ek − eh∗) + ah∗(e1 − ek)
(e1 − eh∗)
(eh∗ − eh∗∗) + ah∗(eh∗∗ − ek) + ah∗∗(ek − eh∗) =
ek − eh∗
e1 − eh∗
(ah∗∗(e1 − eh∗) + a1(eh∗ − eh∗∗) + ah∗(eh∗∗ − e1)) ≥ 0.
The first inequality follows from (2.33) and eh∗ > eh∗∗ , and the last inequality
follows from (2.32) and by the fact that ek ≥ eh∗ ∀k /∈ H̄. This shows that (2.30)
holds for every k. 2
Proof of 2. Given a j∗, say jE, suppose we found a corresponding hE with
hE /∈ H. Then, we define the new candidate sets J̄ = {1, ..., hE} and H̄ =
{hE + 1, ..., n}. Suppose in the next iteration we do not choose j∗ = hE, but
j∗ = k0 for some k0 ∈ {jE + 1, ..., hE − 1} and find the corresponding new h∗
as m0 ∈ H̄ using Step 2. We show that with this choice (2.12) will be violated
for k = hE, that is
ahE(ek0 − em0) + ak0(em0 − ehE) + am0(ehE − ek0) ≤ 0. (2.34)
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First observe that, since for jE we found hE, (2.12) holds for every k. In partic-
ular, for k = k0 and k = m0; that is,
ak0(ejE − ehE) + ajE(ehE − ek0) + ahE(ek0 − ejE) ≥ 0 (2.35)
and
am0(ejE − ehE) + ajE(ehE − em0) + ahE(em0 − ejE) ≥ 0. (2.36)
Furthermore, (2.35) implies
ak0 ≥
ajE(ek0 − ehE) + ahE(ejE − ek0)
(ejE − ehE)
. (2.37)
We finally use this together with (2.36) to show (2.34):
ahE(ek0 − em0) + ak0(em0 − ehE) + am0(ehE − ek0) ≤
ahE(ek0 − em0) +
ajE(ek0 − ehE) + ahE(ejE − ek0)
(ejE − ehE)




am0(ejE − ehE) + ahE(em0 − ejE) + ajE(ehE − em0)
)
≤ 0.
The first inequality follows from (2.37) and the fact that em0 < ehE , and the last
inequality follows from (2.36) and the fact that ehE < ek0 < ejE . This shows
that (2.34) holds. Hence, (2.12) is violated for k = hE. 2
Observation: As a final remark, notice that when taking the argmin in Step
2 of the algorithm, the minimum may not be unique. Suppose that for a j∗ we
find that both h∗1 and h
∗





h∗i = arg min
h∈H̄
{ ah − aj
∗
ej∗ − eh
}, i = 1, 2.
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Notice that these quantities are actually the resulting prices of emission al-
lowances, µ∗, if we would choose one of the pairs in {j∗, h∗1 , h∗2} in the optimal
mixture. This means that for all pairs in {j∗, h∗1 , h∗2}, µ∗ is equal and as a con-
sequence p∗ is equal as well. Hence, if for one pair (2.12) is satisfied, it is
automatically satisfied for the other pairs in case the argmin finds more than
one minimizer. The first equality in (2.38) follows immediately since both h∗1
and h∗2 give a minimum. Rewriting the first equality gives
ej∗ − eh∗1 =
ah∗1 − aj∗
ah∗2 − aj∗
(ej∗ − eh∗2 ). (2.39)







ah∗1 (ej∗ − eh∗2 ) + aj∗(eh∗2 − eh∗1 ) + ah∗2 (eh∗1 − ej∗)
(ej∗ − eh∗1 )(eh∗1 − eh∗2 )
=
ah∗1 (ej∗ − eh∗2 ) + aj∗(eh∗2 − ej∗) + (ah∗2 − aj∗)(eh∗1 − ej∗)
(ej∗ − eh∗1 )(eh∗1 − eh∗2 )
=
ah∗1 (ej∗ − eh∗2 ) + aj∗(eh∗2 − ej∗) + (ah∗1 − aj∗)(eh∗2 − ej∗)
(ej∗ − eh∗1 )(eh∗1 − eh∗2 )
= 0.
The first and second equality follow by rewriting, whereas the third equality
follows by replacing (eh∗1 − ej∗) according to (2.39). Hence, for all pairs the
fraction is equal and any pair can be chosen as an optimal pair.
CHAPTER 3
MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
OBLIGATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY BANDINGS IN THE
UK ELECTRICITY MARKET
3.1 Introduction
In decentralized electricity markets, firms are mainly focussed on maximiz-
ing their profits while competing with other firms. Investments in cheap and
often polluting technologies tend to serve these goals well. This is in con-
flict with the goals set by governments as they aim at reducing pollution and
want therefore to create incentives to make investments in cleaner technolo-
gies more attractive. Charging firms for their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
through either taxation or a cap-and-trade system in which firms need to buy
emission permits, are two possible actions regulators can implement to make
production with polluting technologies more expensive and therefore finan-
cially less attractive. Instead of charging firms for their emissions, govern-
ments may also hand out subsidies to firms for producing with clean tech-
nologies. That way investments in renewable technologies, which usually
come with very high investment costs, become profitable. One can make a
distinction between direct subsidies (usually in the form of Feed-in Tariffs)
and indirect subsidies. In this chapter we discuss the latter in more detail.
An indirect subsidy is usually given in the form of a renewable obligation.
In several US states and in European countries like Belgium, Poland, Roma-
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nia, Sweden, Italy, and UK, a renewable obligation is in effect.1 The renewable
obligation is a target on the proportion of electricity that should come from re-
newable resources and is set by the regulator on one group of operators in
the market. Usually the obligation is imposed on consumption, through elec-
tricity sellers. In Italy however, the obligation is on the generators. So-called
green certificates are used to show compliance to the target, and typically one
such certificate represents 1 MWh of renewable electricity production. At the
end of each obligation period, often a year, each seller or producer should sub-
mit a certain number of certificates to the regulator. When not satisfying the
target, typically a buy-out fine has to be paid. The latter comes with an oppor-
tunity cost that puts a value on each certificate, which forms the price a seller
is willing to pay to a renewable generator. The reward that generators receive
adds to the short-term profits in a way that high long-term investment costs
can be covered. Certificates can also be traded on a secondary market and
as a consequence the renewable obligation does not oblige individual gener-
ators to produce a certain part of their electricity generation with renewable
resources.
The UK and Italy form an exception to the system where one certificate
represents 1 MWh of renewable electricity. In these countries certificates are
banded according to technology, meaning that for different (renewable) tech-
nologies a different number of certificates is handed out per MWh of produc-
tion. These so-called banding systems in the UK and Italy can help in encour-
aging investments in less developed technologies as to make them more com-
petitive in the long run. This way it can overcome one of the shortcomings of
the regular renewable obligation which is known to single out the most devel-
oped technologies, namely onshore wind power and to a lesser extent landfill
gas (see Meyer (2003), Wood and Dow (2011), and Verbruggen and Lauber
(2012)). Although these technologies may be financially attractive, due to all
kind of geographical constraints and opposition against onshore wind farms
it is unlikely that the renewable obligation target can be met in the long run
without investments in other renewable technologies like offshore wind, as
emphasized by Toke (2011) and Wood and Dow (2011).
In this chapter we investigate the effects of imposing a renewable obliga-
tion and introducing tradable green certificates. In particular, we focus on the
(original) obligation system in the UK and take a closer look at their banding
system in a mathematical and analytical framework. In order to analyze the
1For overviews of different support mechanisms across Europe, see Fouquet and Johans-
son (2008) and Koster et al. (2011).
CHAPTER 3: Modeling and Analysis of Renewable Energy Obligations and
Technology Bandings in the UK Electricity Market 75
system we extend the two stage investment model as introduced in Gürkan
et al. (2013) by incorporating renewable obligations. In the mathematical
model, investments are considered long-term decisions (for example yearly)
which take place at the first stage. Production, transmission, and market clear-
ing are short-term decisions (for example hourly or daily) that take place in
the spot market, referred to as the second stage, which can be repeated sev-
eral times. We assume perfect competition at both stages meaning that firms
are price takers.
In order to make our model a good representation of reality and to keep
results analytically tractable, we will make two simplifying assumptions with
respect to the UK system. First of all, as mentioned earlier, in the UK the re-
newable obligation is imposed on total electricity sales. We assume though,
that the firms producing power are selling their power directly to consumers,
meaning that the obligation will be on electricity production. The second sim-
plifying assumption concerns the trading of certificates. Recall that in the
original obligation system each MWh of renewable energy production is re-
warded with one renewable certificate. At the end of each period (typically a
year) generators should submit a certain number of certificates proportional
to the total production to show the obligation is met. In reality, the certificates
can be traded daily on a secondary market and will have a certain value de-
termined by the short term demand for certificates. Trading would be done
on a daily basis and result in day to day variations in the value of a certificate.
We overlook the micro details of the secondary trading market and therefore
ignore the daily trading possibilities. Instead, we consider the average cer-
tificate value that holds over the year, which is directly related to the yearly
obligation target. This average value is the reward the regulator pays firms
per certificate. At the same time the consumer price is regulated in the form
of a mark-up, as to cover the certificate payments.
After modeling the original renewable obligation into a mathematical
framework, we take a closer look at the banding system that was introduced
in the UK in 2009.2 Under the banding policy, production with different re-
newable technologies is rewarded with a different number of certificates. As
a consequence, some model adjustments need to be done; that is, we replace
the obligation on production by one on certificates, and modify the pricing
scheme defining the prices paid for production with non-renewable and re-
newable production and the consumer price. We analyze the consequences of
2For a description of the UK (banding) system, see Constable and Barfoot (2008) and Clark
(2008).
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the new policy and argue that the system can be effective in giving incentives
to invest in less established technologies, but as an undesirable side effect may
result in a more polluting mixture of technologies.
As a potential remedy for this negative side effect, we propose an alterna-
tive banding policy. In this alternative, production with different renewable
technologies will be rewarded with a different amount of certificates in the
same way as in the UK banding system. However, the obligation will be on
renewable production rather than on certificates, similar to how it is done in
the Italian banding system.3 Different from the Italian banding system, in
which the regulator buys excess certificates, we make a modification to the
reward per certificate in order to guarantee that rewards paid to firms are cov-
ered by mark ups paid by consumers, that is, to guarantee revenue adequacy
for the regulator.
We then analyze the original obligation system, the UK banding system,
and our proposed alternative in a numerical study where we assume uncer-
tain demand and uncertain generation output of renewable resources. We fo-
cus on a small network with two non-renewable technologies (coal and com-
bined cycle gas turbine (CCGT)) and three renewable technologies (onshore
wind (ONW), offshore wind (OFFW), and landfill gas (LFG)) and obtain in-
vestment quantities, prices, and CO2 emissions in all three systems. A key ob-
servation in all three systems is that the higher the obligation target, the more
coal is replaced not only by renewable technologies, but also by CCGT which
acts as a peak technology in case of high demand and/or low wind output.
That way CO2 emissions are curbed both by the increased renewable capac-
ity and by the replacement of coal by the cleaner CCGT. Introducing the UK
banding system has the effect of giving incentives for investments in OFFW,
which were not present in the original system. However, bandings fail to cre-
ate the right incentives when the obligation target is set too low. In that case
the UK banding system may result in a cleaner mixture (but without OFFW)
and overshoot the original target on production. On the other hand, when
there are incentives to invest in OFFW we observe that for high obligation
targets on certificates, the original target on production will not be satisfied.
Hence, the UK banding system may lead to a more polluting technology mix-
ture. Furthermore we observe that consumer prices in the UK banding system
are not affected by having the more expensive OFFW in the mixture. Compar-
ing the UK system to our alternative, we observe that the alternative needs
higher obligation targets in order to create incentives for OFFW investments.
3For a description of the Italian system, see Giovannetti (2009).
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When the obligation target is high enough for OFFW to be in the optimal mix-
ture, we observe that consumer prices increase and exceed those obtained in
the other systems.
We also analyze the effect of a decrease in the investment cost of OFFW.
We find that investments are very sensitive to such a cost reduction and that
under both banding policies there will be more OFFW in the system. Interest-
ingly, although the investment quantities change, consumer prices in the UK
banding system and CO2 emissions in the alternative banding system remain
unchanged. On the other hand, we observe a significant increase in consumer
prices in the alternative system and considerably increased levels of CO2 emis-
sions in the UK banding system.
To summarize, the key findings in this chapter are: First, the UK banding
system may result in higher levels of CO2 emissions compared to the original
obligation system when OFFW is in the technology mixture; the alternative
banding system proposes a possible solution for this undesirable side effect,
albeit with relatively higher and less stable consumer prices. Second, cost re-
ductions in a technology with high bandings (that is, OFFW), lead to increased
levels of CO2 emissions in the UK banding system and increased consumer
prices in the alternative system. These are obviously negative side effects of
banding systems, implying that as costs reduce, financial support and hence
bandings should be reduced accordingly.
This chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the basic electricity mar-
ket investment model in Section 3.2 and expand this model to include the
renewable obligation in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we introduce the concept
of bandings. We explain the details of the UK banding system and propose
an alternative system. In Section 3.5 we introduce uncertainty into the mod-
els. Both the generation output of renewable resources and electricity demand
will be uncertain. The numerical study is carried out in Section 3.6. Section
3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Electricity Market Investment Model
In this section we introduce the electricity market investment model. Given
is an electricity grid with supply nodes at which firms owning generation
plants produce electricity using their technologies that are renewable or non-
renewable, and demand nodes at which consumers with, by assumption, in-
elastic demand are located. Supply and demand nodes are connected by
means of transmission lines with a given capacity, forming a network. Typi-
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cally, when power is transmitted from one node to another through a trans-
mission line, flows in the entire network are affected; furthermore, electricity
cannot be stored. Firms at supply nodes make decisions in two stages. At the
first stage all firms simultaneously maximize their profits while determining
their optimal production capacity. Their profits are dependent on the equilib-
rium outcome at the second stage, which in return is dependent on the invest-
ment decisions of all firms at the first stage. The equilibrium at the second
stage is between firms maximizing their profits while producing electricity
given their production capacity in the first stage, a transmission system oper-
ator (TSO) owning the transmission grid, who is maximizing its own profits
and taking care of the flows between supply and demand nodes, and subject
to two types of market clearing conditions, an imposed price cap when there
is unsatisfied demand, and a condition guaranteeing that demand is satisfied
in all nodes. We assume perfect competition, and hence at both stages firms
are not aware of the fact that they can influence prices. Since at the market
equilibrium investment decisions of firms (indirectly) depend on decisions of
other firms, we have a two stage game between the firms. When the first stage
is solved to optimality and the second stage is at equilibrium, for none of the
entities it is profitable to deviate and thus a perfectly competitive equilibrium
is obtained.
A suitable mathematical framework for the two-stage game is presented in
Gürkan et al. (2013). They model the electricity market in a two-stage setting
and shows that under perfect competition the resulting two-stage game can
be written as a single optimization problem when the model is deterministic,
or as a standard two stage stochastic program in case of (demand) uncertainty
at the second stage. In Chapter 2, the same model is used for analyzing the
consequences of imposing a taxation per unit emission or a cap-and-trade sys-
tem. Instead of charging firms for their emissions, in this chapter we analyze
the effects of imposing an indirect subsidy in the form of a renewable obliga-
tion, which will be the subject of Section 3.3. Before imposing the obligation,
we provide an overview of the electricity market investment model as formu-
lated in Gürkan et al. (2013).
We make two adjustments to the models in Gürkan et al. (2013) and Chap-
ter 2. First of all, for simplicity we assume that each firm has its own tech-
nology and is operational at all supply nodes (but not necessarily producing)
for notational convenience. Second, we explicitly distinguish between a set
of non-renewable technologies and a set of renewable technologies. The sets,
parameters, and variables are given below.
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Sets:
N : the set of demand nodes
I : the set of supply nodes
KN : the set of non-renewable technologies
KR : the set of renewable technologies
K : the set of all technologies (K := KN ∪ KR)
L : the set of electricity transmission lines connecting nodes in the net-
work.
Parameters:
cik : unit production cost at supply node i ∈ I for technology k ∈ K
κik : unit investment cost at supply node i ∈ I for technology k ∈ K
dn : demand at demand node n ∈ N
MRk : ceiling on investments in renewable technology k ∈ KR
PTDFl,j : power transmitted through line l ∈ L due to one unit of power
injection into node j ∈ N ∪ I
hl : capacity limit of line l ∈ L
VOLL : value of unserved energy or lost load.
Variables:
xik : generation capacity investment in technology k ∈ K at supply node
i ∈ I
yik : quantity of power generated at supply node i ∈ I by using
technology k ∈ K
f j : net power flow dispatched by the TSO to node j ∈ N ∪ I
δj : unserved demand at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pcj : electricity price at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pNik : price non-renewable technology k ∈ KN at supply node i ∈ I gets
per unit sold
pRik : price renewable technology k ∈ KR at supply node i ∈ I gets per
unit sold.
In the remainder of the chapter, variables may get superscripts N and R
depending on their corresponding technology in KN and KR, respectively. In
addition, for k ∈ K we define xk = (xik)i∈I and yk = (yik)i∈I , the vectors
containing investments and production, respectively, of technology k ∈ K in
all supply nodes.
We next formulate the first and second stage problems. At the first stage
each firm k ∈ K determines its optimal investment quantities xk in all supply
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nodes, in order to maximize the optimal second stage profit minus the invest-
ment cost. The optimal second stage profit of technology k ∈ K at supply node
i ∈ I is the price pik minus production cost cik, times the optimal second stage
production yik as a function of investments xk. Unit investment costs for tech-
nology k ∈ K in supply node i ∈ I are κik. The first stage objective function for












k ) is the optimal production quantity of non-renewable technology k ∈
KN at supply node i ∈ I at the second stage if xNk are the investment quan-
tities. Since firms are assumed to be price takers, for i ∈ I, pNik is taken as a
parameter. Without price regulation, pNik , i ∈ I, k ∈ KN, is typically equal to
the electricity price in node i, pci , but depending on the pricing scheme p
N
ik may
be altered when for example an additional fee for a certificate or permit has













k ) is the optimal production quantity of renewable technology k ∈
KR at supply node i ∈ I at the second stage if xRk are the investment quantities.
The price pRik is taken as a parameter. Without any price policies imposed by
the regulator, typically in each node i ∈ I and for any k ∈ KR, the price pRik is
equal to the electricity price pci , but depending on the pricing scheme imposed
it may be altered. As we will see in the next section, introducing a renewable
obligation may result in a difference between pN and pR.
In addition, there can be a ceiling on capacity investments due to for ex-
ample regulation or physical limitations. This is typical for some renewable
technologies like landfill gas. Hence, we add the following constraint that
should be satisfied for technology k ∈ KR:
∑
i∈I
xRik ≤ MRk (ζRk ), (3.3)
where ζRk is the nonnegative dual price associated with the ceiling. We provide
an interpretation of this dual price at the end of this section.
At the second stage each firm determines its optimal production quantities
while maximizing its second stage profit, subject to the capacity constraint.
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The investment quantities from the first stage are given and treated as param-
eters. For each renewable technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I we define
Fik(·) as a differentiable possibly nonlinear nondecreasing function of the in-
vestment xRik, with Fik(0) = 0, denoting the available capacity. In general Fik(·)
should reflect the fact that for most renewable resources like wind power, not
all installed capacity is available for generation at all times. The availability is
often subject to randomness, which we discuss in more detail in Section 3.5.
The second stage problem for a non-renewable generator k ∈ KN is
ΠNk (x
N




(pNik − cNik )yNik
s.t. yNik ≤ xNik (βNik) ∀i ∈ I
yNik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
(3.4)
For a renewable generator k ∈ KR we have:
ΠRk (x
R





s.t. yRik ≤ Fik(xRik) (βRik) ∀i ∈ I
yRik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
(3.5)
The βs are the dual variables associated with the capacity constraints and rep-
resent the scarcity rents.
The produced electricity is transmitted from the supply nodes to the de-
mand nodes by the Transmission System Operator (TSO). The TSO determines
the optimal net flow f j into node j ∈ N ∪ I. Having f j < 0 means there is a
flow out of node j (which usually holds for the supply nodes). Power is trans-
mitted through transmission lines l ∈ L. Each line in L runs from one node to
another node. Each flow affects the capacities on all lines in the network either
positively or negatively in accordance with Kirchhoff’s Law; see for example
Chao et al. (2000). Kirchhoff’s Law is taken into account via the commonly
used power transmission distribution factors (PTDF), which are given for a
given network. For the network flows to be feasible, it must hold that the net
load on line l ∈ L must lie between the network capacities −hl and hl. TSO’s
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f j = 0 (ρ)
hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L
hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ 0 (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L.
(3.6)
The first constraint is the flow balance constraint with dual price ρ, and the
last two constraints take care of the transmission capacity on the lines l ∈ L
and have dual prices λ+l and λ
−
l , respectively.
Finally, two market clearing conditions should hold at equilibrium. First,
in each supply node i ∈ I, where the demand is defined as di = 0, the flow out
of this node can be at most equal to the total production in that node. In each
demand node n ∈ N, where the supply is defined as yNnk = 0 ∀k ∈ KN and
yRnk = 0 ∀k ∈ KR, the flow into this node should be at least equal to the demand
dn (unless there is unsatisfied demand as we explain below). Perpendicular to
those conditions, the market price pcj in each node j ∈ N ∪ I is determined.
Second, there may be unsatisfied demand at node j ∈ N ∪ I which we denote
by δj. Whenever the unsatisfied demand is positive, the market price in node j
should be set to VOLL, the Value Of Lost Load, or to a high price-cap. In other
words, VOLL can essentially serve as a price-cap and is in general taken as a
high number, compared to regular electricity prices. The above relations are





yRjk + δj + f j − dj ⊥ pcj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ VOLL− pcj ⊥ δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(3.7)
The second stage problem now consists of the firms’ problems (3.4) and (3.5),
the TSO’s problem (3.6), and the two types of market clearing conditions (3.7).
For given xN and xR, a second stage equilibrium can be determined only when
the relation between the prices pN and pR in relation to the consumer price pc
is given. This relation is fixed in a pricing scheme imposed by a regulator.
Details are further discussed in the next section.
Given an equilibrium at the second stage, firms determine their first stage
investment quantities based on the information from the second stage. In
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order to establish the connection between the two stages we write the KKT-
optimality conditions that need to be solved for first stage optimality. The
KKT-optimality conditions of the first stage problem given by (3.1) are:
0 ≤ x∗Nik ⊥ −β∗Nik + κNik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (3.8)
These conditions follow from writing the Lagrangian function of (3.1) and tak-
ing derivatives with respect to xNik , i ∈ I, k ∈ KN. A detailed derivation of these
first stage conditions can be found in Gürkan et al. (2013). x∗Nik is the optimal
investment quantity in non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply node
i ∈ I and β∗Nik is the optimal scarcity rent taken from the second stage when
x = x∗. For every i ∈ I, k ∈ KN, at least one of the two sides in (3.8) should
hold with equality, and hence there can only be a positive investment in tech-
nology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I if the corresponding optimal scarcity rent,




ik can now be interpreted as the value
of an additional unit investment in technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I.
The KKT-optimality conditions of the first stage problem given by (3.2) and
(3.3) are:
0 ≤ x∗Rik ⊥ −F′ik(x∗Rik )β∗Rik + κRik + ζ∗Rk ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
0 ≤ ζ∗Rk ⊥ MRk −∑
i∈I
x∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ KR. (3.9)
These conditions follow from writing the Lagrangian function of (3.2) sub-
ject to (3.3), and taking derivatives with respect to xRik, i ∈ I, k ∈ KR and
ζRk , k ∈ KR. x∗Rik is the optimal investment quantity in renewable technol-
ogy k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I and β∗Rik is the optimal scarcity rent taken
from the second stage when x = x∗. The first condition in (3.9) means that
at least one of the two sides should hold with equality and hence there can





ik covers the sum of the investment cost κ
R
ik and the dual price, ζ
∗R
k ,
associated with the ceiling. β∗Rik is the optimal scarcity rent corresponding to a
unit production, and F′ik(x
∗R
ik ) is the change in production corresponding to a




ik represents the scarcity rent of
a unit investment when x = x∗. ζ∗Rk can be seen as the additional scarcity rent
that comes with the ceiling, MRk . When the ceiling becomes binding, another,
more expensive technology will be used to satisfy demand. As a consequence
prices, and hence scarcity rents, increase with the additional rent ζ∗Rk . The sec-
ond condition in (3.9) guarantees that ζ∗Rk is zero whenever the ceiling is not
84 3.2. The Electricity Market Investment Model
binding.
Finally, we analyze the equilibrium to the two stage game (3.1)-(3.7). The
following theorem summarizes its key properties.
Theorem 3.1. Consider the two-stage optimization problem defined by (3.1)-(3.7).
At an equilibrium, the following holds.
For investment in non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I to be
positive, it must hold that
• p∗Nik − cNik = κNik
• β∗Nik = κNik
• y∗Nik = x∗Nik .
For investment in renewable technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I to be positive,
it must hold that
• F′ik(x∗Rik )(p∗Rik − cRik) = κRik + ζ∗Rk
• F′ik(x∗Rik )β∗Rik = κRik + ζ∗Rk
• y∗Rik = Fik(x∗Rik ).
Proof: Suppose the investment in non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply
node i ∈ I is positive, that is, x∗Nik > 0. If p∗Nik − cNik < κNik , by y∗Nik ≤ x∗Nik
firm k has a negative first stage profit in supply node i and is better off with
no investments. On the other hand, if p∗Nik − cNik > κNik , firm k’s investment
goes to infinity and hence we have no equilibrium. Hence, p∗Nik − cNik = κNik .
Then β∗Nik = κ
N
ik follows immediately from (3.8) and x
∗N










which contradicts our previous statement. The proof for renewable technol-





ik − cRik) = κRik + ζ∗Rk can be interpreted as follows. On
the left hand side, p∗Rik − cRik is the net marginal revenue of production, and
taking the derivative of production with respect to investment gives us the
net marginal revenue of investment. At an equilibrium, this net marginal rev-
enue of investment should be equal to the right hand side, which is the net
marginal cost of investment including the additional scarcity rent for invest-
ment in case (3.3) is binding.
In the absence of environmental regulation to encourage investments in re-
newable technologies, both the price for non-renewable technologies and for
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renewable technologies are typically set at the consumer price. Together with
the results in Theorem 3.1, this implies the following. In each supply node
only a single technology, namely the one with the lowest sum of per unit pro-
duction and investment cost, has a positive investment. The consumer price
and hence the price for all technologies in that node will be set equal to this
sum. In reality, whenever there is a non-renewable technology available in a
node, none of the renewable technologies will have a positive investment be-
cause of its high investment cost. However, given that we may have different
prices for both non-renewable and renewable technologies, we can incorpo-
rate some regulation that will set the price for renewable technologies higher
as to create a financial incentive for investment in some renewable technology
to be positive. We do this in the next section by introducing a renewable obli-
gation that comes with a reward for producing with renewable technologies.
3.3 Introducing a Renewable Obligation and Trad-
able Green Certificates
We introduce a renewable obligation target in the electricity market invest-
ment model that was introduced in the previous section. An obligation target,
denoted by φ, is set by the regulator. φ ∈ [0, 1] is the minimum proportion of










yRik be the total production using non-





Production with renewable resources is in general more expensive (when con-
sidering both investment and production cost) than production with non-
renewable resources. The obligation (3.10) forces producers to replace non-
renewable production with renewable production and thus comes with a cer-
tain additional cost. We let ν be the cost incurred with a unit increase of re-
newable production. More specifically, ν can be seen as the dual variable to
(3.10) and represents the mark-up renewable generators should get in order to
increase their production by one unit. These mark-ups are given to the firms
through certificates. For each unit production, a renewable certificate is ob-
tained and ν should thus be the value of such a certificate. Certificates can
either be traded on a secondary market, or sold to the regulator to show com-
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pliance to the obligation. When trading is considered, ν would be the fair price
for each certificate. When, like we assume, the regulator rewards firms for
owning certificates, ν is the reward per certificate firms get paid at the end of
each period, typically a year. It is thus referred to as the certificate price (from
the regulator’s perspective) or reward (from the firm’s perspective). Rewrit-
ing (3.10) with ν as its dual variable, leads to the following complementarity
condition that should hold at equilibrium:
0 ≤ ∑
k∈KR
(1− φ)YRk − ∑
k∈KN
φYNk ⊥ ν ≥ 0, (3.11)
where YRk := ∑
i∈I
yRik for k ∈ KR and YNk := ∑
i∈I
yNik for k ∈ KN. These aggre-
gate variables per technology will be used in the remainder of the chapter to
simplify notation.
We next consider the effect of rewards on the nodal prices. The electricity
price in each supply node is usually set by the technology that produces with
the highest marginal production cost. Since the fuel cost and hence the unit
production cost (as opposed to the unit investment cost) of renewable tech-
nologies will in general be very low, without loss of generality we can assume
that the electricity price will be set by a non-renewable technology. We refer to
this price as the base price in node i ∈ I and denote it by pNi . When power is
bought from a non-renewable generator k ∈ KN, the price paid per unit thus
equals pNik = p
N
i . When a renewable generator k ∈ KR sells power, it sells both
the power (at price pNi ) to the consumer and the certificate (at price ν) to the
regulator, and should therefore be paid pRik = p
N
i + ν.
In electricity markets consumers typically pay a fixed consumer price that
is independent of the resource. If consumers would only pay the electricity
price pNi in every node i, the rewards paid to the firms could not be covered.
The regulator therefore regulates the consumer price and adds a mark-up on
top of pNi . The mark-up is set in such a way that the additional income covers
the rewards paid to firms for owning certificates (that is, to guarantee revenue
adequacy). Since a part φ of the total production should come from renew-
able resources, given that the total production equals Y(= YN +YR), the total
renewable production should be φY. This is also the number of times a re-
ward should be paid to the firms. Hence, the mark-ups for the consumer
price should cover φYν. Furthermore, we want the mark-up to be equal in
each node i; that is, although the electricity price can be different in each node
due to the network structure, the certificate price and thus the mark-up are
the result of putting a constraint on the entire market and hence should not
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be different for different nodes. Assuming that all the produced power will
be sold, it should hold that the mark-up ∆pc is the solution of ∆pcY = φYν,
resulting in a consumer price equal to pci = p
N
i + φν, i ∈ I. This is imposed in
the following pricing scheme:
pNik = p
N
i ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
pRik = p
N
i + ν ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
pci = p
N
i + φν ∀i ∈ I.
(3.12)
Given this pricing scheme, we can express both pNik and p
R
ik in (3.4) and (3.5)




i − φν for k ∈ KN and pRik = pci + (1− φ)ν for
k ∈ KR. Now a solution of the entire second stage problem can be obtained by
solving the KKT conditions of (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), the market clearing conditions
(3.7), and the obligation (3.11) for given x:
0 ≤ β∗Nik − p∗ci + φν∗ + cNik ⊥ y∗Nik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
0 ≤ β∗Rik − p∗ci − (1− φ)ν∗ + cRik ⊥ y∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
0 ≤ xNik − y∗Nik ⊥ β∗Nik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
0 ≤ Fik(xRik)− y∗Rik ⊥ β∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR


















φy∗Nik ⊥ ν∗ ≥ 0
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j ⊥ λ∗+l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j ⊥ λ∗−l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l − λ∗−l ) + p∗cj − ρ∗ = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j = 0.
(3.13)
Note that (3.13) is in fact equivalent to a single optimization problem, a so-
called optimal power flow (OPF) problem. The OPF problem shows us explic-
itly how certificates affect the cost structure. The OPF problem is:
















ik + VOLL ∑
j∈N∪I
δj
s.t. yNik ≤ xNik (βNik) ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN














φyNik ≥ 0 (ν)
∑
j∈N∪I
f j = 0 (ρ)
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≤ hl (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j ≥ −hl (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L
yNik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
yRik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(3.14)
A solution (y∗, δ∗, f ∗) of the OPF problem satisfies KKT-conditions (3.13)
for some β∗, p∗c, ν∗, ρ∗, λ∗+, λ∗−. More details on the derivation for the base
case model can be found in Boucher and Smeers (2001) and Gürkan et al.
(2013); ours is a straightforward extension. Solving the OPF problem gives
a second stage equilibrium for given x. The entire investment problem can
now be solved by finding an equilibrium to the second stage problem (3.14)
such that x = x∗, together with the first stage optimality conditions consisting
of (3.8) and (3.9).
In Theorem 3.1 we gave properties of x∗, y∗, p∗, and β∗ at the equilibrium.
Given the pricing scheme (3.12), we can now replace the prices and analyze
the equilibrium in case of a renewable obligation. Recall that for a
non-renewable technology k ∈ KN to have positive investments in supply












ik , k ∈ KN,
i ∈ I. Only one non-renewable technology will have a positive investment
and will thus set the price for non-renewable technologies. For a renewable





ik − cRik) = κRik + ζ∗Rk ; rewriting using our pricing scheme
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k )− (1− φ)ν∗. (3.15)









and y∗Rik = Fik(x
∗R
ik ). Due to the obligation, ν
∗ will now be set such that at least
a fraction φ will be produced with renewable technologies, and hence at least
one renewable technology must have a positive investment. Depending on
the caps on investment quantities MRk , k ∈ KR, multiple renewable technolo-
gies can be in the equilibrium mixture. All capacity of the cheapest renewable
technology (in terms of the sum of their production and investment cost), let’s
say k0 ∈ KR, would be used up first. If that is not sufficient to satisfy the obli-
gation, k0 would invest up to his maximum capacity and ζ∗Rk0 would become
positive. The next cheapest renewable technology will be used and as such
the consumer price in node i, p∗ci , will increase. ζ
∗R
k0 will be determined such
that the equality in (3.15) for technology k0 still holds and can thus be seen as
the additional rent for investment in technology k0 due to the ceiling.
Since only the cheapest firms invest at the equilibrium, the determinis-
tic equilibrium can simply be based on all the parameters and is thus quite
straightforward. In reality, broader mixtures of technologies are used, which
is the result of daily uncertainties like demand and weather fluctuations. We
therefore continue our analysis of the effects of the renewable obligation in
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 where we deal with a stochastic version of the model and
carry out a numerical study. Before doing so, we first extend the renewable
obligation to the case in which different renewable technologies are eligible
for a different number of certificates per unit production.
3.4 Introducing a Banding System
The previously introduced model was applicable to the UK system until the
1st of April 2009, when the Renewable Obligation Order 2009 became effec-
tive.4 In this regulatory document a banding system was added to the renew-
able obligation. In the old system, a unit production with a renewable technol-
ogy was eligible for one renewable energy certificate and hence would receive
the certificate price for each unit production. In the new system, renewable
certificates are banded according to technology. This means that different re-
4See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/785/contents/made?view=plain.
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newable technologies are eligible for a different number of certificates. The
main reason for introducing bandings is to encourage investments in less es-
tablished technologies (by giving them more certificates per unit production).
The original renewable obligation failed to give the right financial incentives
as it tended to mainly benefit onshore wind power and landfill gas, as noted
by Meyer (2003). As argued by Toke (2011) and Wood and Dow (2011), invest-
ments in these more established technologies are limited not by the lack of
financial incentives, but mostly because of landscape protection, public oppo-
sition, and space. Therefore, investment in less developed technologies will
be necessary in order to be able to achieve the ambitious renewable energy
targets.
In the new system onshore wind is used as the reference for bandings. A
unit production with onshore wind is rewarded with one certificate, less estab-
lished technologies like offshore wind and geothermal are rewarded with 1.5
and 2 certificates, respectively, and more established technologies like sewage
gas and landfill gas are rewarded with only 0.5 and 0.25 certificates, respec-
tively. The regulator may change these coefficients from time to time when a
different support is desirable. This has recently been done for offshore wind,
which now gets 2 certificates per unit production until 2014.
In this section we first incorporate the UK banding system into the exist-
ing model. We introduce a pricing scheme and analyze the advantages and
drawbacks of the new system. In Section 3.4.2 we propose an alternative that
is closer to the Italian banding system in order to overcome some of these
drawbacks.
3.4.1 The UK Banding System
With the banding system as introduced in the UK, the obligation shifts from
one on the renewable production to one that is expressed as the number of
certificates that should be presented by the entire market at the end of each
period. Hence, with the new system, obligation constraint (3.11) should be
replaced by a condition of the following form:
0 ≤ ∑
k∈KR
αkYRk − R ⊥ ν ≥ 0, (3.16)
where R is the number of certificates all firms together have to present, and
αk is the number of certificates firm k ∈ KR receives for producing one unit of
electricity with renewable technology k.
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As explained in great detail in the Renewable Obligation Order 2009, in
order to determine R, the UK regulator performs two calculations estimating
the number of certificates that should or can potentially be issued. Whichever
calculation gives the highest estimate will be set as the obligation target R.
The first calculation, Calculation A, is based on a fixed target representing the
number of certificates firms should produce per unit of electricity produced.
This target is in fact the original obligation target φ that was used in system
(3.11). The total number of certificates that should be issued based on this
fixed target is simply φ times the expected total electricity production and
will be defined as A.
In the second calculation, Calculation B, the number of certificates that is
likely to be issued, given the existing renewable production capacity and the
expected new built capacity, is estimated. In addition a headroom of 8% is
added. The outcome is defined as B.
In practice this means that if A > B, it is expected that the existing and
expected new built capacity will not be sufficient to reach the original obliga-
tion target φ that was used for Calculation A. Hence, the target is set at A to
oblige firms to install additional renewable capacity. If B > A, it means that
there is already sufficient existing plus expected new built capacity in the sys-
tem. When this happens, the original target φ may be met quite easily and as
a consequence the value of certificates may drop to zero, resulting in an unfa-
vorable situation for the renewable generators. Setting the obligation target at
B should avoid this. In order to provide even more security and to give extra
incentives, an additional headroom of 8% is added to the originally computed
expected number of certificates that is likely to be issued.
After the target R = max{A, B} is determined, the regulator obliges all
firms to produce a certain number of certificates per unit production. If A > B,
each firm will need to submit φ certificates per unit production. If B > A each
firm will have to submit φB = φAB certificates per unit production. Since we
assume perfect competition and deal with certificates that can be traded on
a secondary market, this obligation per firm can also be seen as one for the
entire market. We let φUK be the target on certificates based on the calculations
above (either φ or φB), which means that R, the total number of certificates that
should be presented, equals φUK times the total production. Hence, replacing
R in (3.16), the obligation can be written as
0 ≤ ∑
k∈KR
(αk − φUK)YRk − ∑
k∈KN
φUKYNk ⊥ ν ≥ 0. (3.17)
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Since different technologies are rewarded with a different number of cer-
tificates, prices paid to the generators will depend on the technology used.
Therefore, we have to adjust the pricing scheme (3.12) introduced under the
original renewable obligation. Per unit production in any supply node i ∈ I,
a renewable technology k ∈ KR is given αk certificates. Since, when selling
the electricity, firms also sell their certificates, renewable technology k ∈ KR
is then paid the base price, pNi , plus αk times the certificate price ν. In the
corresponding pricing scheme we get that pNik = p
N
i , k ∈ KN, i ∈ I and
pRik = p
N
i + αkν, k ∈ KR, i ∈ I. With a consumer price similar to the one
in (3.12), namely pci = p
N
i + φ
UKν, i ∈ I, it turns out that mark ups paid by
consumers equal the rewards paid to firms for owning certificates. That is,
renewable technologies are paid ν ∑
k∈KR
αkYRk , which by (3.17) equals νφ
UKY.
It can easily be seen that νφUKY is the total mark ups paid by consumers,
and hence rewards paid to firms are covered. This means the pricing scheme




i ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
pRik = p
N




UKν ∀i ∈ I.
(3.18)
Note that ideally it would hold that, with the obligation on certificates, a
fraction φUK of the total production comes from renewable resources like in
the old obligation system. However, since there is no one-to-one relationship
between renewable production and certificates anymore, this is not necessar-
ily the case. In case a major part of the obligation is satisfied by a technol-
ogy with a high banding coefficient, the actual renewable production may be
(much) lower than the desired target on production and as a consequence the
banding system could result in a more polluting mixture of technologies. In
general, Calculation B may set the target on certificates a bit higher than the
original obligation φ, but when there are technologies with a high banding
coefficient, one may not guarantee that the original target on renewable pro-
duction is met unless the target on certificates is increased accordingly.
We will come back on this issue in our numerical study. In the next sec-
tion, we propose an alternative system that combines features of the original
obligation and the UK banding system.
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3.4.2 An Alternative Banding System
As the UK banding system does not necessarily guarantee that the obligation
target on renewable production (3.11) is satisfied and may even result in a
more polluting mixture, we propose an alternative banding system. Unlike in
the UK banding system where the obligation shifts to one on certificates, the
obligation will be imposed on production in the same way it was done in the
original renewable obligation (that is, as in (3.11) as opposed to (3.17)). On
the other hand, certificates will still be handed out based on the pre-specified
banding coefficients. Since in this case we no longer have a one-to-one corre-
spondence between a unit of renewable production and a certificate, and since
the target is no longer on certificates like in the UK banding system, the dual
price ν in (3.11) no longer represents the value of a certificate; it just represents
the value of a unit production with a renewable resource. This will have a
consequence for the reward per certificate and hence for the pricing scheme.
As we have seen, under the previously discussed obligation policies con-
sumers pay a mark-up that covers the rewards the regulator pays to the firms
for owning certificates; in other words, the proposed pricing schemes are rev-
enue adequate for the regulator. We would like this revenue adequacy to hold
in the alternative system as well. In the UK banding system, in the pricing
scheme (3.18), the consumer price was set at pci = p
N
i + φν in each supply
node i ∈ I. We adopt this price in our alternative system as this price does
not depend on the αks and hence on the technologies used, which is typically
the case in electricity markets. With this price the total income from mark-ups












The latter equality holds by (3.11); that is, either ν = 0 or the left hand side in-
equality in (3.11) holds with equality. The total income has to be divided over
the total amount of certificates on the market, which is ∑
k∈KR
αkYRk . Therefore,










As mentioned above, due to the different interpretation of ν in (3.11), such an
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adjustment was not necessary in the UK banding system. In the investment
model we incorporate the above condition as the following equality that will
have to hold at the second stage:
∑
k∈KR
(ν̃αk − ν)YRk = 0. (3.19)
This condition, that determines the value of ν̃, poses a non-linearity. While,
unlike in the other models, we cannot incorporate this into an OPF problem
formulation, we can still deal with the entire problem as a mixed complemen-
tarity problem by solving the entire set of KKT-optimality conditions. Another
consequence of the non-linearity is a longer computational time in numeri-
cal experiments that will be carried out in Section 3.6. The resulting pricing
scheme in the alternative system becomes
pNik = p
N
i ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
pRik = p
N
i + αkν̃ ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
pci = p
N
i + φν ∀i ∈ I.
(3.20)
It can easily be seen with (3.11) and (3.19) that this new scheme is revenue ade-
quate for the alternative banding system. In practice, it may not be straightfor-
ward how to implement this scheme as the value of ν̃, and hence the unit re-
ward paid to renewable producers, depends on the (realized) renewable pro-
duction. A regulator could either use contracts in which the final unit reward
per certificate is determined ex-post, at the end of each contract period, or
determine adjusted rewards ex-ante, based on historical production data.
Although this alternative system guarantees that the original obligation tar-
get on production is satisfied, there are a few drawbacks to this system. First
of all, the price of a certificate is no longer determined by the secondary trad-
ing market. The regulator has to intervene and buy certificates from firms at
an adjusted price that is influenced by both the technology mixture and the
mark-ups paid by consumers. The intervention in the trading process is likely
to come with a certain administrative burden. Second, as we will see in more
detail in our numerical study, the consumer price is much more sensitive to
the technology mixture and in particular is higher when a large share of the
production is done with a technology with a banding coefficient higher than
1. Furthermore, the consumer price could even increase as a result of a cost
reduction (due to for example innovation) of a technology; this, we do not ob-
serve in the UK banding system. However, as we will show in our numerical
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study, in the UK banding system cost reductions can potentially lead to more
polluting technology mixtures.
3.5 Introducing Uncertainty
The previously introduced models all assume a deterministic world. In real-
ity however, demand can be uncertain due to seasonality and daily changes
in, for example, weather patterns, and also the output of renewable power
plants may vary from day to day, hour to hour. For example wind turbines
are depending on daily weather conditions and influenced by the actual wind
speed. A unit investment in wind energy does not mean we can produce a
given amount of power at all times. We refer to this uncertainty as the uncer-
tainty in availability of capacity.
The way we deal with uncertainty can be explained as follows. At the
first stage, only the underlying probability distributions (which can be sim-
ply based on past empirical data) of the demand and availability of capacity
are known; firms have to make decisions on their optimal investment quan-
tities without knowing the outcome of the random variables. At the second
stage the realizations are revealed to the firms. When firms make their first
stage decision, they view the second stage as a short-run process that repeats
itself over and over again. Each realization of the random variable can for
example be seen as the realization associated with a particular day (or even
an hour). On every day of the year there is an outcome, and the first stage
decision is taken at the beginning of the year. Hence, the first stage decision is
a long-term decision. When making the decision, we take either the expecta-
tion or the sample average (in case we use a sampling technique) over all days
and determine the investment level based on the expected or sample averaged
second stage outcome.
When moving to the stochastic setting, a couple of modifications to the pro-
posed models are needed. First, consider the basic two-stage model consist-
ing of the first stage problem consisting of (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) and the sec-
ond stage problems (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7). At the first stage, we assume
the available renewable capacity at the second stage and the second stage de-
mand to be unknown to the firms. At the second stage, we introduce ω ∈ Ω, a
random vector in the space of possible outcomes Ω, containing the outcomes
of both random available capacities and random demand. These outcomes
are assumed to have some joint distribution Ψ. Outcomes are assumed to be
revealed to firms at the second stage. To incorporate uncertain availability of
96 3.5. Introducing Uncertainty
capacity, for k ∈ KR, i ∈ I, we define Fik(x, ω) as some differentiable random
function of the investment amount x of technology k in supply node i at real-
ization ω ∈ Ω. For given ω ∈ Ω, Fik(x, ω) is the realized available capacity in
technology k ∈ KR in node i ∈ I. Uncertain demand in demand node n ∈ N at
realization ω ∈ Ω is denoted by dn(ω). At the first stage, given the probability
distributions (or historical data) of the random variables at the second stage,
long-term profits are maximized and the corresponding optimal investment
quantities are determined. Long-term profits now consist of the expected sec-
ond stage profits minus the first stage investment cost. For non-renewable






























xRik ≤ MRk (ζRk ).
(3.22)
The second stage for given x and any ω ∈ Ω is given by the OPF prob-
lem (3.14) with ω attached to all variables, d, and F, and without the fourth
constraint that deals with the renewable obligation. The renewable obligation
constraint is instead going to be imposed as a first stage constraint, as we ex-
plain below. For given x = (xN, xR) and in any ω ∈ Ω, we thus solve the
following second stage problem:
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ik(ω) + VOLL ∑
j∈N∪I
δj(ω)
s.t. yNik (ω) ≤ xNik (βNik(ω)) ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN






δj(ω) + f j(ω) ≥ dj(ω) (pcj (ω)) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f j(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≤ hl (λ+l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≥ −hl (λ−l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
yNik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
yRik(ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
δj(ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(3.23)
The stochastic version of the basic model now consists of (3.21) for all k ∈ KN
and (3.22) for all k ∈ KR at the first stage and (3.23) for all ω ∈ Ω at the second
stage.
When introducing a renewable obligation and a banding system, we need
to make a few adjustments to the basic model. In all three systems, we re-
place the second stage obligation by its stochastic equivalent that is going to
be imposed ex-ante, on the expected (or in numerical experiments sample-
averaged) yearly production. This means that from day to day the obligation
may be violated, but (in expectation) the end of the year target should be met.
As such, we are interested in the ex-ante certificate price which depends on
the underlying distribution (or historical data) of the random variable, but is
fixed over the year. Notably, we replace (3.11), (3.17), and (3.19) with (3.24),
(3.25), and (3.26), respectively; see below.
In principle, it is possible to consider a daily obligation as an alternative.
The obligation should then be a second stage constraint (omitting the expec-
tation) and each day (that is, in each realization) there could be a different
certificate price. This implies that the certificate price will be fluctuating over
the days. In this chapter, we focus on having the obligation constraint over a
certain period, since this is what is applied in reality (see for example Bertoldi
98 3.5. Introducing Uncertainty
and Huld (2006) and van der Linden et al. (2005)).
In addition to replacing the obligation, we also need to adjust the pricing
schemes (3.12), (3.18), and (3.20) in the original obligation system, the UK
banding system, and the alternative banding system, respectively. We simply
add ωs to the prices. With these modified pricing schemes, in expectation the
mark-ups paid by consumers cover the rewards. However, due to the uncer-
tain outcome at the second stage, ex-post there may exist gaps between daily
rewards to be paid and daily income from mark-ups. Focusing on such situa-
tions in more detail may be interesting for regulators aiming at daily revenue
adequacy; however, it is outside the scope of this thesis.
Finally, as a consequence of moving the obligation from the second to the
first stage problem, in each of the systems the objective function of the OPF
problem (3.23) needs a modification. All the necessary modifications to the
obligation and the objective function of (3.23) are summarized below.
• No banding:









⊥ ν ≥ 0. (3.24)



























⊥ ν ≥ 0.
(3.25)









CHAPTER 3: Modeling and Analysis of Renewable Energy Obligations and









– Replace (3.11) at the second stage by the first stage condition (3.24).





(ν̃αk − ν)YRk (ω)
]
= 0. (3.26)


















In this section we analyze the effects of the different renewable obligation sys-
tems on investments, prices, and CO2 emissions in a numerical framework. In
order to keep things tractable and solvable in a reasonable amount of time, we
consider a small system. The setting is rigorously simplified in terms of net-
work effects, but nonetheless we can draw some conclusions about possible
side effects of the systems and make a comparison between them.
We are going to focus on three different renewable obligation policies:
• No banding: There is no banding mechanism, meaning all αks for re-
newable technologies are equal to 1.
• UK banding: The banding mechanism that is currently applied in the
UK is imposed, under the assumption that Calculation A sets the tar-
get; the obligation is expressed as the number of certificates per MWh of
power produced.
• Alternative banding: The banding mechanism as proposed in Section
3.4.2 is imposed; the obligation is expressed as the amount of power that
should come from a renewable resource per MWh of power produced,
and rewards are adjusted in order to guarantee long term revenue ade-
quacy.
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First, for different target levels we depict investments, prices, and CO2 emis-
sions in order to analyze the effects of the different systems and to get insight
in their advantages and disadvantages. Second, it is reasonable to expect that
after a technology is given support, more innovation and development will
take place and subsequently that investment costs decrease. We therefore an-
alyze the effects of a cost reduction of one of the technologies in the second
part of this section.
We utilize the MCPs consisting of the first and second stage KKT optimality
conditions as introduced in the previous sections. In order to deal with uncer-
tainty, we use a sampling technique. We generate 3000 random samples from
given probability distributions for the available renewable capacities and de-
mand. We then simultaneously solve all second stage KKT conditions in 3000
realizations and the first stage KKT conditions in which we replace expecta-
tions by sample averages over all realizations. The obtained large sized MCPs
are programmed in GAMS and solved using the PATH solver, see Ferris and
Munson (2000). Using a 300MHz Pentium-II with 1 GB RAM, computation
times are approximately two hours for each instance we solve.
3.6.1 Experimental Data
We consider a single node and hence assume there is no limited network ca-
pacity on the transmission lines. For a thorough analysis of investment under
uncertainty in transmission capacity in the UK electricity market, we refer to
van der Weijde and Hobbs (2012). We instead focus on the direct effects of
obligation policies in absence of network limitations. We consider five firms,
each having a unique technology at their disposal. Non-renewable technolo-
gies coal (Coal) and closed cycle gas turbine (CCGT) are used by firms 1 and
2, respectively. Renewable technologies onshore wind (ONW), offshore wind
(OFFW), and landfill gas (LFG), are used by firms 3, 4, and 5, respectively. In
addition there are two demand nodes, nodes 6 and 7.
Table 3.1 contains the characteristics of the technologies, consisting of per
unit production costs (ck), investment costs (κk), tons of CO2 emission per unit
production (ek), and the banding coefficient (αk).
The CO2 emission per unit production, ek, is given to indicate how pollut-
ing the technologies are. The cost figures are in Pounds and based on data
in MottMacDonald (2010). It is quite common in numerical studies to work
with levelized cost of investment; that is, the investment cost that is needed to
produce 1 MWh of electricity, taking into account that not every MW installed
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of the technologies.
Coal CCGT ONW OFFW LFG
ck 22.1 50.2 0 0 21.1
κk 30.24 12.96 25.62 53.48 24.78
ek 1 0.35 0 0 0.2
αk 0 0 1 2 0.25
will be available at all times. We ignore this when defining the investment
costs that play a role at the first stage, and will thus work with the real invest-
ment cost that is involved with having 1 MW of capacity installed. The fact
that not all installed capacity is available for the full 8760 hours in the year
is taken into account at the second stage via the function F(·) that we specify
below.
Demand dn(ω) in demand nodes n = 6, 7 are independent and are sampled
from uniform distributions with lower bound an and upper bound bn as in
Table 3.2.




The available wind and landfill gas capacities are also randomly distribu-
ted. As a function representing the realized available capacity of technology
k we take Fk(x, ω) = θk(ω)x, where for each renewable technology θk(ω) is
sampled from a uniform distribution with lower bound ak and upper bound
bk, k = 3, 4, 5, as in Table 3.3. We assume onshore and offshore wind are fully
correlated, but assume independence between wind and landfill gas realiza-
tions. We chose uniform distributions out of convenience; one can choose al-
ternatives which may fit the empirical data closely or even use empirical data
itself.
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Finally, as investment in landfills in the UK is limited by law, we impose a
maximum investment in LFG of 5 units.
3.6.2 Effects of Varying the Obligation Target
In this section we compare the three obligation systems in terms of investment
quantities, prices, and CO2 emissions for various obligation targets; that is, we
let the obligation target range from 0 to 0.5 with increments of 0.01.
Figure 3.1: Investment quantities in the no banding system.































In Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 the effects of an increasing obligation target φ on
investments are depicted. In Figure 3.1 the original obligation system with-
out bandings is imposed. For low levels of φ we see that LFG is the only
renewable technology in the mixture. As soon as it reaches its maximum ca-
pacity of 5 at φ = 0.12, investments in ONW begin. There are no financial
incentives to invest in OFFW (though in reality there may actually be invest-
ments in OFFW for other reasons than profit maximization, like geographic
and regulatory constraints limiting onshore wind power). Investments in coal
are decreasing with φ, but for the other conventional technology, CCGT, we
observe a slight increase as φ increases. From our numerical output data we
conclude that CCGT acts as a peak load technology, as it is mainly used for
producing electricity in cases of high demand and/or low wind. More invest-
ment in ONW leads to more intermittency in the system. Consequently, to
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Figure 3.2: Investment quantities in the UK banding system.































Figure 3.3: Investment quantities in the alternative banding system.
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deal with the growing intermittency, more investment in the peak load tech-
nology, CCGT, will be done. Since investment in CCGT is cheaper than invest-
ment in coal, CCGT is preferred as a peak load technology. In the literature it
is also often argued or even assumed that CCGT and gas in general are suit-
able technologies for dealing with intermittency due to its low capital cost and
relatively fast start-up times (see, for example, DeCarolis and Keith (2006), Str-
bac (2002), Strbac et al. (2007)). Concluding, one can say that the obligation
reduces CO2 emissions in two ways, directly, via the replacement of coal by
ONW, and indirectly, via the replacement of coal by the cleaner CCGT.
In Figure 3.2 investments under the UK banding system are depicted. We
observe three major differences compared to Figure 3.1. First of all, for low
levels of φUK there are no investments in ONW in the original obligation sys-
tem (Figure 3.1). However, in the UK banding system both LFG and ONW
are in the mixture. This is caused by the fact that firms have to satisfy a target
expressed in certificates and LFG is only rewarded with 0.25 certificates per
unit production. Secondly, we observe positive investments in OFFW for high
levels of φUK. Starting from φUK = 0.33, we see a trade off between ONW and
OFFW investments. From the fact that OFFW is not in the optimal mixture un-
til φUK = 0.33, we can conclude that for the UK banding system to be effective
in encouraging investments in OFFW one needs rather high target levels. In
general one can conclude that the UK banding system is certainly not effective
in giving incentives to invest in OFFW for all target levels. A third observation
is that, as OFFW investments increase, there is no need for additional CCGT
investments like we observed in Figure 3.1. This is due to the fact that OFFW
is more reliable than ONW. As a consequence, investments in coal decrease
less rapidly when OFFW is in the mixture.
Investments under the alternative banding system are depicted in Figure
3.3. For lower levels of φ we observe less investments in renewables than
in the UK banding system, but about as much as in the original obligation
system. A more obvious observation is that investment in OFFW begins at
φ = 0.41, which is much later than in the UK banding system (Figure 3.2).
Hence, the alternative system needs higher obligation targets in order to suc-
ceed in giving financial incentives to invest in OFFW. The reason for this dif-
ference is the contribution of OFFW to satisfying the obligation target. In the
UK system a unit production with OFFW is rewarded with 2 certificates and
hence contributes to the target on certificates twice as much as ONW. In the
alternative system a unit production with OFFW only contributes one unit to
satisfying the target on renewable production. Hence, OFFW only enters the
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mixture when it has a cost advantage over ONW due to the higher bandings.
In addition it appears that once OFFW has this cost advantage and is in the
mixture, investments will increase more rapidly with φ compared to the UK
banding system in which OFFW is mainly in the mixture to satisfy the target
on certificates.
Figure 3.4: The certificate price ν in the no banding and UK banding
systems, and the adjusted certificate price ν̃ in the alterna-
tive banding system.
































In Figure 3.4 the certificate prices are shown. For the original obligation
system and the UK banding system we use the certificate price ν, while for
the alternative banding system we use the adjusted certificate price ν̃. Hence,
what we observe in the figure is the rewards firms get per certificate. In gen-
eral the certificate price is set in such a way as to make renewable technologies
competitive compared to nonrenewable technologies (and eventually other
renewables). We observe that without bandings and for φ up to 0.11, the cer-
tificate price can be low since LFG is relatively cheap. For higher φ and in
the banding systems, ONW and OFFW are needed to satisfy the target and
hence ν has to increase in order to make those technologies competitive. Since
the production and investment costs in all three systems are the same, the
reward needed for making a technology competitive is almost the same. Fur-
thermore, it can be seen that the curves are relatively insensitive to changes in
φ for φ > 0.11. This can be explained by the fact that once the adequate level
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of ν is reached, there is no need for a higher reward.
Figure 3.5: The average consumer price.


























Figure 3.5 shows the average consumer prices. Since we have different
prices in each realization we look at the average price, p̄c, over all realiza-
tions. As consumers pay pc = pN + φν with ν relatively constant with respect
to φ, as we saw in Figure 3.4, it is not surprising that in all three systems the
average consumer price is increasing with φ. In the no banding system, the
average price makes a jump when φ moves from 0.11 to 0.12, which is caused
by the fact that ONW came into the mixture. In the UK banding system, there
is no such jump, since ONW is in the optimal mixture also for low values
of φ. From the figure we may conclude that going from the original obliga-
tion system to the UK banding system does not necessarily increase prices.
Other than in the lower regions, the average prices in the no banding and UK
banding systems are almost equal, meaning that the additional financial in-
centive given to OFFW in the form of a relatively high banding does not affect
consumer prices. In the alternative banding system prices are in general lower
than or equal to the prices in the other two systems, except for very high levels
of φ (φ ≥ 0.45). Hence, in the alternative system the financial incentive given
to OFFW does result in higher (average) consumer prices. This is caused by
the fact that the reward per certificate will remain the same as we observed in
Figure 3.4, while the total number of certificates significantly increases due to
the larger amount of OFFW in the mixture. This is reflected in the consumer
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prices.
Figure 3.6: The renewable production as a fraction of total production.






































The realized renewable production as fractions of total production in the
three scenarios are depicted in Figure 3.6. By the way the obligation was im-
posed in both the no banding and the alternative banding system the fraction
will automatically be equal to φ, meaning that the target is actually satisfied.
In the UK banding system, as long as only LFG and ONW are in the mix-
ture, we are overshooting the target. However, for high levels of φ the orig-
inal target on renewable production would be violated due to the increased
amount of OFFW production. As a unit production with OFFW contributes
two units to satisfying the target on certificates, less total renewable produc-
tion is needed to satisfy this target.
In Figure 3.7 the average CO2 emissions over all realizations are depicted.
We see that, as one would expect, CO2 emissions are decreasing with φ. Under
the UK banding policy, for low and medium levels of φ there is less emission
than in the other systems, because of the higher fraction of renewable produc-
tion (as observed in Figure 3.6). This is mainly the case when OFFW is not
in the optimal mixture. However, for higher levels of φ, when a significant
amount of OFFW is in the mixture, we observe that the UK banding system
leads to higher levels of CO2 emission compared to the other systems.
To summarize, a renewable obligation leads to more financial incentives for
investments in renewable resources. When OFFW is given more support in
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Figure 3.7: The average CO2 emissions.




























the form of a higher banding, for relatively high obligation levels this support
becomes effective. However, this may come at the cost of more CO2 emissions
in the UK banding system and significantly higher consumer prices in the
alternative banding system.
3.6.3 Sensitivity to Decreasing Investment Costs
One goal of a banding system is to encourage development in less established
technologies like offshore wind power. As technologies get more established,
investment costs are likely to go down in the long run (learning by doing). We
now assume that due to the extra support for offshore wind that is given by
the banding systems, the investment cost of OFFW is going to decrease. In
this section we will therefore analyze the effect of a small decrease in the unit
investment cost of OFFW of 0.42 to κ4 = 53.06. Assuming that operating and
management costs remain the same, this means a decrease of 32.5 per KW of
installed capacity (which is approximately 1% of the original building cost per
KW).
In Figures 3.8 and 3.9 the investment quantities in the UK and alternative
banding systems, respectively, are shown. Investment decisions in the orig-
inal obligation system will be the same as in Figure 3.1. Comparing Figure
3.2 to Figure 3.8, it is obvious that a small decrease in the OFFW investment
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Figure 3.8: Investment quantities in the UK banding system.































Figure 3.9: Investment quantities in the alternative banding system.
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cost can have quite an impact on investment strategies. In Figure 3.2 a target
of 0.33 is needed for OFFW to come into the mixture, whereas with the lower
investment cost a φ of 0.22 is sufficient. The same comparison can be done for
Figures 3.3 and 3.9. In Figure 3.3 a φ of 0.41 is needed to induce investments
in OFFW, whereas in Figure 3.9 a φ of 0.31 is sufficient. Afterwards, invest-
ments in OFFW are increasing rapidly with φ, and ONW investments even
go to zero. Comparing Figure 3.8 to Figure 3.9 we observe that again the UK
banding system needs lower targets in order to induce investments in OFFW,
but that for high levels of φ investments in OFFW are not increasing as rapidly
as is the case in the alternative system.
Figure 3.10: The average consumer price.




























Figure 3.10 shows the average consumer prices after the cost reduction in
OFFW. In the no banding and UK banding systems we observe nearly the
same average prices as those observed in Figure 3.5. In the no banding sys-
tem this is not surprising as OFFW is not in the mixture. In the UK banding
system for high levels of φ there is more OFFW in the mixture than before
the cost reduction. This additional OFFW does not influence the average con-
sumer price. The consumer price consists of pN, the price nonrenewable gen-
erators receive, which is independent of OFFW investment cost, plus φν, the
mark-up. As ν is not influenced by the amount of OFFW in the mixture, the
consumer price is not affected by a different mixture either. Obviously, in the
alternative banding system OFFW does affect the average consumer price. Al-
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though the reward per certificate remains the same, the number of certificates
significantly increases with the amount of OFFW investments. To cover the
expenses of the increased number of certificates, consumer prices increase.
We may conclude that in the alternative banding system consumers pay for
the additional financial support that is given to OFFW. A reduction in OFFW
investment cost can thus lead to a higher average consumer price.
Figure 3.11: The renewable production as a fraction of total produc-
tion.






































Figures 3.11 and 3.12 contain the fraction of renewable production and the
expected CO2 emissions, respectively. It can be seen that in the no banding
and alternative banding system the obligation target is satisfied, and that CO2
emissions are nearly the same. This was also observed in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
Hence, while prices are relatively stable in the UK banding system, emissions
are relatively stable in the original obligation and alternative banding system.
In the UK banding system, the fraction of renewable production and the ex-
pected CO2 emissions are affected by the cost reduction. As can be seen from
Figure 3.11, for φ ≥ 0.35 the obligation target is not satisfied, while it was
satisfied up to φ = 0.44 before the cost reduction. Also, when comparing Fig-
ures 3.7 and 3.12 we see that the cost reduction leads to more emissions for
φ ≥ 0.22. The different mixture as a result of the OFFW cost reduction thus
results in a more polluting system. Obviously this is a negative side effect of
having the target on certificates, while OFFW receives 2 certificates per unit
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Figure 3.12: The average CO2 emissions.




























production when only producing a single unit of renewable electricity. Cal-
culation B could potentially improve the situation as it would put a higher
target on certificates, but one should at least be cautious about the possible
side effects of an obligation on certificates.
To summarize, when a technology with a high banding manages to reduce
its cost, banding mechanisms may cause unwanted side effects. In the UK
banding system a cost reduction in OFFW may lead to increased levels of
CO2 emission, whereas in the alternative system it may lead to increased con-
sumer prices. A possible solution when OFFW costs are reduced, is reducing
its banding coefficient accordingly.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter modeled and analyzed three different renewable obligation poli-
cies in a mathematical framework. The original (UK) renewable obligation,
the renewable obligation including the UK banding system, and a proposal
for an alternative banding system have been modeled in the electricity mar-
ket investment model that was originally introduced by Gürkan et al. (2013).
Then a numerical study shed some light on the possible advantages and dis-
advantages of each system and we have observed a couple of side effects.
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The main goal of the renewable obligation is to reduce CO2 emissions by
reducing investments in polluting technologies and to have them replaced by
renewable ones. As we observed in our numerical study, CO2 emissions are
curbed both directly by the replacement of coal by onshore wind, and indi-
rectly by the replacement of coal by the cleaner CCGT. While we see an in-
creasing investment in onshore wind and to a lesser extent landfill gas, a ma-
jor concern is that in the long term targets may not be met without investment
in less developed technologies like offshore wind. As can also be observed in
our numerical study, the renewable obligation fails to give the right financial
incentives to these less developed technologies. This is the main reason why
a banding system was introduced in the UK in 2009. Rather than rewarding
each unit production with a renewable resource with the same amount of cer-
tificates, more certificates and hence more support is given to the technologies
that needed additional incentives.
We find that the banding system can be successful in giving incentives to
OFFW, but that rather high targets are needed in order to do so. Once there
is a substantial amount of investment in OFFW, we observe that the original
obligation target on production may not be met. This is caused by the fact that
a unit production with OFFW adds two units to satisfying the obligation target
whereas it only adds one unit of renewable energy. This problem may be
magnified when less developed technologies like tidal and wave power enter
the optimal mixture. They need more support as stressed out by Allan et al.
(2011), and therefore they have banding coefficients of 3 and 5, respectively.
We then proposed an alternative banding system, which guarantees that
the original obligation target on production is always satisfied. On the down-
side, based on our numerical study it is expected that in the alternative system
prices will significantly rise and that even higher targets are needed in order
to give incentives for investment in tidal and wave power.
It is expected that more support for OFFW is going to cause more develop-
ment in OFFW and hence will result in a downward shift in OFFW investment
cost in the long run. We analyzed the consequences of such a cost decrease
and found that investment levels in different technologies are in general very
sensitive. Since more OFFW comes into the optimal technology mixture, less
investment in renewable technologies is needed to satisfy the obligation in the
UK banding system. Therefore we find that a cost decrease in OFFW actually
results in more CO2 emissions. We do not observe this in the alternative band-
ing system, but there the prices are very sensitive to changes in cost and we
find a significant increase in the consumer price. Obviously, bandings, besides
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its positive effects on less established technologies, can have certain negative
side effects and can give the wrong message in the long run. When technolo-
gies succeed in reducing its cost as a result of the given support (learn by
doing), the financial support should be reduced accordingly.
CHAPTER 4
PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES: CAN RENEWABLE
ENERGY QUOTA BE ACHIEVED UNDER FIXED
FEED-IN TARIFF POLICIES?
4.1 Introduction
Governments aim at meeting certain quotas on the amount of renewable elec-
tricity production in electricity markets. As investment in renewable resources
is costly, without financial support, firms are typically inclined to invest in
non-renewable resources like coal and gas plants. Therefore, in order to com-
pensate for the high investment and to stimulate development in existing and
new renewable resources, financial incentives must be given. A regulator has
two ways of giving these incentives, namely via quantity based and via price
based instruments.
In a quantity based renewable energy policy, the regulator sets a minimum
quantity or percentage of electricity production that must come from renew-
able resources. This target or quota is typically imposed as an obligation on
electricity producers or consumers, and is set for a certain period, typically one
year or a couple of years. In order to show compliance to the target, tradable
green certificates are handed out for each unit production with a renewable
resource. These certificates are tradable in a secondary market and have a cer-
tain monetary value. This value, which is referred to as the certificate price,
is determined by the market. More specifically, the certificate price is deter-
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mined by the demand for certificates and the fine firms pay when not meeting
the target set by the regulator. The certificate price adds to the short term rev-
enue of the renewable electricity producers and hence helps in covering their
high investment cost. By creating a market for certificates, the regulator is giv-
ing producers an indirect subsidy. Quantity based instruments are used in for
example UK, Italy, Belgium, Romania, and Poland.
When price based instruments are used, instead of fixing the quantities,
prices are fixed. The regulator regulates the prices renewable electricity pro-
ducers get for a unit production with a renewable resource. These prices, re-
ferred to as feed-in tariffs (FITs), can be dependent or independent of the price
of electricity and ultimately depend on the policy imposed by the regulator.
The level of the tariff is typically based on effective marginal or so-called lev-
elised cost of generation, that is, the costs for a unit production, including
investment, fuel, operations and management, and other costs. Since effec-
tive marginal costs differ among renewable technologies, feed-in tariffs are
often differentiated based on technology. In some cases, tariffs are also dif-
ferentiated based on other factors like time of the year (Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Portugal), installed capacity (France, Germany, Luxembourg, Slove-
nia, and Spain), overall electricity generation (Austria), and grid connection
(Greek Islands), see Klein (2008). Since feed-in tariffs are in general paid on
top of or instead of the price of electricity, the feed-in tariffs are a direct sub-
sidy. These subsidies are paid either by tax payers or by electricity consumers
(ratepayers). In this chapter we deal with the fixed feed-in policy that pays
firms a fixed price instead of the electricity price, and we assume that the tar-
iffs are paid by the tax payers.
In the literature, many comparisons between quantity based certificate sys-
tems and price based feed-in tariff systems are made. Feed-in tariffs are gen-
erally considered as favorable due to the lower market risk as a result of long-
term price contracts, see for example Butler and Neuhoff (2008) and Mitchell
et al. (2006). The latter also concludes that feed-in tariff systems have led to
higher levels of renewable investments in practice compared to certificate sys-
tems. Furthermore, a feed-in system is capable of promoting different types
of technologies by handing out differentiated tariffs whereas quantity based
systems single out the least costly renewable technology as argued in del Rio
and Gual (2007). Broad mixtures can be desirable as investments in new and
less established technologies can lead to research and development in these
technologies, resulting in more efficient use and lower operating costs in the
long term.
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One specific theoretical drawback of FITs is the following. Suppose there is
a choice between investing in a non-renewable and a renewable technology.
Typically, without any government regulation there is no incentive to invest in
the renewable technology due to the high effective marginal costs as a result
of high investment costs and the random availability of capacity. It is pointed
out in the literature that when the difference between the effective marginal
costs of both technologies is constant, price based instruments can be seen
as inferior to quantity based instruments as quota cannot be guaranteed un-
der a price based policy. Such a situation is analyzed in Requate and Unold
(2003) for taxation versus emission permits in a market with a polluting and
an abatement (clean) technology. Under permits, an optimal permit price will
be set by the market and quota will be met. Under taxation, for a tax level
higher than the optimal permit price, all firms invest in the clean technology.
For a tax level lower than the optimal permit price, no firm will invest in the
clean technology. When the tax level is set equal to the optimal permit price,
firms are indifferent between both technologies. This implies that in a decen-
tralized market, the price based instrument alone will not necessarily result in
quotas being met. A similar example can be found in Chapter 2, in which we
showed that when the optimal permit price is set as a tax, multiple equilibria
exist; only one of these equilibria satisfies the emission cap.
Since certificates are similar to permits and FITs are similar to taxes, the
same issue is expected in case we compare FITs to certificates. We show that
indeed, under the assumption of constant effective marginal cost and hence
a constant difference in marginal cost between a non-renewable and renew-
able technology, meeting renewable quota cannot be guaranteed under an FIT
policy. In order to show this, we consider a two-stage investment model for a
perfectly competitive electricity market, similar to the models used in Chap-
ter 2 and Chapter 3. At the first stage, firms simultaneously decide on their
investment quantities as to maximize their long term profits. At the second
stage, firms decide on their production quantities, random demand realiza-
tions and random availability of renewable capacity are revealed, and the
market is cleared. We impose a renewable electricity obligation on the first
stage of the problem, employ this to derive the optimal certificate price, and
use this information as a benchmark for determining the best possible feed-in
tariff. We then show that in the absence of an explicit obligation, only a price
based FIT cannot guarantee that quota are met.
Contrary to those analytical results, in reality FIT systems seem to perform
well as mentioned earlier. The targets set by regulators are often met with-
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out explicitly imposing them on firms. For this practical reason, we question
whether the constant effective marginal cost assumption is a realistic one. Fur-
thermore, as argued by Weitzman (1974), any outcome that can be achieved
under quantity based policies can be achieved by means of a price based pol-
icy, as long as convexity assumptions hold. Hence, as under linear investment
cost assumptions a FIT system seems to be inferior to a quota system, it is nat-
ural to move to non-linear convex investment costs for renewable technolo-
gies. Assuming non-linear convex investment cost functions simply means
that with each additional unit of capacity installed, installing this unit is more
costly than the previous unit. Convex cost assumptions in electricity markets
are not uncommon in the literature, see for example Reichenbach and Requate
(2012) and Traber and Kemfert (2011). However, to the best of our knowledge
there is no literature studying the consequences of different cost assumptions
on feed-in policies, in particular in the presence of uncertainty. One could also
study non-linear concave cost functions, but this is beyond the scope of this
chapter.
We show that under non-linear convex investment costs in renewable re-
sources, FITs can indeed achieve the same outcomes as a certificate system. In
particular, we impose an alternative obligation type constraint on the market
to obtain a benchmark for the optimal feed-in tariffs. Then we remove the ex-
plicit obligation and show that with the feed-in tariffs obtained the obligation
is still satisfied. Moreover, when multiple renewable technologies are avail-
able, a regulator has the freedom to set the tariff levels in such a way that any
renewable technology can be in the optimal technology mixture. We consider
parameter vectors determining the feed-in tariffs for each technology and aim
to find for each possible parameter vector the corresponding technology mix-
ture at the market equilibrium. We do this by finding vectors for which a
single technology is invested in and for which a slight deviation results in an-
other technology entering the mixture. This is then used to divide the space of
all possible parameter choices into areas where one, two, or three renewable
technologies are in the mixture. Finally, for the case of more than three renew-
able technologies, we find the feed-in parameters for which one technology is
singled out.
In a numerical study, we consider a small market with two non-renewable
technologies and three renewable technologies, and provide a numerical ap-
plication of the analytical results derived in this chapter. In particular, we con-
sider the effects of different choices of the parameters determining the feed-in
tariffs, as set by the regulator, on the optimal investment mixture. We show
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that in case of linear investment cost functions typically one technology is
singled out regardless of the feed-in parameters set by the regulator. Further-
more, in the absence of an explicit obligation, meeting a renewable quota can-
not be guaranteed. When investment cost functions are quadratic we find for
each possible parameter vector the exact technology mixture. Furthermore,
we find areas for which two and three renewable technologies are in the opti-
mal mixture. A regulator can thus choose a feed-in parameter vector based on
the desired mixture using our theory. We show that removing the obligation
that is used to obtain a benchmark value for the optimal feed-in tariff does not
change the optimal technology mixture. We also consider two cases where
renewable technologies have non-linear non-quadratic convex cost functions.
While analytically we cannot determine areas in which two or three technolo-
gies are in the optimal mixture, our numerical tools provide a way to deter-
mine these by running a series of numerical experiments. Finally, our obser-
vations lead to a theoretical result for two specific classes of cost functions,
namely functions with a superadditive non-constant part and functions with
a subadditive non-constant part; when investment cost functions are of either
form, the areas in which two or three technologies are in the optimal mixture
are characterized by a specific shape.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the elec-
tricity market investment model. In Section 4.3, we introduce the renewable
obligation and the concept of a certificate system. In Section 4.4, we explain
the details of the feed-in tariff system. Our main analysis, theorems, and re-
sults are presented in Section 4.5, in which we compare a system with linear
investment cost to a system with non-linear convex investment cost. In Section
4.6, we carry out our numerical study. Section 4.7 includes the conclusions.
4.2 The Electricity Market Investment Model
We present a mathematical model for an electricity market with random de-
mand and uncertain output of renewable resources. We first describe the elec-
tricity market and its characteristics and state the assumptions we make. Then
we present the model and do some preliminary analysis.
The electricity market is represented by an electricity grid with supply and
demand nodes. A set of transmission lines connects the nodes and forms the
electricity network. Transmission lines are usually owned by a transmission
system operator (TSO). At supply nodes, firms owning production capacity
produce electricity. Their production capacity consists of non-renewable and
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renewable technologies from which electricity can be generated. Outputs of
renewable resources like wind and solar power are typically dependent on
weather conditions and therefore uncertain. Production capacities can be ex-
panded when firms invest in additional capacity, which is typically done on
a monthly or yearly basis. At demand nodes, consumers with an hourly or
daily random, and by assumption inelastic, demand are located. Each period
electricity, which is a non-storable good, is transmitted from supply nodes to
demand nodes, using the transmission lines in the network, in order to satisfy
demand. Transmission from one node to another may affect flows in the entire
network.
Decisions by firms and the TSO are made in two stages. At the first stage,
long-term decisions are made. All firms, at the beginning of the year or month,
simultaneously maximize their long-term profits while deciding on their in-
vestment in (additional) production capacity. Long-term profits also depend
on daily or hourly outcomes that are unknown at the time of making the de-
cision. These daily or hourly outcomes result from the second stage, which
can be seen as a short-term process that repeats itself every day or hour and is
referred to as the spot market. In the spot market, firms produce power in or-
der to maximize their short term profits, the TSO decides on the flows through
the transmission lines while ensuring reliability of the system and maximizing
its own profits from buying electricity at supply nodes and selling it to con-
sumers at demand nodes. Spot market prices are determined by the market,
which goes as follows. Given the first stage investment quantities, an equi-
librium to the second stage between all firms and the TSO is determined. At
an equilibrium, the price in each node is set such that supply meets demand,
unless there is unsatisfied demand. When that is the case, the price in the cor-
responding node will be set equal to an imposed price cap, the value of lost
load, which in the literature is referred to as VOLL pricing; see for example
Stoft (2002) and Ehrenmann and Smeers (2008). Demand and available gener-
ation capacity in renewable resources are assumed to be unknown at the first
stage. Firms only know the underlying probability distributions (potentially
based on past empirical data) of demand and generation output, while their
realizations will be revealed at the second stage. We assume perfect competi-
tion at both stages, meaning that none of the operators in the market is aware
of the fact that by behaving strategically, they can influence the market price.
As decisions at both stages (indirectly) depend on decisions made by all firms
at both stages and by the TSO at the second stage, the two-stage problem can
be seen as a two-stage game between firms and the TSO. An equilibrium to
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this game is found when for none of the operators it is profitable to deviate.
We present a mathematical representation of the electricity market as a two-
stage game between firms and the TSO under perfect competition, similar to
the models presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. We present a stochastic
version the model, excluding a renewable obligation or feed-in tariffs; these
will be added later. In the model, each firm is assumed to have its own
unique technology. Therefore, the terms firm and technology will be used
interchangeably. Furthermore, each firm is assumed to be operational at all
supply nodes (but not necessarily producing). Sets, variables, and parameters
used in the model are given below.
Sets:
N : set of demand nodes
I : set of supply nodes
KN : set of non-renewable technologies
KR : set of renewable technologies
K : set of all technologies (K := KN ∪ KR)
L : set of electricity transmission lines connecting nodes in the network.
Parameters:
cik : unit production cost at supply node i ∈ I for technology k ∈ K
κik(xik) : investment cost as a function of xik at supply node i ∈ I for
technology k ∈ K
PTDFl,j : power transmitted through line l ∈ L due to one unit of power
injection into node j ∈ N ∪ I
hl : capacity limit of line l ∈ L
VOLL : value of unserved energy or lost load.
Variables:
xik : generation capacity investment in technology k ∈ K at supply node
i ∈ I
yik : quantity of power generated at supply node i ∈ I by using
technology k ∈ K
f j : net power flow dispatched by the TSO to node j ∈ N ∪ I
δj : unserved demand at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pej : electricity price at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pNik : price non-renewable technology k ∈ KN at supply node i ∈ I gets
per unit sold
pRik : price renewable technology k ∈ KR at supply node i ∈ I gets per unit
sold.
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Uncertainty is dealt with as follows. Let ω ∈ Ω be a random vector in the
space of possible outcomes Ω. The vector ω contains outcomes for both ran-
dom demand and random available capacity of renewable resources, which
have some joint distribution Ψ. Random available capacity for renewable
technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I is denoted by Fik(x, ω), some non-
decreasing differentiable possibly nonlinear random function of investment
quantity x. The function F(·) reflects that for renewable technologies not all
capacity is available for production at all times, due to its dependence on for
example wheather conditions. Random demand in demand node n ∈ N is
denoted by dn(ω).
In the remainder of this chapter, variables may get superscripts N and R
depending on their corresponding technology in KN and KR, respectively. In
addition, for k ∈ K we define xk = (xik)i∈I and yk = (yik)i∈I , the vectors
containing investments and production, respectively, of technology k ∈ K in
all supply nodes.
At the first stage, each firm k ∈ K simultaneously maximizes its long-term
profit while deciding on its optimal investment quantities xk in all supply
nodes. A firm’s long-term profit consists of its expected second stage profit
minus its total investment cost. The investment cost for technology k ∈ K
in supply node i ∈ I is a function of the investment quantity xik and is de-
noted by κik(xik). Throughout the chapter we assume linear investment cost
for each non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I and thus
write κNik (x
N




ik . For renewable technologies we assume the investment
cost functions to be nonnegative and differentiable; we specify the functions
later. The second stage profit in a realization ω ∈ Ω for technology k ∈ K
in supply node i ∈ I consists of the price pik(ω) paid for a unit production,
minus marginal production cost cik, times production quantity yik(xk, ω) as a
function of investment quantities xk. The expectation with respect to ω gives
the expected second stage profit. For non-renewable technology k ∈ KN the
















k , ω) is the optimal production quantity of non-renewable tech-
nology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I in realization ω ∈ Ω at the second stage
if xNk is the investment quantity. The price p
N
ik (ω) paid per unit production
with technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I is taken from the second stage
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and dealt with as a parameter in (4.1), since we assume perfect competition
and hence that firms are price takers. Typically, non-renewable technologies
receive the price of electricity, defined as pei (ω) in supply node i ∈ I per unit
production, but depending on the pricing scheme imposed by a regulator this
may be altered.
For renewable technology k ∈ KR the first stage problem is similar to (4.1),
except from the fact that investments in a renewable technology may be lim-
ited either by law or by physical limitations such as a lack of space or re-
sources. For example, in the UK electricity market, investments in landfill
gas (LFG) are capped by law (by means of permits). As such, we introduce
for each renewable technology k ∈ KR a maximum investment quantity MRk ,
which can be infinite for certain technologies. The first stage problem for re-
















xRik ≤ MRk (ζRk ).
(4.2)
Here, ζRk is the dual variable with respect to the ceiling on investments in
technology k ∈ KR and represents the scarcity rent for additional resources.
Again, yRik(x
R
k , ω) is the optimal production quantity of renewable technology
k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I in realization ω ∈ Ω at the second stage if xRk
is the investment quantity. The price pRik(ω) is taken from the second stage
and dealt with as a parameter. Without any regulation to support renewable
technologies, this price would equal the electricity price pei (ω) in supply node
i ∈ I. However, depending on regulation and subsidies this may be altered
via a pricing scheme imposed by a regulator.
At the second stage, in each realization of the random demand and random
generation output of renewable resources, for given first-stage decisions, firms
and the TSO make decisions while the market is cleared. More specifically,
in each realization ω ∈ Ω and for given xNk and pNik (ω) for all i ∈ I, non-
renewable firm k ∈ KN maximizes its short-term profit while determining its
optimal production quantity yNk (x
N
k , ω) in all its supply nodes by solving
ΠNk (x
N




(pNik (ω)− cNik )yNik (ω)
s.t. yNik (ω) ≤ xNik (βNik(ω)) ∀i ∈ I
yNik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
(4.3)
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Here, βNik(ω), k ∈ KN, i ∈ I, is the dual variable associated with the capacity
constraint. It represents the scarcity rent of capacity in non-renewable tech-
nology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I in realization ω ∈ Ω. The price pNik (ω)
for technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I in realization ω ∈ Ω is taken as
a parameter. Different demand realizations may result in different prices at
equilibrium, and hence the price is dependent on ω ∈ Ω and is determined at
the second stage equilibrium as we discuss below.
Similarly, renewable technology k ∈ KR maximizes, in each realization
ω ∈ Ω and for given xRk , its short-term profit while determining its optimal
production quantity yRk (x
R
k , ω) in all its supply nodes by solving
ΠRk (x
R





s.t. yRik(ω) ≤ Fik(xRik, ω) (βRik(ω)) ∀i ∈ I
yRik(ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
(4.4)
Again, βRik(ω), k ∈ KR, i ∈ I, is the dual variable associated with the capacity
constraint. It represents the scarcity rent of available capacity in renewable
technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I in realization ω ∈ Ω.
A transmission system operator (TSO) optimizes its short-term profits from
buying electricity from supply nodes, and transmitting and selling it to de-
mand nodes. The TSO is a price-taker and thus takes in each realization ω ∈ Ω
electricity prices pej(ω) in each node j ∈ N ∪ I as given. Its decision variables
are the flows, f j, into or out of each node j ∈ N ∪ I. f j > 0 indicates a flow into
node j, whereas f j < 0 indicates a flow out of node j. Electricity is transmit-
ted through the network of transmission lines l ∈ L that run from one node
to another. Typically, a power injection into one node, affects flows on all
transmission lines. These effects can be positive or negative, and are given by
so-called power transmission distribution factors (PTDF), which are based on
Kirchhoff’s Law, see for more details Chao et al. (2000). On each transmission
line l ∈ L there can be a capacity hl limiting the net load in both directions, that
is, the net flow on line l has to be between −hl and hl. The TSO determines in
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f j(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))
hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≥ 0 (λ+l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≥ 0 (λ−l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L.
(4.5)
The first constraint balances the flows such that the total flow out of all nodes
equals the total flow into all nodes, with (free) dual variable ρ. The second
and third constraint make sure that the net flow on each line l ∈ L remains
between its limits hl and −hl, with dual variables λ+l and λ−l , respectively.
In each realization ω ∈ Ω, the market is cleared by means of two types
of market clearing conditions. The first type determines in each realization
ω ∈ Ω the electricity price pej(ω) in each node j ∈ N ∪ I while balancing
supply and demand. In each supply node i ∈ I, where demand in each ω ∈ Ω
is defined as di(ω) = 0, the flow out of the node can be at most the total
production in the node. In each demand node n ∈ N, where production in
each ω ∈ Ω is defined as yNnk(ω) = 0, k ∈ KN, and yRnk(ω) = 0, k ∈ KR, the
flow into the node should be at least the demand, unless there is unsatisfied
demand (see below). Hence, for all nodes j ∈ N ∪ I we have a constraint
taking care of supply and demand. The price of electricity in each node is
determined perpendicular to each of these constraints. The second type deals
with unsatisfied demand. When in ω ∈ Ω there is unsatisfied demand in node
j ∈ N ∪ I, which we define as δj(ω), then the price in that node will be set at
VOLL, the value of lost load. This is an, in general, relatively high number
that serves as a price cap in case of demand curtailment. The market clearing







f j(ω)− dj(ω) ⊥ pej(ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ VOLL− pej(ω) ⊥ δj(ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(4.6)
Summarizing, the second stage in each realization ω ∈ Ω consists of opti-
mization problem (4.3) for all non-renewable technologies k ∈ KN, optimiza-
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tion problem (4.4) for all renewable technologies k ∈ KR, the TSO’s problem
(4.5), and the market clearing conditions (4.6). Given a pricing scheme that
expresses in each ω ∈ Ω the prices pNik (ω), k ∈ KN, i ∈ I, and pRik(ω), k ∈ KR,
i ∈ I, in terms of the price of electricity pei (ω) in supply node i ∈ I, then the
entire second stage can be solved by means of a mixed complementarity prob-
lem (MCP) consisting of the KKT optimality conditions to all the second stage
problems. Given x, in any ω ∈ Ω the MCP that solves the second stage to op-
timality is to find y∗(ω), δ∗(ω), pe∗(ω), β∗(ω), λ∗+(ω), λ∗−(ω), ρ∗(ω), f ∗(ω)
that satisfy the following set of KKT-conditions:
0 ≤ β∗Nik (ω)− p∗Nik (ω) + cNik ⊥ y∗Nik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
0 ≤ β∗Rik (ω)− p∗Rik (ω) + cRik ⊥ y∗Rik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
0 ≤ xNik − y∗Nik (ω) ⊥ β∗Nik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
0 ≤ Fik(xRik, ω)− y∗Rik (ω) ⊥ β∗Rik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
0 ≤ VOLL− p∗ej (ω) ⊥ δ∗j (ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ ∑
k∈KN
y∗Njk (ω) + ∑
k∈KR
y∗Rjk (ω)+
δ∗j (ω) + f
∗
j (ω)− dj(ω) ⊥ p∗ej (ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ω) ⊥ λ∗+l (ω) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ω) ⊥ λ∗−l (ω) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l (ω)− λ∗−l (ω))+
p∗ej (ω)− ρ∗(ω) = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j (ω) = 0.
(4.7)
System (4.7) is simply the set of all KKT-conditions corresponding to (4.3),
(4.4), (4.5), (4.6). Note that in (4.7) information on how p∗Nik , k ∈ KN, i ∈ I, and
p∗Rik , k ∈ KR, i ∈ I, relate to the price of electricity pei in supply node i ∈ I is
suppressed. This relation is typically imposed by the regulator through a pric-
ing scheme. Examples of such pricing schemes will be given in the remainder
of this chapter when we introduce a renewable obligation and feed-in tariffs.
An equilibrium to the entire two-stage problem, including the first stage,
can be found by solving another MCP. In order to do so, we first present the
KKT-optimality conditions of the first stage for x∗ and ζ∗. The KKT-optimality
conditions for non-renewable technology k ∈ KN with optimization problem
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+ κNik ⊥ x∗Nik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I. (4.8)
This condition follows from the first order conditions of (4.1); a detailed deri-
vation can be found in Gürkan et al. (2013). For each ω ∈ Ω, β∗Nik (ω) is
the optimal scarcity rent β∗Nik (ω) in (4.7), given x = x
∗. x∗Nik is the optimal
investment quantity in non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply node
i ∈ I. In particular, it can only be positive when the expected scarcity rents
cover the unit investment cost.
The KKT-optimality conditions for renewable technology k ∈ KR with op-











ik ) + ζ
∗R
k ⊥ x∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
0 ≤ MRk −∑
i∈I
x∗Rik ⊥ ζ∗Rk ≥ 0.
(4.9)
The conditions in (4.9) follow from the first order conditions of (4.2). Again,
for each ω ∈ Ω, β∗Rik (ω) is the optimal β∗Rik (ω) in (4.7) for x = x∗. x∗Rik is
the optimal investment quantity in renewable technology k ∈ KR in supply
node i ∈ I. The interpretation of the term (∂Fik(x∗Rik , ω)/∂xRik)β∗Rik (ω) is the
following. β∗Rik (ω) is the scarcity rent of available capacity in renewable tech-
nology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I in realization ω ∈ Ω corresponding to a
unit change in production. ∂Fik(x∗Rik , ω)/∂x
R
ik is the change in production cor-




ik (ω) is thus
the scarcity rent corresponding to a unit change in investment at x = x∗. The
first condition of (4.9) thus implies that, in order to have a positive investment
in renewable technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I, the expected scarcity
rent corresponding to a unit investment should cover the sum of the marginal
investment cost and the scarcity rent of the ceiling, ζ∗Rk .
The equilibrium to the two-stage game can now be found by solving the
MCP that finds x∗ and ζ∗R that satisfy the first stage conditions (4.8) for all k ∈
KN and (4.9) for all k ∈ KR, and that finds, for given x∗ and for each possible
realization ω ∈ Ω a solution to the second stage optimality conditions in (4.7).
We next introduce the modifications that need to be done when including a
renewable obligation or a feed-in tariff system.
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4.3 Introducing a Renewable Obligation and Cer-
tificate System
In order to meet long term quota, a regulator can impose a renewable obli-
gation on the electricity market. An obligation can be imposed either on pro-
ducers or on consumers. Since the former is more common, we assume the
obligation is imposed on the producers. Compliance to the obligation target
is typically shown in the form of certificates. For a unit production with a
renewable resource, a producer receives one certificate. These certificates can
be traded on a secondary market and hence have a certain value, the certifi-
cate price. At the end of each period, typically a year, firms need to show
compliance to the target by having sufficient certificates.
Since the obligation holds for a certain period, we add an obligation condi-
tion to the first stage. We impose that, in expectation, a fraction φ of the total













⊥ ν ≥ 0. (4.10)
The obligation is perpendicular to the variable ν, which can be seen as the
value of a unit production with a renewable resource. Since each unit produc-
tion is rewarded with a certificate, ν thus also represents the certificate price a
renewable technology receives on top of the electricity price. We impose the
following pricing scheme at the second stage. In all i ∈ I we let
pNik (ω) = p
e
i (ω) ∀k ∈ KN
pRik(ω) = p
e
i (ω) + ν ∀k ∈ KR.
(4.11)
Note that, contrary to the pricing schemes presented in Chapter 3, we do not
express pN and pR in terms of the consumer price. Instead, we express all
prices in terms of the electricity price pe as this allows for a better comparison
with the model that will be discussed in the next section.
We replace pN and pR in the first and second stage problems defined in the
previous section. For given x and ν, the MCP that solves the second stage to
optimality is now to find for any ω ∈ Ω, y∗(ω), δ∗(ω), p∗(ω), β∗(ω), λ∗+(ω),
λ∗−(ω), ρ∗(ω), and f ∗(ω) that satisfy the following set of KKT-conditions:
0 ≤ β∗Nik (ω)− p∗ei (ω) + cNik ⊥ y∗Nik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (4.12a)
0 ≤ β∗Rik (ω)− p∗ei (ω)− ν + cRik ⊥ y∗Rik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR (4.12b)
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0 ≤ xNik − y∗Nik (ω) ⊥ β∗Nik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (4.12c)
0 ≤ Fik(xRik, ω)− y∗Rik (ω) ⊥ β∗Rik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR (4.12d)
0 ≤ VOLL− p∗ej (ω) ⊥ δ∗j (ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I (4.12e)
0 ≤ ∑
k∈KN
y∗Njk (ω) + ∑
k∈KR
y∗Rjk (ω)+
δ∗j (ω) + f
∗
j (ω)− dj(ω) ⊥ p∗ej (ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I (4.12f)
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ω) ⊥ λ∗+l (ω) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L (4.12g)
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ω) ⊥ λ∗−l (ω) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L (4.12h)
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l (ω)− λ∗−l (ω))+
p∗cj (ω)− ρ∗(ω) = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I (4.12i)
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j (ω) = 0. (4.12j)
This set of KKT conditions is equivalent to the following optimization prob-
lem, the so called Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem:













(cRik − ν)yRik(ω) + VOLL ∑
j∈N∪I
δj(ω)
s.t. yNik (ω) ≤ xNik (βNik(ω)) ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN






δj(ω) + f j(ω) ≥ dj(ω) (pej(ω)) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
∑
j∈N∪I
f j(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≤ hl (λ+l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f j(ω) ≥ −hl (λ−l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
yNik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
yRik(ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
δj(ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(4.13)
The first stage problem consists of (4.1) for all k ∈ KN and (4.2) for all k ∈ KR
with pN and pR replaced according to the pricing scheme (4.11), and (4.10).
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An equilibrium to the two stage problem of the decentralized electricity mar-
ket can now be found by determining x∗, ν∗, ζ∗, y∗(ω), δ∗(ω), p∗(ω), β∗(ω),

















ik ) + ζ
∗R
k ⊥ x∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR (4.14b)
0 ≤ MRk −∑
i∈I














⊥ ν∗ ≥ 0 (4.14d)
and (4.12) at x = x∗ and ν = ν∗ in each realization ω ∈ Ω.
4.4 Introducing a Feed-in Tariff System
Feed-in tariffs are per unit subsidies paid by the regulator to firms for produc-
ing with certain renewable technologies. The (additional) financial support is
given to encourage development and investment in renewable technologies,
eventually leading to cleaner generation mixtures. The feed-in tariff (FIT) is
a price based instrument; that is, (part of the) prices paid to renewable elec-
tricity producers are fixed by the regulator. It is typically a fixed amount of
money paid for a unit production with a renewable resource either instead
of the price of electricity or on top of it. To avoid confusion, in this chapter
we use the term feed-in tariff for the entire amount of money that is paid per
unit production with a renewable resource. Feed-in tariffs are paid either from
taxes or from mark-ups paid by consumers (referred to as ratepayers). Since
we assume inelastic exogenous demand in this chapter, it is also natural to
assume that feed-in tariffs are paid from taxes. A feed-in tariff can be price
independent or price dependent. Price dependent policies are policies where
the given tariff varies with the price of electricity; usually the higher the price,
the lower the (necessary) financial support. In this chapter, we focus on one
specific feed-in policy, namely the price independent fixed price policy.
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The fixed price policy is the most popular feed-in policy applied across
Europe, and is applied in for example Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany,
Ireland, Portugal, and Slovakia. For a complete overview, see Klein (2008).
Under the fixed price policy, each unit production with a renewable resource
is rewarded with a price that is fixed for a certain contract period, typically
several years. This fixed price is paid to firms instead of the price of electricity,
and is independent of the price of electricity itself. The fixed price can be dif-
ferent for different (renewable) technologies. Since consumers pay the market
price of electricity for each unit consumed, the actual feed-in tariff paid by the
regulator is the difference between the fixed price and the price of electricity.
We let τ̄Rk be the fixed feed-in tariff for technology k ∈ KR. These fixed
tariffs are typically set by the regulator, known to the firms, and thus can be
seen as a parameter. However, for analytical purposes we allow it to be an
endogenous variable as discussed below. We assume the technology specific
tariff to be the same in all supply nodes i ∈ I. The pricing scheme imposed on
the market is that in each node i ∈ I we set in each ω ∈ Ω:
pNik (ω) = p
e
i (ω) ∀k ∈ KN
pRik(ω) = τ̄
R
k ∀k ∈ KR.
(4.15)
A fixed feed-in tariff in relation to the electricity price is depicted in Figure 4.1.
We see that, while the per unit price paid to a renewable technology is fixed,
the payment on top of the price of electricity and thus the cost incurred by the
regulator is fluctuating.
We replace pN and pR in the first and second stage problems according to
(4.15). For given x and any ω ∈ Ω, the MCP that solves the second stage to
optimality is now to find y∗(ω), δ∗(ω), p∗(ω), β∗(ω), λ∗+(ω), λ∗−(ω), ρ∗(ω),
f ∗(ω) that satisfy the following set of KKT-conditions:
0 ≤ β∗Nik (ω)− p∗ei (ω) + cNik ⊥ y∗Nik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (4.16a)
0 ≤ β∗Rik (ω)− τ̄Rk + cRik ⊥ y∗Rik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR (4.16b)
0 ≤ xNik − y∗Nik (ω) ⊥ β∗Nik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (4.16c)
0 ≤ Fik(xRik, ω)− y∗Rik (ω) ⊥ β∗Rik (ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR (4.16d)
0 ≤ VOLL− p∗ej (ω) ⊥ δ∗j (ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I (4.16e)
0 ≤ ∑
k∈KN
y∗Njk (ω) + ∑
k∈KR
y∗Rjk (ω)+
δ∗j (ω) + f
∗
j (ω)− dj(ω) ⊥ p∗ej (ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I (4.16f)
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Price of electricity (pe(ω))
Fixed FIT (pR(ω) = τ̄R)
Paid on top of price of electricity
(τ̄R − pe(ω))
τ̄
0 ≤ hl − ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ω) ⊥ λ∗+l (ω) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L (4.16g)
0 ≤ hl + ∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,j f ∗j (ω) ⊥ λ∗−l (ω) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L (4.16h)
∑
l∈L
PTDFl,j(λ∗+l (ω)− λ∗−l (ω))+
p∗cj (ω)− ρ∗(ω) = 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I (4.16i)
∑
j∈N∪I
f ∗j (ω) = 0. (4.16j)
In case of a fixed feed-in tariff, there is no equivalent OPF problem to (4.16).
However, the problem can still be solved as an MCP. The first stage consists
of (4.1) for all k ∈ KN and (4.2) for all k ∈ KR with pN and pR replaced ac-
cording to the pricing scheme (4.15). An equilibrium to the two stage prob-
lem of the decentralized electricity market can now be found by determining






+ κNik ⊥ x∗Nik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (4.17a)
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∗R
k ⊥ x∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR (4.17b)
0 ≤ MRk −∑
i∈I
x∗Rik ⊥ ζ∗Rk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ KR (4.17c)
and (4.16) at x = x∗ in each realization ω ∈ Ω.
In reality, regulators determine feed-in tariffs at the beginning of a period,
often based on estimated levelised costs of renewable technologies, that is,
the effective marginal costs for a unit production, including investment, fuel,
operations and management, and other costs. Due to uncertainty in demand
and uncertain output of renewable resources, the estimated levelised costs
may differ from the actual costs involved with a unit production, resulting in
either too much or insufficient financial support. In case too much support is
given, this may result in windfall profits for renewable electricity producers
and an excessive financial burden on the regulator and hence tax or ratepay-
ers. When insufficient support is given, desired quota may not be met. Hence,
a balance has to be found between giving too much and too little support.
Instead of an exogenous feed-in tariff based on levelised cost, in this chapter
we aim to determine the feed-in tariff endogenously with the goal of meeting
a renewable quota. In order to get a benchmark for the ’right’ feed-in tariff,
we impose a condition similar to the renewable obligation (4.10) at the first
stage. For convenience, instead of imposing that a fraction φ of the total ex-
pected production should be produced with renewable technologies, we now
impose that a fraction φ of the expected demand should be produced with










− φEω[d(ω)] ⊥ σ ≥ 0. (4.18)
Both (4.10) and (4.18) are similar, except when there is a lot of unsatisfied
demand, in which case (4.18) requires more renewables than (4.10), or when
there is a lot of excess production. In the latter case the electricity price drops
to zero and (4.10) requires more renewables than (4.18). In practice and as
observed in numerical experiments, unsatisfied demand is typically negligible
and the electricity price dropping to zero is not very common. Hence, we can
conclude that (4.18), while different, poses a good benchmark for verifying
whether or not the original obligation on production (4.10) can be satisfied by
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the market.
The dual price σ obtained in (4.18) is not going to have the same interpreta-
tion as the price of certificates ν in (4.10), since the certificate price is paid on
top of the electricity price while here the optimal dual price is going to repre-
sent the optimal unit payment that is paid instead of the electricity price. That
is, we use σ to set the tariff levels. We introduce a parameter αk ≥ 0 for each
k ∈ KR with ∑
k∈KR
αk = 1 and set τ̄Rk = αkσ. These parameters are determined
by the regulator and serve as a mean to discriminate between the different
renewable technologies. This can be desirable in order to encourage invest-
ments in less established technologies or to limit investments in renewable
technologies with certain negative side-effects.
4.5 Linear Versus Non-linear Convex Cost
In this section, we analyze the implications of both linear investment cost in
renewable technologies and non-linear convex investment cost in renewable
technologies. We focus on the fixed price policy and analyze whether the pol-
icy is able to guarantee that a renewable quota is met.
We consider an electricity market with only two available technologies,
namely a non-renewable technology and a renewable technology. We assume
there is a single node and hence do not take into account any network restric-
tions and in addition assume there is no limit on the investment quantity in
both technologies. There is a random availability of renewable capacity at the
second stage, denoted by the function FR(xR, ω), ω ∈ Ω, that is assumed to
be of the following form: FR(xR, ω) = θ(ω)xR, ω ∈ Ω, with θ(ω) ∈ (0, 1)
representing the random availability according to a certain probability distri-
bution. In addition, we make two assumptions on the cost. The second stage
production cost, typically fuel cost, of the non-renewable producer is higher
than the production cost of the renewable producer, that is, cN > cR. Fur-
thermore, it is natural to assume that the expected effective marginal cost or
levelised cost of the renewable producer are higher than the levelised cost of
the non-renewable producer, that is,





+ cR ∀ xR ≥ 0. (4.19)
The interpretation of the fraction involved in (4.19) is the following. Recall
CHAPTER 4: Prices versus Quantities: Can Renewable Energy Quota be
Achieved under Fixed Feed-in Tariff Policies? 135
that κR(xR) is the investment cost function in xR. κR
′
(xR) is its derivative with
respect to xR, and a unit investment in the renewable technology thus costs
κR
′
(xR) in xR. Of this unit, in expectation, only Eω[θ(ω)] < 1 is available. The





We next show that with a renewable obligation and a certificate system, the
set quota is always met at equilibrium. In addition, we give a lower bound
for the optimal certificate price at an equilibrium. Before proving this, note
that θ and β∗R or β∗N may be correlated and hence have a nonzero covariance.
The following lemma shows that both covariances are nonpositive, which has
a relevant implication later.
Lemma 4.1. Let θ(ω), ω ∈ Ω, be continuously distributed with values between 0
and 1. At a solution to the MCP consisting of (4.14) and (4.12) for given x and ν we
have:
(i) COVω(θ(ω), β∗N(ω)) ≤ 0 and consequently
Eω[θ(ω)β∗N(ω)] ≤ Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗N(ω)].
(ii) COVω(θ(ω), β∗R(ω)) ≤ 0 and consequently
Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] ≤ Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗R(ω)].
Proof: (i) We argue that θ and β∗N are negatively correlated and hence that their
covariance is nonpositive. In each ω ∈ Ω, θ(ω) represents the available capac-
ity and hence affects y∗R(ω). Low values of θ(ω) lead to low y∗R(ω). When
there is sufficiently high demand, the non-renewable technology produces at
full capacity and hence β∗N(ω) is determined by p∗e(ω) + cN. The electricity
price is equal to the effective marginal cost of the non-renewable producer,
unless there is unsatisfied demand; in that case, p∗e(ω) = VOLL and thus
β∗N(ω) will be very high. On the other hand, high values of θ(ω) lead to high
y∗R(ω) and the non-renewable technology may not be able to produce at full
capacity, leading to β∗N(ω) = 0. Therefore, θ(ω) and β∗N(ω) are negatively
correlated. This implies COVω(θ(ω), β∗N(ω)) ≤ 0. Then Eω[θ(ω)β∗N(ω)] =
Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗N(ω)] + COVω(θ(ω), β∗N(ω)) ≤ Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗N(ω)] follows
immediately.
(ii) We argue that θ and β∗R are negatively correlated and hence that their
covariance is nonpositive. In each ω ∈ Ω, when x∗R > 0 and hence y∗R(ω) >
0, β∗R(ω) = p∗e(ω) + ν − cR. ν depends on the distribution of θ(ω), but is
the same in every ω ∈ Ω, cR is a constant, and hence β∗R(ω) changes with
p∗e(ω). In the proof of (i) we argued that p∗e(ω) is high when θ(ω) is low.
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We conclude that θ(ω) and β∗R(ω) are negatively correlated. This implies
COVω(θ(ω), β∗R(ω)) ≤ 0. Then Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗R(ω)] +
COVω(θ(ω), β∗R(ω)) ≤ Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗R(ω)] follows immediately.2
Theorem 4.1. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.14) at the first stage and (4.12) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. The regulator thus imposes a renewable obligation
(4.10) with φ ∈ [0, 1) on the market along with the pricing scheme (4.11). The
following statements hold at an equilibrium:
(i) φ = 0 implies x∗R = 0.
(ii) φ > 0 implies that (4.10) is satisfied with equality.
(iii) When φ > 0, ν∗ ≥ κ
R′(x∗R)
Eω[θ(ω)]
+ cR − κN − cN.
Proof: (i) Suppose x∗R > 0. By (4.10), since φ = 0, ν∗ = 0 or y∗R(ω) = 0 in
all ω ∈ Ω. If ν∗ = 0, then (4.12b) reduces to 0 ≤ −p∗e(ω) + β∗R(ω) + cR
in all ω ∈ Ω. Together with 0 ≤ −p∗e(ω) + β∗N(ω) + cN, ω ∈ Ω, and the
assumption that cN > cR, this implies that β∗N(ω) < β∗R(ω) in all ω ∈ Ω.
Then we have in all ω ∈ Ω that y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R > 0 and hence β∗R(ω) =
p∗e(ω)− cR. This leads to the following:






The first inequality follows from (4.12a), the second inequality follows from







and using Lemma 4.1 that
Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] ≤ Eω[θ(ω)]Eω[β∗R(ω)] < κR
′
(x∗R).
This implies that the left-hand side of (4.14b) holds with strict inequality,
meaning that x∗R = 0 which is a contradiction with the assumption that x∗R >
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0. If, on the other hand, ν∗ > 0 and y∗R(ω) = 0 in all ω ∈ Ω, then y∗R(ω) <
θ(ω)x∗R in all ω ∈ Ω. This implies that β∗R(ω) = 0 in all ω ∈ Ω and that the
left-hand side of (4.14b) holds with strict inequality, leading to x∗R = 0 and
again a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that x∗R is such that (4.10) is not satisfied with equality. We
have strict inequality and hence ν∗ = 0. By the same argument that was used
in the proof of (i), this implies x∗R = 0, meaning that y∗R(ω) = 0 in all ω ∈ Ω.
Since φ > 0, (4.10) is then either violated since there is no renewable produc-
tion, or holds with equality when there is no production at all. The latter
contradicts the assumption that (4.10) is not satisfied with equality. Hence,
x∗R will be such that (4.10) is satisfied with equality.
(iii) Since φ < 1, x∗N > 0 and hence by (4.14a) Eω[β∗N(ω)] = κN. We know
that x∗R > 0 and hence by (4.14b) that Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = κR
′
(x∗R). It holds
that in all ω ∈ Ω, y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R > 0, since if for some ω̃ ∈ Ω y∗R(ω̃) <
θ(ω̃)x∗R, β∗R(ω̃) = 0 and (4.12b) would be violated, that is, it would reduce to
−p∗e(ω̃)− ν∗ + cR < 0, where the inequality holds by the fact that p∗e(ω) ≥
cN > cR. In all ω ∈ Ω, y∗R(ω) > 0 and hence β∗R(ω) = p∗e(ω) + ν∗ − cR.
Furthermore, we know that by (4.12a) p∗e(ω) ≤ β∗N(ω) + cN. We get that
κR
′
(x∗R) = Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)(p∗e(ω) + ν∗ − cR)] ≤
Eω[θ(ω)(β∗N(ω) + cN + ν∗ − cR)] ≤ Eω[θ(ω)](κN + cN + ν∗ − cR).
The latter inequality follows from Lemma 4.1. Solving for ν∗, we obtain the
given lower bound. 2
Note that (iii) implies that ν∗ is at least equal to the difference in levelised
cost between the renewable and non-renewable technology. This is thus the
fair price to pay to the renewable producer for investing in a more costly tech-
nology. With an optimal ν∗ a new firm entering the market would be indif-
ferent between investing in the non-renewable and the renewable technology.
Due to the imposed obligation, firms would have to satisfy the obligation tar-
get and have no incentive to overinvest in the renewable technology as the
certificate price would drop to zero.
We next consider the benchmark model for determining the feed-in tariffs,
consisting of (4.16) for every ω ∈ Ω at the second stage, and (4.17) and the
renewable obligation (4.18) at the first stage. The renewable obligation is im-
posed solely for finding the equilibrium value of σ∗. Within the model, we
set the fixed price τ̄R equal to σ∗, meaning that renewable technologies re-
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ceive a fixed price of σ∗ for each unit production. Here, σ is thus a variable
for determining a certain fixed feed-in tariff, while τ̄R is the tariff, in this case
equal to σ∗. Later, we remove the obligation constraint and analyze the effects
of handing out a tariff that is different from the optimal σ∗, both in case of
linear investment cost and non-linear convex investment cost in the renew-
able technology. Before doing so, we first state a useful lemma stating that the
renewable technology is always producing at full (available) capacity.
Lemma 4.2. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. At the equilibrium it holds that in each ω ∈ Ω we
have y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R.
Proof: We distinguish between two cases, namely x∗R = 0 and x∗R > 0. The
first case is trivial since y∗R(ω) = 0 should hold in each ω ∈ Ω. For x∗R > 0,
suppose for some ω̃ ∈ Ω we have y∗R(ω̃) < θ(ω̃)x∗R, then β∗R(ω̃) = 0 and
(4.16b) reduces to 0 ≤ −τ̄R + cR. This is only feasible when τ̄R < cR, but in
that case β∗R(ω) = 0 in all ω ∈ Ω and the left-hand side of (4.17b) would be a
strict inequality, implicating x∗R = 0, which is a contradiction.2
Note that the model allows for (renewable) production to exceed demand in
certain realizations. In particular, in realizations with significantly low de-
mand and high output of renewable rescources, this could potentially occur.
However, since in reality the percentage of renewable capacity is relatively
low compared to non-renewable technologies and significant drops in elec-
tricity demand are not common, we do not explicitly exclude equilibria with
excess production within the model.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. Assume that in order to get a benchmark value for
the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation (4.18) with φ ∈ [0, 1)
on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed price feed-in policy (4.15).
We set τ̄R = σ∗ endogenously. The following statements hold at an equilibrium:
(i) φ = 0 implies x∗R = 0.
(ii) φ > 0 implies that (4.18) is satisfied with equality.
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Proof: (i) Suppose x∗R > 0. By (4.18), since φ = 0, y∗R(ω) = 0 in all ω ∈ Ω
or σ∗ = 0. The former is in contradiction with Lemma 4.3. If σ∗ = 0, then
(4.16b) reduces to 0 ≤ β∗R(ω) + cR in all ω ∈ Ω. If cR > 0, this implies that
0 = y∗R(ω) in all ω ∈ Ω. Similarly, if cR = 0, then in each ω ∈ Ω either
β∗R(ω) = 0 or y∗R(ω) = 0. However, if β∗R(ω) = 0 in all ω ∈ Ω, then (4.17b)
implies x∗R = 0, yielding a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that x∗R is such that (4.18) is not satisfied with equality. This
implies σ∗ = 0, so (4.16b) again reduces to 0 ≤ β∗R(ω) + cR, and we again
have in all ω ∈ Ω that β∗R(ω) = 0 or y∗R(ω) = 0, implying x∗R = 0. Given
that φ > 0, in order for the problem to be feasible, x∗R > 0 should hold and
hence (4.18) must be satisfied with equality.
(iii) We know that x∗R > 0 and hence by (4.17b) that Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] =
κR
′




(x∗R) = Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)(σ∗ − cR)] = Eω[θ(ω)](σ∗ − cR).
2
By (iii) in Theorem 4.2 we conclude that, at the equilibrium, σ∗ is equal to the
levelised cost of the renewable technology in xR = x∗R. Combining Lemma
4.2 and Theorem 4.2 (ii), we obtain the following corollary that will be rele-
vant later.
Corollary 4.1. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. Assume that in order to get a benchmark value for
the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation (4.18) with φ ∈ [0, 1)
on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed price feed-in policy (4.15).
Then at the equilibrium x∗R = φEω [d(ω)]Eω [θ(ω)] .
Proof: This follows directly from (ii) in Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.2. 2
Next, we are going to consider linear investment cost functions for renew-
able technologies and remove the explicit obligation (4.18) that was used to
get a benchmark value for the feed-in tariff from the set of optimality condi-
tions. Instead, the feed-in tariffs are set exogenously based on the results in
Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the same model as in Theorem 4.2, but without the renewable
obligation (4.18) at the first stage and consider the feed-in tariff τ̄R to be given exoge-
nously. We assume a linear investment cost function, that is, κR(xR) = κRxR, for
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some constant κR > 0. Let σ∗ be the optimal σ derived in Theorem 4.2. The following
statements hold at an equilibrium:
(i) For τ̄R < σ∗, x∗R = 0.
(ii) For τ̄R > σ∗, the problem is infeasible.
(iii) For τ̄R = σ∗, any x∗R ≥ 0 is feasible.
Proof: (i) If τ̄R < cR, then β∗R(ω) = 0 in every ω ∈ Ω and the left-hand side
(4.17b) holds with strict inequality, yielding x∗R = 0. For cR ≤ τ̄R < σ∗ =
κR
Eω [θ(ω)]
+ cR, suppose that x∗R > 0. By Lemma 4.2 it follows that in every
ω ∈ Ω we have y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R. Then (4.16b) implies β∗R(ω) = τ̄R − cR in
all ω ∈ Ω. We obtain





This means that the left-hand side of (4.17b) holds with strict inequality and
hence that x∗R = 0. This contradicts our assumption.
(ii) τ̄R > σ∗ = κ
R
Eω [θ(ω)]
+ cR. By (4.16b) we have that in each ω ∈ Ω
β∗R(ω) ≥ τ̄R− cR > 0. Equality is implied, since β∗R(ω) > 0 means y∗R(ω) =
θ(ω)x∗R > 0 in all ω ∈ Ω. We get that
Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)(τ̄R − cR)] > Eω[θ(ω)(σ∗ − cR)] = κR.
This means that the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated; the problem is infea-
sible.
(iii) Distinguish between x∗R > 0 and x∗R = 0. If x∗R > 0, then by Lemma
4.2 y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R > 0 in every ω ∈ Ω. This yields β∗R(ω) = σ∗ − cR =
κR
Eω [θ(ω)]
in every ω ∈ Ω and hence Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = κR. If x∗R = 0, then
in every ω ∈ Ω we have y∗R(ω) = 0 and β∗R(ω) ≥ κREω [θ(ω)] , meaning that
(4.17b) is satisfied. It can in fact be checked that (4.16) and (4.17) are satisfied
as long as x∗N is feasible. 2
In reality, case (i) means that insufficient subsidies are paid for the renewable
producer to cover her long term cost. Case (ii) means that too much support is
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given and that infinite investments in the renewable technology would incur
with a tariff this high. Case (iii) is the result of removing the restrictive renew-
able obligation. A new firm entering the market would be indifferent between
investing in the non-renewable technology or the renewable technology. In
other words, in case of linear investment cost in the renewable technology,
when a renewable obligation is not explicitly imposed on the market, feed-in
tariffs cannot guarantee that a certain target on renewable production is met.
As mentioned in the introduction, a similar result is shown in Requate and
Unold (2003) for a taxation in a model with a single decision stage and with
no uncertainty. That result implies that subsidies would have the same effect.
We have now shown that in a market with investments taking place at the
first stage, production taking place at the second stage, and where both de-
mand and availability of renewable resources at the second stage are random,
a similar result holds for a fixed feed-in tariff.
We next show that when a strictly convex investment cost function for the
renewable technology is considered, the obligation target can be met without
explicitly imposing it on the market. We can achieve this by handing out a
feed-in tariff that is equal to the dual variable that we find using our bench-
mark model. In addition, we show that when deviating from the optimal
feed-in tariff, the optimal investment in the renewable technology increases
or decreases, but does not necessarily lead to infeasibility or zero investments
as has been shown for the linear cost function in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.4. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. Assume that we have a strictly convex investment
cost function for the renewable technology. We assume κR(0) = 0, κR
′
(x) > 0
∀x ≥ 0, and κR′′(x) > 0 ∀x ≥ 0. Assume that imposing (4.18) with a certain target
φ ∈ (0, 1) leads to an equilibrium investment quantity in the renewable technology





cR. Assume that a certain feed-in tariff τ̄R leads to a certain investment quantity
equal to x∗R. The following statements hold:
(i) If τ̄R < σ∗(φ), then x∗R < x∗R(φ) and the left-hand side of (4.18) is violated.
(ii) If τ̄R > σ∗(φ), then x∗R > x∗R(φ) and the left-hand side of (4.18) holds with
strict inequality.
(iii) If τ̄R = σ∗(φ), then x∗R = x∗R(φ) and left-hand side of (4.18) holds with
142 4.5. Linear Versus Non-linear Convex Cost
equality.
Proof: (i) We show that x∗R(φ) is not an equilibrium, and that at the equilib-
rium x∗R must be smaller. Suppose we have an equilibrium investment of
x∗R = x∗R(φ). In each realization ω ∈ Ω, by Lemma 4.2 we have y∗R(ω) =
θ(ω)x∗R(φ) > 0 and hence β∗R(ω) = τ̄R − cR. We obtain









This means that the left-hand side of (4.17b) holds with strict inequality and
hence that we are not at an equilibrium. It is however possible to find an
x∗R ∈ [0, x∗R(φ)) for which y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R and β∗R(ω) = τ̄R − cR in each
ω ∈ Ω such that
Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)(τ̄R − cR)] = κR
′
(x∗R).
In particular, since κR
′
(x) is an invertible function,
x∗R = (κR
′




The inequality follows from strict convexity of the investment cost function
κR(x), implying that its first derivative is a strictly increasing function. Using
Lemma 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 we obtain
Eω[y∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)]x∗R < Eω[θ(ω)]x∗R(φ) = φEω[d(ω)].
(ii) We show that x∗R(φ) is not an equilibrium, and that at the equilibrium
x∗R must be larger. Suppose we have an equilibrium investment of x∗R =
x∗R(φ). In each realization ω ∈ Ω, y∗R(ω) = θ(ω)x∗R(φ) by Lemma 4.2 and
hence β∗R(ω) = τ̄R − cR. We obtain




This means that the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated and that the renewable
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producer can invest more, up to x∗R such that
Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)(τ̄R − cR)] = κR
′
(x∗R).
Similar to the proof of (i), since κR
′




)−1(Eω[θ(ω)(τ̄R − cR)]) > x∗R(φ).
Using Lemma 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 we obtain
Eω[y∗R(ω)] = Eω[θ(ω)]x∗R > Eω[θ(ω)]x∗R(φ) = φEω[d(ω)].
(iii) From (i) and (ii) it follows that when we have an investment quantity
xR 6= x∗R(φ), the expected scarcity rents Eω[θ(ω)β∗R(ω)] are either more or




and hence x∗R = x∗R(φ) is the equilibrium solution coinciding with the equi-
librium solution we obtained in the benchmark model in Theorem 4.2. 2
4.5.1 Multiple Renewable Technologies
Next, we consider an electricity market with a single non-renewable technol-
ogy and several renewable technologies, namely |KR| > 1. We still assume
there is a single node and hence do not take into account any network restric-
tions and assume there is no limit on the investment quantity in the technolo-
gies. Random availability of renewable capacities at the second stage are still
of the form FRk (x
R
k , ω) = θk(ω)x
R
k , k ∈ KR, ω ∈ Ω, with θk(ω) ∈ (0, 1) follow-
ing a certain probability distribution. We make the following assumption on
the order of the levelised cost:







+ cRk ∀ xRk ≥ 0, k ∈ KR. (4.20)
We thus assume that all renewable technologies have higher levelised cost
than the non-renewable technology. We next show some properties that have
valuable implications. First we show that at the equilibrium all renewable
technologies produce at full capacity in each realization. This is a result similar
to Lemma 4.2 and is stated for the sake of completeness since it will be useful
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in the rest of this section.
Lemma 4.3. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. At the equilibrium it holds that in each ω ∈ Ω
and for each k ∈ KR we have y∗Rk (ω) = θk(ω)x∗Rk .
Proof: Let k ∈ KR and apply the proof of Lemma 4.2.2
The following corollary is similar to Corollary 4.1 and has important impli-
cations later on.
Corollary 4.2. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. Assume that in order to get a benchmark value for
the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation (4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1)
on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed price feed-in policy (4.15).








Proof: Since φ > 0, at least one renewable technology will have a positive in-
vestment. For this to be possible, σ∗ > 0 and (4.21) follows immediately from
Lemma 4.3 and (4.18). 2
Next, we analyze the equilibrium in case of linear investment cost. We as-
sume κRk (x
R




k for all k ∈ KR, with some constants κRk > 0, k ∈ KR.
Hence, marginal investment cost are constant and we can simply order the






+ cRj ∀i < j. (4.22)
We give each renewable technology k ∈ KR a subsidy of αk times the optimal
dual price σ∗ determined by the renewable obligation constraint imposed at
the first stage. This σ∗ serves as a benchmark for determining the feed-in
tariffs in a way that the renewable quota can be met. The αks are determined
by the regulator, and we show for which choices of these parameters which
technologies are in the optimal technology mixture.
Theorem 4.5. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16)
at the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω. Assume that in order to get a benchmark
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value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation (4.18) with
φ ∈ [0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed price feed-in
policy (4.15). We endogenously set τ̄Rk = αkσ




αk = 1. Assume linear investment cost functions for all renewable technologies,
that is κRk (x
R




k , k ∈ KR. The following statements hold at an equilibrium:
(i) φ = 0 implies x∗Rk = 0 ∀k ∈ KR.
(ii) When φ > 0 and α1 ≥ αk ∀ k ∈ KR, then x∗R1 =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θ1(ω)]
and x∗Rk = 0 for all
k 6= 1.
(iii) For every h ∈ KR, when αk = 0 for all k 6= 1, h, there exists unique α∗1 and α∗h,
such that x∗R1 > 0 and x
∗R
























Proof: (i) This follows immediately from the proof of (i) in Theorem 4.2, using
assumptions (4.20) and (4.22).
(ii) Suppose there exists an h ∈ KR, h 6= 1, for which x∗Rh > 0. By Lemma
4.3, y∗Rh (ω) = θh(ω)x
∗R
h > 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω, implying β∗Rh (ω) = αhσ∗ − cRh , ω ∈ Ω.
On the other hand, since x∗Rh > 0, by (4.17b) we must have
κRh = Eω[θh(ω)β
∗R
h (ω)] = Eω[θh(ω)(αhσ
∗ − cRh )].
From this we get an expression for αhσ∗, and using α1 ≥ αh and assumption
(4.22) we have
α1σ
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This implies
Eω[θ1(ω)β∗R1 (ω)] ≥ Eω[θ1(ω)(α1σ∗ − cR1 )] > κR1 .
Hence, the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated for k = 1. x∗R1 follows from
Corollary 4.2.
(iii) Since αk = 0 for all k 6= 1, h, τ̄Rk = 0 and consequently x∗Rk = 0 for all
k 6= 1, h. We are going to find α1, αh with α1 + αh = 1 such that the left-hand












+ cRh . (4.26)







+ cRh . (4.27)
Using (4.27), α∗1 and α
∗
h immediately follow from (4.25) and (4.26), respectively.
2
Corollary 4.3. Consider the problem in Theorem 4.5. Let α∗1 be defined by (4.23), α
∗
h
by (4.24), and σ̃∗ by (4.27). Then the following statements hold at an equilibrium:




(ii) If αh > α∗h and α1 + αh = 1, then σ






(iii) If αh < α∗h and α1 + αh = 1, then σ
∗ < σ̃∗, x∗R1 =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θ1(ω)]
, and x∗Rh = 0.













cRh . By (4.17b) we have x
∗R
k = 0 for all k ∈ KR and (4.18) will be violated.
Similarly, if σ∗ > σ̃∗, then the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated for k = 1, h.
(ii) Since α1 + αh = 1, α1 < α∗1 . In order to satisfy the quota, at least one of
(4.25) and (4.26) must hold. Suppose σ∗ ≥ σ̃∗ such that (4.25) is still satisfied
regardless of the lower α1. Then αhσ∗ > α∗hσ
∗ ≥ α∗hσ̃∗ =
κRh
Eω [θh(ω)]
+ cRh , and
hence the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated for k = h. Hence, σ∗ < σ̃∗ such
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that (4.26) holds while α1σ∗ < α∗1σ





+ cR1 . The latter implies
x∗R1 = 0. x
∗R
h follows from Corollary 4.2.
(iii) Since α1 + αh = 1, α1 > α∗1 . In order to satisfy the quota, again at least
one of (4.25) and (4.26) must hold. Suppose σ∗ ≥ σ̃∗ such that (4.26) is still
satisfied regardless of the lower αh. Then α1σ∗ > α∗1σ




and hence the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated for k = 1. Hence, σ∗ < σ̃∗






+ cRh . The latter
implies x∗Rh = 0. x
∗R
1 follows from Corollary 4.2. 2
Corollary 4.4. Consider the problem in Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.3. For any











] ∀k ∈ H (4.28)
and
αk = 0 ∀k /∈ H, (4.29)









Proof: This follows immediately from (iii) in Theorem 4.5 applied to more than
two technologies.2
Corollary 4.5. Consider the problem in Corollary 4.4. If the explicit obligation (4.18)
is removed from the problem statement, choosing the αs based on (4.28) and (4.29)
cannot guarantee that the obligation will be implicitly satisfied. That is, any solution
with x∗Rk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ H, x∗Rk = 0 ∀k /∈ H, and x∗N ≥ 0 for which the second stage
constraints (4.16) are satisfied, are equilibrium solutions.
Proof: This follows immediately from (iii) in Theorem 4.3 applied to multiple
renewable technologies.2
From (iii) in Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.4 for |H| ≥ 2, it follows that in case
of linear cost functions, there are multiple equilibria as all technologies have
their levelised cost covered, while there is no criterion to choose one technol-
ogy over the other. Not all of these equilibria will satisfy the obligation when
it is removed as an explicit constraint. Note that in reality, network limitations
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and limitations on the maximum installed capacity may play a role in technol-
ogy choices and exclude some of the multiple equilibria that are found using
a mathematical framework. On the other hand, when investment costs are
considered to be non-linear and convex, we do obtain a unique equilibrium,
as we show next.
Since with non-linear convex investment costs, determining the parame-
ters for which technologies may be in the optimal mixture is more involved
compared to the linear investment cost case, we first consider a market with
a single non-renewable and only two renewable technologies. Both renew-
able technologies receive a per unit subsidy being τ̄Rk = αkσ
∗, k = 1, 2, with
α1 + α2 = 1. To simplify notation, we take α1 = α, α2 = 1 − α, α ∈ [0, 1].
Then, for each α ∈ [0, 1] we can consider the optimal technology mixture. In
particular, for low values of α, technology 1 will not get sufficient support and
only technology 2 will have a positive investment. The corresponding opti-
mal investment quantity can be found using Corollary 4.2. For high values
of α, technology 2 will not get sufficient support and the optimal investment
quantity in technology 1 can be found using Corollary 4.2. For all remaining
values of α, both technologies have a positive investment. The next theorem
finds the maximum value of α for which only technology 2 is investing and
the minimum value of α for which only technology 1 is investing.
Theorem 4.6. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, 2}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). We endogenously set τ̄R1 = ασ
∗ and τ̄R2 = (1− α)σ∗ with
α ∈ [0, 1]. Assume non-linear convex investment cost functions for both renewable
technologies. The following statements hold at an equilibrium:






















































(iii) If α∗1 < α < α
∗
2 , then x
∗R
1 > 0 and x
∗R
2 > 0.
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Proof: (i) Since φ > 0, at least one of the renewable technologies will have a
positive investment. Suppose x∗R1 > 0. By (4.17b) we must have











For technology 2, by (4.16b) we know β∗R2 (ω) ≥ (1− α)σ∗− cR2 , ω ∈ Ω. Using





2 ) ≥ Eω[θ2(ω)]((1− α)σ∗ − cR2 ).









(1− α) . (4.32)
Furthermore, for technology 1 we have y∗R1 (ω) = θ1(ω)x
∗R
1 > 0 in each ω ∈ Ω
by Lemma 4.3, and hence β∗R1 (ω) = ασ
∗ − cR1 , ω ∈ Ω. Using (4.32) and since
α ≤ α∗1 , we obtain
Eω[θ1(ω)β∗R1 (ω)] = Eω[θ1(ω)](ασ


























































(ii) Again, since φ > 0, at least one of the renewable technologies will have
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a positive investment. Suppose x∗R2 > 0. By (4.17b) we must have











For technology 1, by (4.16b) we know β∗R1 (ω) ≥ ασ∗ − cR1 , ω ∈ Ω. Using this





1 ) ≥ Eω[θ1(ω)](ασ∗ − cR1 ).











Furthermore, for technology 2 we have y∗R2 (ω) = θ2(ω)x
∗R
2 > 0 in each ω ∈ Ω
by Lemma 4.3, and hence β∗R2 (ω) = (1− α)σ∗ − cR2 , ω ∈ Ω. Using (4.35) and
since α ≥ α∗2 , we obtain
Eω[θ2(ω)β∗R2 (ω)] = Eω[θ2(ω)]((1− α)σ∗ − cR2 ) ≤
Eω[θ2(ω)]
(



















































(iii) Suppose x∗R1 > 0 and x
∗R





and we must have
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and
Eω[θ2(ω)β∗R2 (ω)] ≤ κR
′
2 (0). (4.37)
Using that β∗R1 (ω) = ασ
∗ − cR1 for all ω ∈ Ω, we can use (4.36) to obtain
an expression for σ∗. Using this and the fact that β∗R2 (ω) ≥ (1− α)σ∗ − cR2 ,
ω ∈ Ω, and α < α∗2 yields
Eω[θ2(ω)β∗R2 (ω)] ≥ Eω[θ2(ω)]((1− α)σ∗ − cR2 ) =
Eω[θ2(ω)]



























 = κR′2 (0).
Hence, (4.37) is violated. In a similar way, x∗R1 = 0 leads to a contradiction. 2




+ cRk > κ
N + cN ≥ 0
for k = 1, 2. This means that the case where κR
′
1 (0) = 0 and c
R
1 = 0, which
would imply that the first technology is in the optimal mixture for all α > 0,
cannot occur. In addition, the case where κR
′
2 (0) = 0 and c
R
2 = 0, which would
imply that the second technology is in the optimal mixture for all α < 1, can-
not occur either.
We next consider a market with a single non-renewable and three renew-
able technologies. The renewable technologies receive a per unit subsidy be-
ing τ̄Rk = αkσ
∗, k = 1, 2, 3, with α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 and αk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, 3.
We are going to consider vectors α = [α1 α2 α3]> and their corresponding
optimal technology mixture. In particular, we are going to find such vectors
for which one technology has a positive investment while the other two have
zero investment. Using these vectors, we can characterize the equilibrium in
case of quadratic cost functions as we discuss later.
First, consider vectors α = [α1 α2 α3]> with one of the elements equal to
zero. Obviously, the renewable technology corresponding to the zero element
will not invest. Theorem 4.6 can then be applied to the remaining two tech-
nologies. For example, we could take α3 = 0 and apply Theorem 4.6 to tech-
nologies 1 and 2. We then obtain two vectors, namely α2,3 = [α∗1 1− α∗1 0]>
and α1,3 = [α∗2 1− α∗2 0]> with α∗1 and α∗2 as defined in Theorem 4.6. The
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meaning of the vector α2,3 is then the following: when α3 = 0, α∗1 is the largest
α1 for which x∗R1 = 0 and technology 2 is the sole investor. Slightly increasing
α1 and decreasing α2 results in positive investment in both technologies 1 and
2. The meaning of the vector α1,3 is the following: when α3 = 0, α∗2 is the
smallest α1 for which x∗R2 = 0 and technology 1 is the sole investor. Slightly
decreasing α1 and increasing α2 results in positive investment in both tech-
nologies 1 and 2. The first index in the superscript denotes the technology
that has a positive investment, while the second index indicates the technol-
ogy for which the subsidy is zero. Formally, we define all six such vectors as
follows:














































with {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}. Then, x∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
, x∗Rj = x
∗R
h = 0, and for vectors
with αj = α
i,h
j + ε, αi = α
i,h
i − ε, αh = 0, ε > 0 and small, we have x∗Ri , x∗Rj > 0,
x∗Rh = 0. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.6.
Next, consider vectors α = [α1 α2 α3]> with all αs positive. We find for
each technology a vector such that this technology is the sole investor while
the other two have zero investments. There are many such vectors. How-
ever, we are going to consider a very specific one for each technology. We
determine a vector such that, when slightly decreasing the α of the investing
technology while slightly increasing the α of one of the other technologies, the
latter technology will enter the mixture.
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with {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}. Then, x∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
, x∗Rj = x
∗R
h = 0. For vectors
with αj = αij + ε, αi = α
i
i − ε, αh = αih, ε > 0 and small, we have x∗Ri , x∗Rj >
0, x∗Rh ≥ 0. Note that increasing αj could result in a positive investment in
technology h without increasing αh. Similarly, for vectors with αh = αih + ε,
αi = α
i
i − ε, αj = αij, ε > 0 and small, we have x∗Ri , x∗Rh > 0, x∗Rj ≥ 0. These
results are formally proven in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.7. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, 2, 3}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). Choose i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3},
and let τ̄Rk = α
i
kσ
∗, k ∈ KR. Assume non-linear convex investment cost functions for
all three renewable technologies. The following statements hold at an equilibrium:























, x∗Rj = x
∗R
h = 0.
(iii) If we take τ̄Ri = (α
i
i − ε)σ∗ and τ̄Rj = (αij + ε)σ∗, ε > 0 and small, then
x∗Rj > 0.
Proof: (i) Suppose σ∗ < σ̃∗. We know that since φ > 0, at least one renewable
technology has a positive investment. Suppose x∗Ri > 0. Then by Lemma 4.3
154 4.5. Linear Versus Non-linear Convex Cost
y∗Ri (ω) = θi(ω)x
∗R
i > 0 and by (4.16b) we have β
∗R
i (ω) = α
i
iσ
∗ − cRi . This
gives
Eω[θi(ω)β∗Ri (ω)] = Eω[θi(ω)](α
i
iσ













By Corollary 4.2, we must have that one of the other technologies has a posi-
tive investment as well. Suppose x∗Rj > 0. We have β
∗R
j (ω) = α
i
jσ
∗− cRj for all
ω ∈ Ω. This gives
Eω[θj(ω)β∗Rj (ω)] = Eω[θj(ω)](α
i
jσ
∗ − cRj ) < Eω[θj(ω)](αijσ̃∗ − cRj ) = κR
′
j (0),
and hence the left-hand side of (4.17b) is nonbinding and consequently x∗Rj =
0. Similarly, we have x∗Rh = 0 yielding a contradiction. Hence, σ
∗ ≥ σ̃∗.
Suppose σ∗ > σ̃∗. By (4.16b) for k = i we have β∗Ri (ω) ≥ αiiσ∗ − cRi for all
ω ∈ Ω. This gives













This is in contradiction with Corollary 4.2.
(ii) Suppose x∗Rj > 0. We have
Eω[θj(ω)β∗Rj (ω)] = Eω[θj(ω)](α
i
jσ
∗ − cRj ) = Eω[θj(ω)](αijσ̃∗ − cRj ) =
κR
′





and hence the left-hand side of (4.17b) is nonbinding for k = j and conse-
quently x∗Rj = 0. The same holds for technology h, meaning that x
∗R
h = 0 and




(iii) Changing the αs may result in a different σ∗. We distinguish between
two cases, namely σ∗ ≥ σ̃∗ and σ∗ < σ̃∗. In case σ∗ ≥ σ̃∗, obviously (αij +
ε)σ∗ > αijσ̃
∗. Suppose x∗Rj = 0. We have
Eω[θj(ω)β∗Rj (ω)] ≥ Eω[θj(ω)]((αij + ε)σ∗ − cRj ) > Eω[θj(ω)](αijσ̃∗ − cRj ) =
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and hence the left-hand side of (4.17b) is violated for k = j. In case σ∗ < σ̃∗,
for technology i we have (αii − ε)σ∗ < αiiσ̃∗. This implies








meaning that x∗Ri <
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
and hence that one of the other technologies
must have a positive investment. Since technology h still has the same αh,
technology j should have a positive investment. In fact, (αij + ε)σ
∗ > αijσ̃
∗
regardless of the lower σ∗. 2
We have found nine special vectors for which only one technology will be in-
vested in. We know that when moving in a certain direction in each of them,
another technology may enter the mixture. We next use this to derive some
generalized results on the optimal technology mixtures for different choices
of the parameter vectors. In particular, we characterize the areas in which
only one renewable technology is invested in and analyze the line segments
in between some of the points.
















+ cRj if i 6= j.
(4.38)


































with {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}. We next show that if we take any convex combination
of the vectors ei, αi, αi,j, and αi,h, with ei the unit vector with ith element equal
to 1, we have x∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
and x∗Rj = x
∗R
h = 0. We denote the set of all
convex combinations of ei, αi, αi,j, and αi,h by Conv{ei, αi, αi,j, αi,h}, the convex
hull of the four vectors.
Theorem 4.8. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, 2, 3}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). Choose i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}. Let
α̃ ∈ Conv{ei, αi, αi,j, αi,h}, and let τ̄Rk = α̃kσ∗, k ∈ KR. Assume non-linear convex
investment cost functions for all three renewable technologies. Then x∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
and x∗Rj = x
∗R
h = 0.




ψk = 1. We thus have

























































































































































We are going to find an upper bound for σ∗ and show that if x∗Rj > 0 or
x∗Rh > 0 we are not at an equilibrium.
By Corollary 4.2, we know that x∗Ri ≤
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
. Furthermore, at the equi-
librium we must have
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by (4.17b), and we have β∗Ri (ω) ≥ α̃iσ∗ − cRi by (4.16b). This and the fact that
κR
′








≥ κR′i (x∗Ri ) ≥ Eω[θi(ω)](α̃iσ∗ − cRi ).


























































































































Eω[θj(ω)β∗Rj (ω)] = Eω[θj(ω)](α̃jσ
∗ − cRj ) ≤ κR
′





which means that the left-hand side of (4.17b) is nonbinding for k = j, which
contradicts x∗Rj > 0. In the same way, x
∗R
h > 0 leads to a contradiction. By




By Theorem 4.6 we know exactly what happens on the line segments [ei, ej],
[ei, eh], and [ej, eh]. Next, we consider the line segment [αi, αi,j] in more detail.
This line segment is in the convex hull of ei, αi, αi,j, and αi,h and therefore we
can apply Theorem 4.8. In addition, we show that on one side of this line
segment, both technologies i and j will be in the optimal mixture.
Theorem 4.9. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, 2, 3}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
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price feed-in policy (4.15). Choose i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}.
Let α̃ ∈ int Conv{αi, αi,j}, and let τ̄Rk = α̃kσ̃∗, k ∈ KR. Let α̂ = α̃ + ε(ej − ei) with
ε > 0 and small, and let τ̂Rk = α̂kσ̂
∗, k ∈ KR. Assume non-linear convex investment
cost functions for all three renewable technologies. Then the following statements hold
at an equilibrium:
(i) If α = α̃, then x̃∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
, x̃∗Rj = x̃
∗R
h = 0, α̃iσ̃
∗ = zii, α̃jσ̃
∗ = zij, and
α̃hσ̃
∗ < zih.
(ii) If α = α̂, then x̂∗Ri <
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
, x̂∗Rj > 0, and x̂
∗R
h = 0.
Proof: (i) Let ψ ∈ (0, 1) be such that α̃ = ψαi + (1− ψ)αi,j. Obviously, α̃ ∈
Conv{ei, αi, αi,j, αi,h}, so by Theorem 4.8 the optimal investment quantities im-
mediately follow. Since x̃∗Ri > 0, we have



















































































h) + (1− ψ)zii(zii + zij)
)
=





h) + (1− ψ)(zii + zij)
< zih.
(ii) We show that we have α̂jσ̂∗ > zij and hence x̂
∗R
j > 0. Suppose α̂jσ̂
∗ ≤ zij.
Since α̂j > α̃j, this implies σ̂∗ < σ̃∗. Then, using that α̂i < α̃i and α̂h = α̃h, we
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obtain α̂iσ̂∗ < α̂iσ̃∗ < α̃iσ̃∗ = zii and α̂hσ̂




and x̂∗Rh = 0. By Corollary 4.2, x
∗R
j = 0 is not an equilibrium. 2
We next consider the line segment [αi, αj] and the area Conv{αi, αj, αh} for
some {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}. On the line segment, either only technologies i and j
are in the mixture, or all three technologies are in the mixture. The mixture de-
pends on the structure of the cost function. We can show that when we have
quadratic investment cost and hence linear marginal investment cost for all
technologies, only technologies i and j are in the mixture. Furthermore, when
slightly increasing the αh coefficient, technology h enters the mixture as well.
Theorem 4.10. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, 2, 3}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). Choose i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}.
Let α̃ ∈ int Conv{αi, αj}, and let τ̃Rk = α̃kσ̃∗, k ∈ KR. Let α̂ = α̃ + ε(2eh − ei − ej)
with ε > 0 and small, and let τ̂Rk = α̂kσ̂
∗, k ∈ KR. Assume quadratic investment
cost functions for all three renewable technologies where κR
′
k (x) = skx + κ̄
R
k , k ∈ KR,
with κ̄Rk and sk, k ∈ KR, positive constants. Then the following statements hold at an
equilibrium:
(i) If α = α̃, then x̃∗Ri > 0, x̃
∗R
j > 0, x̃
∗R
h = 0, and α̃hσ̃
∗ = zih.
(ii) If α = α̂, then x̂∗Ri > 0, x̂
∗R
j > 0, and x̂
∗R
h > 0.
Proof: (i) Let ψ ∈ (0, 1) be such that α̃ = ψαi +(1−ψ)αj. By (4.17b) and (4.16b)
we have for all k ∈ KR
sk x̃∗Rk + κ̄
R
k ≥ Eω[θk(ω)β̃∗Rk (ω)] ≥ Eω[θk(ω)](α̃kσ̃∗ − cRk ),










Eω[θk(ω)](α̃kσ̃∗ − zik), (4.42)
with equality whenever the right hand side is positive. Suppose x̃∗Rh > 0. By













































































Eω[θj(ω)](α̃jσ̃∗ − zij) >











h) + (1− ψ)(zii + zij + zih)
.









This contradicts Corollary 4.2. Hence, x̃∗Rh = 0. Similarly, along the same lines,
α̃hσ̃









We thus have α̃hσ̃∗ = zih. Since the right-hand side in (4.42) is positive for
k = i, j, x̃∗Ri > 0 and x̃
∗R





























h) + (1− ψ)(zii + zij + zih)
> 0.
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(ii) Recall that 0 = x̃∗Rh =
1
sh
Eω[θh(ω)](α̃hσ̃∗ − zih). Since α̂h > α̃h, either
α̂hσ̂
∗ − zih > 0 meaning that x̂∗Rh > 0 or we have α̂hσ̂∗ − zih = 0 meaning
























This contradicts Corollary 4.2. Furthermore, since x̃∗Ri > 0 and x̃
∗R
j > 0, we
can take ε small enough such that x̂∗Ri > 0 and x̂
∗R
j > 0. 2
Using Theorems 4.9 and 4.10, we can define the areas in which two and three
technologies are in the optimal mixture. This is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.6. Consider the problem in Theorem 4.10. The following statements hold
at an equilibrium:
(i) If α ∈ int Conv{αi,h, αi, αj,h, αj}⋃ int Conv{αi, αj}, then x∗Ri > 0, x∗Rj > 0,
and x∗Rh = 0.
(ii) If α ∈ int Conv{αi, αj, αh}, then x∗Ri > 0, x∗Rj > 0, and x∗Rh > 0.




ψi = 1, ψ1, ψ3 ≥ 0, and
ψ2, ψ4 > 0. If ψ1 = ψ3 = 0 then we are on the line segment int Conv{αi, αj}
and by (i) in Theorem 4.10, x∗Ri > 0, x
∗R
j > 0, and x
∗R







h + (1− ψ)α
j
h for some ψ ∈ (0, 1). We thus have that
αh is lower than in the case of ψ1 = ψ3 = 0. Along the same lines as the proof
of (i) in Theorem 4.10, x∗Rh = 0 follows. In addition, by (ii) in Theorem 4.9,
x∗Ri > 0 and x
∗R
j > 0.
(ii) This immediately follows from applying (i) and (ii) in Theorem 4.10 to
i and h and to j and h. 2
Theorem 4.10 and Corollary 4.6 show that when all cost functions are quadra-
tic, we can analytically characterize the areas for which one, two, and three
renewable technologies are investing. In the next section, we give a numerical
example. When cost-functions are of a different form, using Theorems 4.7, 4.8,
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and 4.9 one can determine the feed-in parameters for which one technology
is singled out, as well as ranges of feed-in parameters or line segments such
that on one side of such line segments a second technology enters the optimal
mixture. However, the results from Theorem 4.10 no longer hold, meaning
that analytically the feed-in parameters for which any two or three renewable
technologies are in the optimal mixture cannot be traced. Our numerical tools
provide a way to overcome this, as we show in Section 4.6.4.
For a market with two or three renewable technologies with general non-
linear convex investment cost functions, we have determined for which
choices of the feed-in parameters a single renewable technology is invested
in. We next show that the same results hold when considering n renewable
technologies. To simplify notation, we define zij for all i, j ∈ KR = {1, ..., n}
according to (4.38). We define vectors αi,H, where H ⊆ KR \ {i} is the set of
renewable technologies that we give zero support; this set is allowed to be








0 j ∈ H.
We next state the generalizations of Theorems 4.8 and 4.9. Detailed proofs
are omitted as they are similar to the proofs of Theorems 4.8 and 4.9.
Theorem 4.11. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, ..., n}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). Let i ∈ {1, ..., n} be given, let
α̃ ∈ Conv
{
αi,H|H ⊆ KR \ {i}
}
,
and let τ̄Rk = α̃kσ
∗, k ∈ KR. Assume non-linear convex investment cost functions for
all renewable technologies. Then x∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
and x∗Rj = 0 ∀j ∈ KR \ {i}.
Theorem 4.12. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, ..., n}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
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(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). For some i ∈ KR, let Hj = KR \ {i, j} for some j 6= i, let
α̃ ∈ int Conv{αi, αi,Hj}, and let τ̄Rk = α̃kσ̃∗, k ∈ KR. Let α̂ = α̃ + ε(ej − ei) with
ε > 0 and small, and let τ̂Rk = α̂kσ̂
∗, k ∈ KR. Assume non-linear convex investment
cost functions for all renewable technologies. Then the following statements hold at
an equilibrium:
(i) If α = α̃, then x̃∗Ri =
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
, x̃∗Rk = 0 for k 6= i, α̃iσ̃∗ = zii, α̃jσ̃∗ = zij, and
α̃hσ̃
∗ < zih, h ∈ Hj.
(ii) If α = α̂, then 0 < x̂∗Ri <
φEω [d(ω)]
Eω [θi(ω)]
, x̂∗Rj > 0, and x̂
∗R
h = 0, h ∈ Hj.
4.6 Numerical Study
In this section we introduce a numerical framework to show how the theory
from Section 4.5 can be applied in practice. We deal with both linear and non-
linear convex investment cost functions and provide numerical evidence for
our conclusion that with linear investment cost functions a system of feed-in
tariffs cannot guarantee that certain targets on renewable electricity will be
met. Furthermore, for the case of quadratic cost functions, we show which
technologies are in the optimal investment mixture for any choice of the feed-
in parameters. Recall that for non-linear non-quadratic investment cost func-
tions, analytically we can only determine the parameter choices for which one
technology is singled out. Numerically however, we do obtain information on
the optimal technology mixture for any parameter choice by doing numerical
experiments. We finally use our observations in this numerical study to make
a theoretical statement.
We consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at the
second stage. We impose renewable obligation (4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the
first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed price feed-in policy
(4.15), as to get a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs. We show the effects
of having different choices of the parameter vector α on technology choices
in case of linear, quadratic, and two other non-linear convex investment cost
functions, and (partly) characterize the equilibria. In order to deal with the
expectations in the model, we use a sampling technique. We generate 3000
random samples for both the uncertain demand and the uncertain availabil-
ity of renewable resources, and replace expectations by sample averages. We
solve the resulting problem using the PATH solver, see Ferris and Munson
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(2000). Computation times are approximately 20 minutes for each problem
we solve on a 300MHz Pentium-II with 1 GB RAM.
4.6.1 Experimental Data
We assume that there are five firms, each investing in a unique technology.
Renewable technologies onshore wind (ONW), offshore wind (OFFW), and
solar (SOL) are used by firms 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Non-renewable tech-
nologies coal and closed cycle gas turbine (CCGT) are used by firms 4 and
5, respectively. There are no network limitations and no limits on the max-
imum investment in each technology. Table 4.1 contains the characteristics
of these technologies, consisting of per unit production costs (ck), fixed in-
vestment costs for non-renewable technologies (κNk , k = 4, 5), parameters of
the probability distributions of available renewable capacities, and its sample
averages. The functions Fk(x, ω) = θk(ω)x have θk(ω) sampled from a uni-
form distribution with lower bound ak and upper bound bk, k = 1, 2, 3. By θ̄k,
k = 1, 2, 3, we denote the sample averages.
Table 4.1: Characteristics of the technologies.
ck κNk ak bk θ̄k
ONW 0 .17 .29 0.2303
OFFW 0 .34 .44 0.3902
SOL 0 .05 .17 0.1105
Coal 17.77 27.23
CCGT 41.28 13.72
The cost figures are in Euros and are based on data by the European Commis-
sion (See European Commission (2008)). The investment cost functions for
renewable technologies are specified below. We generated the random avail-
abilities of onshore and offshore wind using the same sample, meaning that
onshore and offshore wind realizations are fully correlated. Realizations for
demand and solar however, are taken from independent samples. The uni-
form distributions are chosen out of convenience, and one could choose alter-
natives that may fit empirical data closely or even use empirical data itself.
Demand is assumed to be uniformly distributed with lower bound 30 and
upper bound 35; the sample average demand is 32.4919. For the renewable
obligation, we take φ = 0.15, and we choose VOLL = 10.000.
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4.6.2 Linear Cost Functions
We assume the three renewable technologies to have a linear investment cost
function. We take κRk (x) = κ̄
R
k x, x ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, 3, with κ̄Rk as given in Table
4.2.





It can be seen that the data satisfies (4.20) and (4.22). We apply Corollary 4.4
to subsets H = {1, 2, 3}, H = {1, 2}, H = {1, 3}, and H = {2, 3}, and adopt
the notation we used in case of non-linear convex cost functions. We find
α1 = α2 = α3 =
 0.10250.1247
0.7728




α1,2 = α3,2 =
 0.11710
0.8829




Note that (4.28) applied to subsets H = {1}, H = {2}, and H = {3} leads to
the unit vectors e1, e2, and e3, respectively. We depict all these vectors in Fig-
ure 4.2 and draw the areas in which each technology is the single technology
invested in. The lines within the triangle can be interpreted as follows. On,
for example, the line segment [α1,3, α1], which is in fact also the line segment
[α2,3, α2], both technology 1 and technology 2 can be in the optimal mixture.
In fact, there are multiple equilibria on this line segment.
Similarly, we can interpret the point α1 as the parameter choice for which all
three technologies can be in the optimal mixture. While in case of nonlinear
investment cost functions there is usually an area for which all three can be
in the optimal mixture as we will see later, in case of linear investment cost
there is only a single point. Furthermore, in this single point it is not even
guaranteed that all three technologies are in the optimal mixture. In particular,
if we hand out subsidies equal to τ̄k = α1kσ
∗, k = 1, 2, 3, we obtain the following
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Figure 4.2: Optimal technology mixtures in case of linear investment
cost functions.
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 , σ∗ = 901.617.
We observe that one technology, namely solar, is singled out. A slight de-
viation from α1 can lead to another technology being singled out. Finally, if
we omit the explicit obligation and fix subsidies at τ̄k = 901.617α1k, k = 1, 2, 3,
the problem becomes unbounded since infinite investment in solar is optimal.
This would be very costly in reality. On the other hand, if we slightly modify
the subsidies to τ̄k = 901.616α1k, k = 1, 2, 3, the problem becomes bounded
and feasible, but there is no investment in renewable technologies anymore.
Basically, without an explicit obligation there is no guarantee that targets are
met. Either we overshoot the target, or there is no investment in renewable
technologies at all. This result confirms what we found in Corollary 4.3 and
shows how sensitive the problem is to the parameter choices in case of linear
cost functions.
4.6.3 Quadratic Cost Functions
Next, we assume the three renewable technologies to have a quadratic invest-
ment cost function. We take κRk (x) = 0.5x
2 + κ̄Rk x, x ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, 3, with κ̄Rk as
given in Table 4.3.





It can be seen that the parameters satisfy (4.20). We apply the theory from




 , α2 =
 0.08440.1674
0.7481








 , α2,3 =
 0.33510.6649
0







 , α2,1 =
 00.1829
0.8171




Using Theorem 4.8 and Corollary 4.6, we determine all the points for which
a certain technology mixture is optimal. This is depicted in Figure 4.3. In
each point, we find a unique equilibrium solution. For example, on the line
segment Conv{α1, α1,3}, only technology ONW is in the optimal mixture. On
the left of this line segment OFFW is also in the mixture. On the interior of the
line segment Conv{α1, α2} both ONW and OFFW are in the optimal mixture.
Above this line segment solar is also in the mixture.
Figure 4.3: Optimal technology mixtures in case of quadratic invest-
ment cost functions.
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Finally note that when we omit the explicit obligation, set the feed-in tariffs
exogenously based on the benchmark values we find, and using an appro-
priate vector α, the original obligation target is still met as opposed to what
we found in case of linear investment cost functions. For example, choosing









 , σ∗ = 824.274.
When we omit the obligation and set τ̄Rk = 824.274α̃k for k = 1, 2, 3 as the
given feed-in tariffs, we obtain exactly the same solution.
4.6.4 Other Non-linear Convex Cost Functions
We assume the three renewable technologies to have non-quadratic convex
investment cost function. First, we consider the cubic functions κRk (x) =




 , α2 =
 0.08660.1457
0.7677







 , α2,3 =
 0.37280.6272
0







 , α2,1 =
 00.1595
0.8405




We can again find the areas for which a single renewable technology is in
the mixture, using Theorem 4.8. This is depicted in Figure 4.4. In addition, we
know by Theorem 4.9 that on one side of each of these line segments another
technology enters the mixture. We cannot, however, use our theorems to de-
termine the exact areas in which two or three technologies are in the optimal
mixture. It can be checked that, for example, slightly above Conv{α1, α2} we
still have x∗R3 = 0. The result from Theorem 4.10 (ii) does not hold here since
we have non-quadratic cost functions. The boundary of the non-convex area
in which all three technologies are in the optimal mixture is indicated with the
dashed curves in Figure 4.4. These curves are obtained by performing a series
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of numerical experiments for a range of parameters vectors on and close to
the line segments Conv{α1, α2}, Conv{α1, α3}, and Conv{α2, α3}.
Figure 4.4: Optimal technology mixtures in case of cubic investment
cost functions.
Finally, we consider the functions κRk (x) = 2x
3
2 + κ̄Rk x, x ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, 3,




 , α2 =
 0.08490.1623
0.7528







 , α2,3 =
 0.34350.6565
0
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 , α2,1 =
 00.1774
0.8226




Using Theorem 4.8, we determine the areas for which a single renewable
technology is invested in. Again, we cannot apply Theorem 4.10 since our
functions are not quadratic. It can be checked that, for example, on the in-
terior of the line segment Conv{α1, α2} we have x∗R3 > 0. The areas where
two or three renewable technologies are in the mixture are separated by the
dashed curves, see Figure 4.5. Again, the curves are obtained using numerical
experiments.
Figure 4.5: Optimal technology mixtures in case of investment cost
functions of the form κRk (x) = 2x
3
2 + κ̄Rk x, k = 1, 2, 3.
Recall that, analytically, we can only partly characterize the equilibrium in
case we have non-quadratic investment cost functions; that is, we can fully
determine the areas in which only one renewable technology is in the optimal
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mixture and find line-segments such that on one side of a line segment a sec-
ond renewable technology enters. However, we cannot apply our theorems
to exactly determine the areas in which two or three renewable technologies
are in the optimal mixture. Using our numerical tools, we have seen that we
can keep track of the optimal mixtures for any choice of the parameter vec-
tors, regardless of the cost functions. These numerical tools thus supplement
the theoretical results in this chapter. Moreover, we can make a theoretical
generalization based on our observations. In particular, we find a class of in-
vestment cost functions for which we obtain a non-convex area similar to the
one in Figure 4.4 and a class of investment cost functions for which we obtain
a convex area similar to the one in Figure 4.5. We conclude by stating two
definitions and the theoretical result, and refer to the appendix for a formal
proof.
Definition 4.1. A function f (x) is superadditive if for any a, b in its domain we
have
f (a) + f (b) ≤ f (a + b).
Definition 4.2. A function f (x) is subadditive if for any a, b in its domain we
have
f (a) + f (b) ≥ f (a + b).
Theorem 4.13. Consider the MCP consisting of (4.17) at the first stage and (4.16) at
the second stage for every ω ∈ Ω and let KR = {1, 2, 3}. Assume that in order to get
a benchmark value for the feed-in tariffs, the regulator imposes a renewable obligation
(4.18) with φ ∈ (0, 1) on the first stage, along with the pricing scheme for the fixed
price feed-in policy (4.15). Choose i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3}.
Let α ∈ int Conv{αi, αj}, and let τ̄Rk = αkσ∗, k ∈ KR. Assume non-linear non-
quadratic convex investment cost functions for all three renewable technologies and
assume that the non-constant part of each cost function is the same and invertible.
In particular, assume that we can write κR
′
k (x) = κ̃(x) + κ̄
R
k , k ∈ KR, with κ̃(x)
an invertible non-decreasing function in x with κ̃(0) = 0 and κ̄Rk , k ∈ KR, positive
constants. Then the following statements hold at an equilibrium:
(i) If κ̃(x) superadditive and κ̃(1) ≤ 1, then x∗Rh = 0.
(ii) If κ̃(x) subadditive and κ̃(1) ≥ 1, then x∗Rh > 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Finally note that the cubic functions κRk (x) = 0.01x
3 + κ̄Rk x, k ∈ KR, satisfy the
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conditions in (i). For each {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3} we indeed have x∗Rh = 0 on the
interior of the line segment [αi, αj], see Figure 4.4. The functions κRk (x) = 2x
3
2 +
κ̄Rk x, k ∈ KR, satisfy the conditions in (ii), and for each {i, j, h} = {1, 2, 3} we
have a positive investment in technology h on the interior of the line segment
[αi, αj] as shown in Figure 4.5.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter addressed two instruments used for giving financial incentives
for promoting renewable electricity investments, namely renewable certifi-
cates and fixed feed-in tariffs. A theoretical drawback of feed-in tariffs is its
inability to satisfy certain targets on renewable electricity production in the
absence of an explicit obligation on the market.
We presented a mathematical framework and showed that in one partic-
ular case, that is when investment cost functions of renewable technologies
are linear, indeed a system of (fixed) feed-in tariffs only cannot guarantee
that a quota is met and either overshoots the target or does not meet the re-
quirement. Typically either one renewable technology receives more financial
support than its levelised cost, resulting in windfall profits and hence overin-
vestment, or none of the renewable technologies receives sufficient financial
support.
We then moved to non-linear convex investment cost functions and showed
that under the new assumptions renewable quota can be achieved using a
feed-in tariff without explicitly imposing an obligation on the market. Fur-
thermore, the mixture of renewable technologies satisfying the quota can be
determined through tariff differentiation by the regulator. We established
a number of theoretical results showing for which choices of feed-in tariffs
which technologies are in the optimal technology mixture. In case of more
than two renewable technologies and when cost functions are non-linear con-
vex and non-quadratic, our numerical tools proved capable of keeping track
of the optimal technology mixture corresponding to each choice of feed-in tar-
iffs. We thus provided both theoretical results and numerical tools helping an
environmental regulator in finding feed-in tariffs that, as long as cost func-
tions are non-linear convex, guarantee that a target on renewable electricity
production can be satisfied without explicitly imposing it on the market and
that, for up to three renewable technologies, can achieve any desired optimal
renewable technology mixture.
To an extent our results are applicable to other feed-in policies like the pre-
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mium price policy, the Dutch spot-market gap policy, and the Spanish cap and
floor policy. We leave this for further research.
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4.8 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.13
First recall that we have κ̄k = κR
′
k (0) = Eω[θk(ω)](z
i


















Using these two statements, we prove (i) and (ii).
(i) Since κ̃(x) is superadditive and invertible, its inverse κ̃−1(x) is subadditive.
Suppose x∗Rh > 0. This implies σ










































h) + (1− ψ)(zii + zij + zih)
 .











This contradicts Corollary 4.2. Hence, x∗Rh = 0.
(ii) Since κ̃(x) is subadditive and invertible, its inverse κ̃−1(x) is superaddi-
tive. Suppose x∗Rh = 0. This implies σ
∗ ≤ zih/αh. Furthermore, by Theorems
4.7 and 4.8 we know that more than one technology has a positive investment
quantity and hence x∗Ri > 0 and x
∗R
j > 0. Then using (4.17b) and (4.16b) we











































h) + (1− ψ)(zii + zij + zih)
 .








The strict inequality follows from the superadditivity of κ̃−1 and the fact that
both evaluation points are nonzero. We have a contradiction with Corollary
4.2. Hence, x∗Rh > 0. 2
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